


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THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COMMON GOOD

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CHAPTER II

SOME SOCIAL THEORIES AND THE ETHICAL PROBLEM

THESIS

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1936

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COMMON GOOD

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CHAPTER I

THE SOCIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL

To hopefully attack such a problem as the relation of the individual to the common good, it is necessary, at the outset, to attempt to arrive at some not wholly inadequate conception of the nature of the individual as he finds himself situated in society. It is not necessary that any detailed analysis of the self or the community should be attempted; but it is at least essential to possess some rough idea of each, which though not exhaustive, will be sufficiently adequate to discover some of the implications which are involved in the relation. It is sometimes said that a writer is entitled to define his subject-matter in any way he pleases, so long as he makes it perfectly clear with his definition, that he intends to adhere to what he has so defined. But, in the case of the individual and his relation to society, we are not entitled to proceed in this way; for we might arbitrarily either so define the individual in isolation from society that the two would have only an external relation, or we might so define the individual as altogether a social construct, that our problem would really vanish because the solution was shuffled in at the beginning. If a psychological analysis of the individual were to force us to accept his isolation from society as a fact, then we could only acknowledge his right to protect his 'privacy', 'liberties' and 'rights' against an alien though encompassing community. If, on

the other hand, a psychological analysis were to be accepted which made all the spiritual possessions, which the individual designated 'mine', merely the result of social forces flowing through him, then all we could do would be to point out the illusion of any form of 'individualism'. In either case there would be no ethical problem involved; for, in the first case, what is wholly alien cannot be that to which an individual owes any obligation; and, in the second case, no ethical questions can arise if the individual is completely described as part of society, and entirely fashioned by it.

The conception of the individual, which is best supported by metaphysical and psychological analysis, is contained in the proposition that the individual is distinguishable but not separable from society. In dealing with material things we are accustomed to think that what can be distinguished can, ipso facto, be also separated. But, however the case may be with regard to physical objects, the proposition that what is distinguishable is thereby separable, does not hold true of psychical entities. One mind can interpenetrate or overlap another as two circles with different centres may have part of their areas in common. An individual mind can contain what is common to a group, so that, in this sense, the part can include the whole; and yet the individual mind is distinguishable but not separable from the group, so long as the relation of the individual to the group is in question. One would find it impossible to put into con-

ceptual thought or language any intelligible answer to the question, what am I when I am only myself? To furnish any description of his individuality, the individual in question must needs express himself in terms of social relations, or relations with Nature, or perhaps with Deity: and the two latter have their social implications.

Furthermore, the individual thinks of these terms in which he finds it necessary to describe himself, not as alien to himself, but as one with himself in his 'unity of consciousness'; and yet he does, as a matter of fact, distinguish himself as an individual - the 'I' am 'I' - from the society from which he is inseparable. What one often thinks of as a real separation is only a thought-of separation, expressed in language, and therefore only a distinction within a continuum. We are familiar with the device of pedagogics in separating the branches of knowledge taught at a University; but, in reality, these so-called separations are only distinctions within a whole of knowledge. From the point of view of a wide philosophic knowledge, we can distinguish but not entirely separate, one subject from another. In an analogous way the individual is to be conceived as not separable from society, but as projecting himself into and being interpenetrated by it. The individual, then, is the place where two orders of being meet and join, so as to be distinguishable but not separable. This paradoxical nature of the individual is fundamental for social ethics, because, in the individual, there meet and join the world of the community with its

traditions, laws, arts, sciences, and the innumerable contacts with the other individuals who compose it, and the inner world of the individual's individuality.

If it can be maintained - as I think it can - that all philosophies contain in themselves an aspect of the truth awaiting a larger synthesis, then a synoptic view of the history of philosophy would seem to point to the fact that the individual is distinguishable but not separable from wider structures in which 'he lives and moves and has his being'. Professor G. P. Adams has pointed out, in his 'Idealism and the Modern Age', that theories of the self may be divided into theories of 'appropriation' and 'activist' theories. The activist theories look at the self from within, regarded as a centre of energy, a seat of action, the home of creativity. The theories of appropriation, on the other hand, regard the self as having its centre of gravity, so to speak, in either ideal structures, or in the factual structures of society. Now one aspect of the self, and now another, is seized upon by the different systems of philosophy. The Platonic tradition, in the main, interpreted the self as deriving its significance from participation in ideal structures, so that its central point fell within that in which it participated. We find both the 'appropriative' and the 'activist' theories of the self in the Pauline theology. The appropriative theory is emphasized when Paul speaks of the individual Christian as deriving his significance from participation in the

wider structure, which he expressed as being 'in Christ'. Paul emphasizes the 'activist' theory when he speaks of the Christian as 'working out his own salvation with fear and trembling'. We may say that both Platonism and early Christian theology strongly emphasize the contemplative, 'appropriative' theories of the individual self - although the 'activist' theory is not overlooked. Perhaps the greater emphasis is laid upon the 'appropriative' theory of the self in the writings of both Plato and Paul.

On the other hand, many systems of thought have allowed the emphasis to fall upon the notion of the self as an active and creative agent. It is a far cry from primitive Animism to Berkeley and Kant, and onwards to the Pragmatists and Activists; but they all have this much in common that they emphasize 'activist' theories of the self rather than 'appropriative' ones. It is a familiar fact that Kant claimed that the activity of the individual's 'good will' was the only thing which was good in itself, making ethics a concern, primarily, of the will of the individual abstracted from the concerns of society, which were handed over to 'legality'. That the history of philosophy contains metaphysical interpretations of the self which have emphasized either the appropriative or the activist theories of the self, makes it presumptive that we should look for any adequate interpretation in a synthesis of the two theories. The conception of a distinguishable but not separable self seems to point in the

direction of a necessary synthesis, for it stands for the indubitable fact that the self cannot be regarded as nothing but a private fount of activity, or nothing but a cistern filled with appropriations from society. And it is only as a self is conceived of as participating in and contributing to the life of a community of selves, that both its appropriative and activist proclivities can receive satisfaction. On the one hand, the self reaches out for the ideas which lie 'outside' itself, embodied in language, and appropriates the life of a community and of other individuals which it did not create; while, on the other hand, from within, the self, by the aid of the very language which it has appropriated, and standing within the social conditions which it falls heir to, makes a difference by its own active contribution, to the society of which it is a part.

Professor W. E. Hocking defines a human self as "a process of intercourse with reality: it is a continuous activity of judging things in the light of a system of standards, one's own standards."¹ Whatever that system of standards may be, it is appropriated as his own by the activity of the individual: "it is my standard, and whoever criticises my standard criticises me." But these standards, if they are not to be subjective, require to be checked and validated by a reference to standards prevailing in the group to which the individual belongs. A lunatic,

who lives in a world of his own standards, certainly expresses the activity aspect of an individual, and achieves a greater 'integration' of himself than many who are sane; but the integration is achieved by severing the agreement of his standards with those prevailing in his group. The price of living in association with others is the achieving of some agreement of one's own standards with those acknowledged in one's particular community. Those standards which have been formed by many individuals, and through much experimentation in the past, are distinguishable from the activity of the single individual; but a mature individual, or one developing within a community, cannot be totally separable from them. Even before an individual has made those standards his own, they are beginning to be impressed upon him, consciously and unconsciously, by the action of the community. It is apparent that an individual, learning from childhood to take his place in the community, cannot, so long as that process is going on, be separated from what he is becoming in virtue of his gradual appropriation of the standards of his community. As the subject of that process, he is distinguishable at all stages of his growth: distinguishable at a lower level, before he has appropriated the standards; distinguishable, perhaps, at a higher level, after he has appropriated the standards and sets out to raise the common standards in the light of an ideal. But even such an ideal, in the mind - for example - of a genius who strives to heighten the standards, must meet and join with the prevailing standards.

Even the prophetic soul, who sees further than his fellows, must realize, as he seeks to graft the new limb on to the old stock of society, that the new and the old must be distinguishable and not separable.

I have dwelt, at some length, upon the fact of the distinction without separation of the individual from society because it is fundamental to the social interpretation of the individual. On the one hand, it is necessary to avoid the fallacious concept of the isolated individual who is thought of as in, but not permeated by, social forces; and, on the other hand, it is equally necessary to avoid the fallacious concept of an individual regarded as deriving all his being from social forces. Both conceptions - it would seem - are equally unsound. To avoid these errors, the facts seem to warrant the making of a distinction without a separation between the individual in himself and the social forces at work in his being. The temptation however is always present to convert the distinction into a separation; for it is easy to have one set of facts in sight which seem to point to the self as independent of society, while another set of facts is ignored which would show that he cannot be so separated. The error of the extreme 'collectivist' theory is that it attempts to make individuality entirely a product of society. As we have already noticed, society contributes very largely to self-consciousness - so largely that the very language by means of which the self makes itself audible is a product of society, for language must have arisen from individuals

acting in concert. From this, and kindred facts, some have drawn the conclusion that individuality is nothing but the voice of society sounding in its several members. The collectivist - as for want of a better name we may designate one who believes that the individual is altogether a social product - does not distinguish the individual and his interests from society except in a quantitative manner.

A good example of the 'collectivist' theory of the individual may be found in the writings of Emile Durkheim (1858 - 1917). Durkheim and his followers argue that individual minds are nothing more than empty moulds: the only thing which distinguishes an individual from identity with his group is the 'representation' which is present to his mind of his mechanical and organic state - that is a consciousness of the 'mould'. Otherwise, all that there is in an individual is his knowledge of the collective 'representations', presented to him by his community with coercing force. Durkheim even goes to the length of thinking that categories are the forms which certain collective representations impose upon individual

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"The representation is something new, to produce which certain characters of the brain-cells have of course contributed, but to the constitution of which they are not adequate, since it survives them and manifests different properties." - "Representations individuelles et representations collectives." p.293

minds. For example, he believes that the notion of succession has been derived from the periodicity of religious rites in primitive communities. In criticism of this, William Ray Dennes makes the pertinent remark that the theory is ridiculous, for it is "only by the mind's perceiving the data in the form of succession that the periodicity of religious rites could have been known at all".³

Any collective theory of the self, such as Durkheim's, which accounts for the social individual wholly in terms of social forces, appears to be an ultra-simplification which leaves out everything in the structure of the individual which distinguishes him from society. As a matter of fact, Durkheim is not interested to make any attempt to distinguish the individual from a mere product of social forces, for any acknowledged creativity on the part of the individual would dislocate his theory which demands other premisses. Durkheim commits himself to the following statement:—"In order to understand the way in which society represents itself and the world surrounding it, it is necessary to consider the nature of society and not that of individuals."⁴ It is not necessary, at this point, to enter into any discussion of Durkheim's theory of group psychology,

³ "The Method and Presuppositions of Group Psychology", University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. 6. p.39

⁴ "Les regles de la methode sociologique." Ed. 2 pref. p. 16

but it may be pertinent to say that he seems to sacrifice any adequate account of the individual, as distinguishable from society, to the interests of his general theory. Durkheim is content to leave the individual as a vague social construct, for the individual is not regarded by him as the foundational factor to be taken into consideration in social studies. But the distinguishable individual ought not to be so overlooked simply because he does not easily fit in with a positive science of society such as Durkheim's treatment claims to be. More will be said of Durkheim's theory in the next chapter: suffice it now to say that society is surely exalted unduly by him when it is made to swallow and digest the individual so that the latter is no longer distinguishable from 'collective representations'.

Especially from the ethical point of view, the individual, as the pronouncer of moral judgments, even upon society itself, cannot be reduced to a mere social product. "In the end, right and wrong are my conceptions, not society's; otherwise moral initiative would be impossible.... If, when I think, it is society that thinks in me, then there is no thought and no society."⁵ If there be no individual distinguishable though not separable from society, we are forced to close the gates against the possibility of any ethical

⁵ "Man and the State" by W. E. Hocking, p.p. 236, 7.

inquiry, but, furthermore, no way is left open, in such a conception of the individual, to account for the rise of innovators and men of genius. In short, if man has his roots wholly in society, if he derives all that he is from it, how can anything more come out of society than is already in it? We are faced then with Bergson's problem which he has discussed in his "The Two Sources of Morality and Religion", namely, how can there be any real progress if every member of society is in a closed system which dictates the whole pattern of his being? "Society" - as Santyana saw - "is like the air, necessary to breathe, but insufficient to live on".

The fact that an individual has entered into relation with society to share the life of his group does not mean that he cannot, as an individual, be distinguished from a mere creature of the customs of that group with which he is indissolubly linked. It is a non sequitur that the group, and the group alone, supplies him with all his thoughts, his motives, and his very conscience. It does not necessarily follow from the fact that an individual is always found in relation to society that he therefore derives all which constitutes his individuality therefrom. An individual cannot be shaken loose from society and treated as a Robinson Crusoe or a St Simon Stylites on his pillar; but the fact that he cannot be separated surely does not foredoom him to be only the echo of the society of which he is part. Of that society he is still a significant part, having a distinct contribution of his own

to make, and counting for something on his own account.

Individualism claims - and I think rightly - that every man has his own autonomy, his own inner spring of being. However we may attempt to explain the phenomenon, it still remains a fact of history that certain individuals have drawn 'from out a boundless deep' ideas which have ever since fed the life of the world. They have tapped wells of inspiration lying deeper than the closed cisterns of social custom. And what is true of the great recorded souls - Plato, Shakespeare, Goethe and the rest - is, in a measure, true of all who are, in any significant sense, individuals. No philosophy has ever plumbed the depths of the mystery which lies in the hinterland of the individual's being; but, when the individual comes back with his treasure, he, and his work, are incorporated into society, so that he forms a distinguishable but not separable part of the whole.

An individual, who is to be so distinguished from society, becomes articulate through his work which is the expression of his individuality. Now, whatever may be the complex inspirations of that work, no individual can maintain truthfully that those inspirations have come to him as an isolated being, sundered from society. He can never, indeed, go back and build the creations of his own individuality as if nobody had been upon the field before him and as if he were not encompassed about with witnesses. An individual has always to say 'I am debtor': in debt not merely to the light which shines for him as one to be distinguished

from his fellows, but in debt also to society on whose shoulders he stands. And, when he has produced his work, he must get it approved or condemned by a society of judges who will uphold or veto his work. The work is the individual's; the judgment is the individual's; but, as a member of society, he must submit his work to the evaluation of others, and his judgment to the judgment of others. If the fallacy of the extreme collectivist is that the individual and his expression are totally social products, the fallacy of the extreme individualist is the notion that he can dispense with the requirement that he is, after all, inseparably bound to society. Says W. E. Hocking, "I dare say no self-appreciation is so robust as to persist permanently in defiance of the best available other judgment. Montesquieu rose to a sublime height when he disregarded the unfavorable opinion of the two best judges in Europe, and printed *L'Esprit des Lois*. But Montesquieu's assurance of the worth of his performance was a deduction from the premisses of worth which he had built up through years of lively intercourse with just such critics. It is possible for society to develop in its finest with the value-premisses by which they are able to defy its own temporary and particular appreciation: more than this, the aim of all its education is to confirm individual selves in a competent independent judgment which is essentially their own. But, since a man's work is the action of his judgment for society and upon society, any appeal from a present public in its behalf is an appeal to another and wiser public, not from every

possible public."⁶

I am concerned to safeguard both the social and the autonomous aspects of the individual as he appears in society. As a matter of fact, the only individual with whom we are concerned, or can be concerned, is the individual as he has appeared in historical societies. The individual with whom we are concerned is the individual who actually lived in his tribe or nation, in his Athens or Rome, or in his San Francisco or London of modern times. We are not concerned with the possible status of a supposititious individual who might abstractly be conceived of as existing outside all social relations. If it were possible, as it is not, to find an individual living independently, separated from all vital contact with his kind - Rousseau's 'natural man' for example - it would not be necessary to deny to him all individuality: such an individual would conceivably have other relations - to Nature, to a notion of Deity - but he would exist only in the fiction of imagination, and not in the world where all individuals we have known have appeared. Moreover, we could not carry forward the notion of entire separation, applied to such a fictitious individual, and preserve it as an adequate description of an individual as he was thought of as forming himself into a member of society. Directly an individual enters into social relations, the hypothesis of a separable individual must be

modified to that of a distinguishable but not separable individual. The grain of truth that there is in Rousseau's theory of the 'natural man' lies in the fact that the 'independence' of the individual in question must be preserved as the distinguishing mark of an individual in society, not the mark of his entire separation from society. The fictitious element in Rousseau's doctrine of the 'natural man' is not his attributing to the individual an innate freedom, his right to be an 'end in himself' - as Kant would say - but it lies in the notion that an individual can ever, except in abstract thought, be so isolated from his kind. Rousseau is quite justified in assuming, for the purpose of his argument, a 'natural man' endowed with the love of liberty as a basic quality which the 'contract' must preserve and honor. In the sense that the 'natural man' is that basic part of the individual which claims to be free, he is no fiction: he is indeed a persistent constituent of our individuality which must be preserved in association with our fellows, as it was supposed to exist apart from that association. It is this indubitable fact which enabled the late Professor W. R. Boyce Gibson to write, "The natural man, as an individual and as the focus for freedom and the love of it, is not a mere logical abstraction, a residuum of individualistic analysis, but a very palpable fact to which justice must be done in any attempt to bring together the principles of political right. An individual that has no social relations running through him is no doubt a psychological fiction,

but Rousseau's individual may be the centre of many social relations without his ceasing to be, from the ethical and political standpoint, a natural man.... We may then conceive (my italics) an individual's living in a social tissue in which the relations are of this external order. As individuals they will not be abstractions. They will be Egos. As Egos they will have such freedom as belongs to the individuality as such, a freedom not to be bartered away without forfeiting all individuality. To such the first glimpse of the universal may come through a deepening of their own individual centre of vision, through a sentiment interne which discloses, to the feeling at any rate, the presence within the soul of a supra-individual order... We have good reason to assume that this was Rousseau's real meaning. But it will not be more than part of his meaning as a political thinker, for it only partially explains the political problem he has in mind. For the full conception and solution of that problem the start must be made not from the single individual, but from the association of individuals. For the problem concerns social relations, originally external, of members of a group to one another, and the regulation of those in such a way as to promote a moral and rational order, the kind of civilization suitable to an ideal State... The problem is, how can the individual members of a group live together in political unity without sacrificing their individual freedom?"⁷

⁷ "The Political Philosophy of J. J. Rousseau" by W. R. Boyce Gibson. The Australian Journal of Psy. and Philos. Vol. 6 p.p. 168,9.

Although the artificiality of Rousseau's treatment is apparent, yet he is dealing with a very real problem, namely the relation of an individual, possessed of an innate right to freedom, to a society with which he must be linked, yet in such a way as not to rob him of his freedom. Into such a relation, which only by a device of speculation can be an external one, the individual is plunged (not necessarily by any social 'contract'); and the point to be always remembered is that, in the relation (as well as theoretically out of the relation) he still remains a liberty loving individual - an end in himself. But, only theoretically, can he be conceived of as out of the relation to society and so separable. Under actual conditions, he is still the liberty loving individual, inseparable from society, but still retaining the love of liberty and the claim to be an end in himself - which is the fact that distinguishes him from society. And the individual, with whom we are always dealing in ethical problems, is the composite individual, a compound of social forces and the 'natural man', who, however fictitious he may be historically, is not so as one of the components of the social interpretation of the individual.

CHAPTER II

SOME SOCIAL THEORIES AND THE SUBMERGED INDIVIDUAL

If we now regard the relation which we have been discussing, from the side of the community rather than that of the individual, must we not also admit that the community is distinguishable but not separable from the individuals of whom it is composed? We have maintained that the individual is to be distinguished but not separated from society; we now maintain that society is to be distinguished but not separated from the individual. But, approaching the relation from the side of society, we see that the same temptation is present as confronted us when we approached the relation from the side of the individual, namely to convert what can be distinguished into what must be separated. Just as the planets became separated from the sun to pursue each its own independent orbit, so social structures have often been thought of as achieving an independence by which they follow 'laws' of their own, cut loose from the individuals from whom they originally drew their life. But the same arguments, which have been used in the preceding chapter to show the impossibility of separating the individual from society, apply to the attempt to sever society from the individual. Society, isolated and abstracted from its members, is surely as impossible a conception as that of a wholly isolated individual. Social structures develop vast proportions, permeated not only with ration-

ality but with much illogicality - as Pareto has pointed out in his monumental work - but the truth remains that originally, and in the course of their development, they have been, and are, dependent upon the activity of individuals. Ezekiel described one of the creatures of his vision as "having, underneath the wings on the four sides, the hands of a man"¹. The wings were held aloft by human hands. This is true of all human societies: the 'hands' of individuals have created the 'wings' of society, which would collapse save for the 'hands' of the living individuals and the innumerable unremembered dead.

A social structure begins directly there is an interaction of two individual minds. Marriage and friendship are social structures composed of the relationship of two individuals. Nicolai Hartmann notes that, when reciprocity of two individuals takes place, there occurs a synthesis which is never fulfilled in the conduct of one person, an interpersonal synthesis which embraces in its unity not only two values but also two carriers of values. This phenomenon Hartmann refers to as "an ethically real structure of a higher order, which as a union of two dispositions bears a unique, a higher and more complex value,² a value which cannot be resolved into its constituents." These complementary relationships lie at the root of those

¹ Ezekiel 1.8.

² "Ethics", by Nicolai Hartmann, p. 422

vast social structures which man has built up. But, notwithstanding all the vastness and intricacy which these structures have assumed, we must insist that they are still distinguishable but not separable from the underlying and basic individuals. In the simple complementary relationships of friendship and family, a man's individuality is not surrendered to a higher synthesis which thereby takes the place of his individuality, but that individuality is enhanced by the association of several individuals to create more satisfactory contents for the individuality of each. And so it is with regard to the wider complementary relationships of the innumerable groups, the nation, and society at large. As society grows, there are also formed oppositional relationships between groups and groups, nations and nations, rifts between individuals and the common good, conflicts between 'values' and 'values'; but the fact remains that the complementary relationships hold society together, and even the oppositional relationships become a basis for a wider synthesis. "The moral work of the world can be carried out slowly and surely through the permeating influence of complementary relationships, in the face of all the irresoluble conflicts of human beings..."³

But the point to which I wish to return is

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 Essay on "The Ethics of Nicolai Hartmann" by W. R. Boyce Gibson, in the "Australian Journal of Psy. and Philos."
 Vol. 12. p. 61

that the individual must not be thought of as submerged beneath a tissue of relationships, but rather as capable of achieving greater individuality by means of them. This is Hartmann's major conviction, stated in the concluding words of his first volume on Ethics, that "the moral being is not the Absolute nor the State nor anything else in the world, but singly and alone, man, the primal carrier of moral values and disvalues". And by this statement Hartmann means that the individual, living in the midst of these social structures, is to be served by them, rather than absorbed by them, and that the individual alone is able to pass a valuational judgment upon them. Hartmann is correct, I believe, in insisting that neither the network of complementary and oppositional relationships found in society, nor even God for that matter, can submerge the individual as the unique ethical unit.

However, in the speculations of certain sociologists and so-called 'group' psychologists, there is certainly a tendency to allow the individual to be smothered beneath the massive superstructures of customs and laws which untold generations of men have reared. Man, as an individual who can 'call his soul his own' is ignored and submerged beneath the 'mighty Babylon' he has built up. Much of the speculations of sociologists is based, from the outset, upon an inadequate psychological analysis of the individual. It is indeed more than doubtful if general psychology, obsessed as it has been with the method of the natural sciences which relates particulars to

classes, is able to do justice to what is characteristic of the individual. Science rejects variety for the sake of uniformity, and offers us quantitative results in terms of that which can be measured: for example, light, sound, and heat are all reduced to terms of motion, but what is characteristic of human experience of colors, sounds and degrees of heat and cold, is thereby abstracted for the sake of a principle of uniformity. Psychologists base their methods upon those of natural science, but how in the world can we ever arrive at that which is characteristic of an individual if an individual is simply thought of, as in William McDougall's psychology, in terms of an example of the class of beings which are uniformly characterized by the possession of a certain number of instincts? In the light of the attempt which general psychology usually makes, by trimming away the differences of individuals to arrive at a uniformity scientifically manageable, we may perhaps understand how Nicolai Hartmann with his 'as many values as there are persons', holds psychology in contempt. We do not rise to his defence, but merely suggest certain limitations of general psychology, which many psychologists themselves would be the first to recognize. Doubtless, psychology has done some very valuable work in setting forth the laws of certain phenomena discoverable in the body-mind; but general psychology shows itself to be inadequate when it is assumed (as by William McDougall) to be a sufficient basis for an explanation of social structures. McDougall says, in his *Introduction to Social Psychology*, that his aim is

"to show how, given the native propensities and capacities of the individual mind, all the complex mental life of societies is shaped by them and in turn reacts upon the course of their development and operation in the individual."⁴ As these "native propensities and capacities of the individual mind" are assumed to be innately uniform at the start, it is certainly impossible to see how anything save a flatly uniform society will ever be evolved from them. On this basis, the real individuality of individuals is surrendered, and also no explanation can be offered to account for the real individuality of varying societies. How could one explain, on this basis, the varying cultures and civilizations of the world, the differences which exist between the civilizations of, say, China and the United States, or the cultures of Greece and of Egypt? It is palpably impossible to reduce society, and especially the differences between societies, to the sole instrumentality of a certain number of instincts uniformly resident in all individuals. If injustice be done to a certain uniqueness that is characteristic of individuals as distinguishable from society, it will at last be impossible to do justice to the uniqueness of the society from which the individuals cannot be separated. John Dewey certainly has grounds for inquiring "why the novelist and the dramatist

⁴ "Introduction to Social Psychology" by W. McDougall, p. 6

are so much more illuminating as well as more interesting commentators on conduct than the schematising psychologist".⁵

The reason, of course, is that novelists and dramatists do not allow the individual to lose his individuality by becoming merely a unit in a classificatory scheme: they model, even their fiction, upon real individuals in real societies. The psychologists and sociologists who submerge the individual are victims of their own methodology, or rather - to use a word which has been coined - their own methodolatry. Every study requires its own methodology; and one is suspicious that the methodology, so successfully followed in the natural sciences, is not the methodology which will be successful in the social sciences.

Gabriel Tarde (1843 - 1904) has fallen into the error of trying to account for the social phenomena on the basis of one instinct alone - imitation. By this method, I should judge, he has debarred himself from giving any adequate interpretation of social structures, especially in their modern complexity. Nevertheless, he has at least attempted to rescue the individual from being totally submerged. He says, "Heterogeneity and not homogeneity is at the heart of things. What is less like the truth or more absurd than the supposition of innumerable elements co-eternally similar? Things are not born similar, they become similar. And except for the innate diversity of the elements, what explanation can be given for their dif-

⁵ "Human Nature and Conduct" by John Dewey, p.155

ferences?"⁶ While Tarde's theory seems to be an untenable over-simplification of the facts, he has at least left the door open for the fundamental requirement of social ethics, namely that an individual may, even in an infinitesimal measure, offer his contribution to the betterment of society. But, with Tarde, when inventions have been hit upon, and customs instituted, by the originitative capacity of human beings responding to certain fundamental needs, the innate differences of individuals are swamped by the instinct of imitation. The imitative instinct gets the upper hand over that which is unique in individuals, so that society is run into certain fixed channels. Less and less, it would seem, as the needs of mankind have been met in what are regarded as satisfactory ways, is there left room for new ventures of individuality; and more and more does man become an imitator of what already exists. It appears to me that Tarde has worked the imitative instinct to death in taking it to be the sole factor by means of which social structures may be explained. In our modern forms of society there are, of course, large areas where we find it convenient to imitate or appropriate what lies at hand; but, on the other hand, the verdict of history is that the active or creative aspect of the individual has increased. Man does not cease to be an experimenter and initiator, because,

⁶ "Les lois de l'imitation" by Gabriel Tarde, p.80

in other respects, he is an imitator.

Emile Durkheim(1858 - 1917) feels that he is able to proceed with his analysis of social phenomena without any recourse to individuals as psychic beings in their own right. William Ray Dennes has briefly summarized the psychology of the individual, from which Durkheim sets out, as follows:- "Durkheim asserts that so soon as a sensation appears as complete its formative dependence upon and connection with cerebral states ceases. It proceeds to compound itself with other existing sensations to form an image or images, in a manner impossible to explain in terms of cerebral physiology alone. The passage from sensation to image bridges the gulf between physio-psychic and the purely psychic orders of reality, for Durkheim supposes images to be 'purely psychic'. Images are taken as compounding to form what Durkheim calls concepts, and concepts as compounding to form representations, and both of these processes are contended to be of a nature not neural but psychic. Durkheim holds that representations, once they are formed, persist as such and not as the mere correlates of the cerebral cell-patterns which William James considered as comprising the basis of memory."⁷ These representations, which form the main content of an individual's mind, combine to form what Durkheim calls 'collective representations'. It is necessary that indiv-

individual minds be present in the form of a group before these collective representations can be formed and interact; but these latter are dependent upon the individual minds only as the raw material from which they have sprung. "Collective representations are exterior to individual minds because they are derived, not from the individuals taken in isolation, but from their convergence and combination... Doubtless in the development of the common result each individual has his part to play. But private sentiments do not become social except by combining under the action of those forces sui generis which association develops."⁸ It seems, then, that for Durkheim, the structure of society is composed of a tissue of these collective representations, which have broken loose from their original moorings, where each once was a representation in some individual mind, and escaped into an external psychic stratosphere. But, as the air presses upon the earth fifteen pounds to the square inch, so in an analogous way, the collective representations - in other words, the social mind - exert an external pressure upon individuals. These latter are submerged beneath the weight of the social forces which originally had their genesis in the cerebral processes of individuals massed together in the 'horde' which Durkheim takes to be the ultimate social unit. In order to obtain an explanation of social facts, Durkheim insists that they must be studied objectively, as

⁸ "Representations individuelles et representations collectives" by Emile Durkheim, p. 293.

is the case with the 'objects' of natural science. Durkheim proposes three principles for the understanding of social phenomena as follow:-⁹

1. The determining causes of a social fact must be sought among antecedent social facts, and not among the states of the individual mind.
2. The function of a social fact should always be sought in the relation which it sustains to some social end.
3. The first origin of every social process of any importance must be sought in the constitution of the internal social milieu.

The social milieu referred to consists of the body of culture, tradition and laws, which has been stored within the society from the past, and, in the second place, persons. But, it is significant for our purpose in referring to Durkheim's theory as one that submerges the individual, that the importance of persons for society consists in only two things, namely how numerous they are, and, secondly, the degree of their concentration in physical proximity. The more individuals there are in any society, the more representations; and the greater the coalescence of the individuals, the more intense the force of the collective representations which form the social mind.

The submergence of the individual in Durkheim's theory seems to be accounted for, in the main, by three factors: first, his inadequate psychology of the individual,

⁹ "Les regles de la methode sociologique" by E. Durkheim, p. 135

secondly, his refusal to admit any category of teleology into his system, and lastly, his view that the individual is coerced by society from without. To deal with the last first: Durkheim considers that the origin of social phenomena must lie outside the individual because he is coerced by these phenomena. But surely it is not a necessary conclusion that the individual can have no hand in building up that which coerces him, and that it must needs be external. He may, for example, as he actually does, hand over the right to use force to the State which he has built up and of which he is a member. Perhaps the first two factors which I have named ought to be reduced to one, for Durkheim's inadequate psychology of the individual consists, very largely, in his refusal to attribute to him any category of purpose; and this is reflected in the subsequent treatment of social phenomena. Both his treatment of the individual and that of social structures are, it would seem, determined by his avowed method of submitting them to scientific treatment, according to the methods of natural science. In Durkheim's 'individual representations', and therefore in his 'collective representations', there is no room for any purposive activity; but to omit purpose is to omit that which is most characteristic of an individual, especially as he becomes conscious of himself as a person actively striving after ideals. To be faithful to his method, Durkheim must also reject the notion that social structures have any goal, any far off event, towards which they move. Hence he writes: "When one undertakes to explain a social phenomenon, it is necessary to

investigate separately the efficient cause which produces it and the function which it fulfils. We shall use the idea of function in preference to that of end or purpose precisely because social phenomena generally do not exist with a view to the useful results which they produce... Questions of intention are too subjective to admit of scientific treatment."¹⁰ But it does not seem to be a fair nor an adequate method of treatment to neglect questions of intention, which lie at the very heart of individuality, and which would surely be reflected in society in some way, simply because they do not 'admit of scientific treatment'. However, this method of treatment is sacrosanct for Durkheim, although it issues in the submergence of the individual in a purposeless society. Not admitting purpose, Durkheim cannot admit that the study of social phenomena involves any ethical issues; and yet, even he, has a principle by which better and worse states of society may be distinguished. That principle is the principle of 'normality', for the application of which he has certain suggestions which need not be entered into here. Just as we can say, without involving any ethical connotation of the 'ought', that bodies ought to behave in a certain way when subject to the law of gravitation, so there are certain ways

in which societies 'ought' normally to conduct themselves. But, of course, this kind of argument merely reduces what generally is to what ought to be, and is tantamount to ruling out any ethical considerations whatever. Similarly, Durkheim's system has not, and cannot have, without being wrecked entirely, any place for canons of value. The difference between a courageous and self-sacrificing act, and one that is cowardly and ignoble, simply does not come within the purview of Durkheim's system. I would therefore submit that such a system is not true to the real facts of the lives of individuals nor of societies; and, such being the case, it is based upon artificialities which are assumed for the sake of the method employed. The artificiality of Durkheim's system has largely come about through his attributing to social phenomena a separate existence, achieved by combinations among themselves, apart from the interpenetrating life of individuals. We have in Durkheim a good example of the submergence of the individual, consequent upon abstract metaphysical construction, which arises when the principle that society is distinguishable but not separable from the individual, is ignored.

Vilfredo Pareto published, in 1916, an enormous work of eighteen hundred pages - the *Traité de Sociologie Générale* - in which he also attempted to apply the method of natural science to the study of society. On the occasion of his Jubilee at Lausanne he said: "The principal end of my studies has been to apply to the social sciences, of which economics is only a part, the experimental me-

thod which has given such brilliant results in the natural sciences." Pareto recognizes that man is largely an illogical animal, and that consequently the larger part of man's communal life is shot through with irrationality. But that fact does not deter Pareto from making the attempt to describe man's social life according to the method of the natural sciences. Pareto does not begin, like McDougall, with certain basic instincts, nor, like Durkheim, with certain metaphysical presuppositions, but he endeavors to discover uniformities among the heterogeneous mass of man's myriad social customs, in so far as they can be studied objectively. To the underlying uniformities or 'sentiments', which he thinks he has succeeded in isolating, Pareto has given the name 'Residues'. The Residues, of course, are not to be thought of as entities, but are to be conceived of as abstractions in the field of social phenomena, in an analogous sense to that in which 'heat', 'force', 'weight', are abstractions in the field of physics. Pareto tentatively abstracts, from the vast range of social facts, six of these uniform sentiments or Residues, which he holds as adequate to describe the myriad modes of social behavior. They are: "Residues in which the 'instinct of combinations' is manifested; Residues which show the persistence of aggregates; Residues which express the need of manifesting one's sentiments on an individual or collective basis; the Residues related to sociability; Residues of the integrity of the individual and of his belongings

and affairs;and the sexual Residue."¹¹ The most important Residues in maintaining the social equilibrium,are the instinct for combinations ("the sentiment that by means of certain practices the integrity of the individual,which has been damaged by certain real or imaginary causes, may be reestablished" - Henderson) and the persistence of aggregates (such for example as patriotism). From the point of view of our study of the individual and the common good,it is significant to note that Pareto maintains that nothing can be done to alter the Residues. They are uniform and constant sentiments always at work in society. Pareto,however,concedes that the art of government lies in skilfully utilizing these Residues;and we may presume that the door is left open also for human progress to be accomplished by means of ethical endeavor,which may,through governmental or other institutions,intelligently work with these Residues and within their limits. So that it would seem the Residues may supply an insight into the general structure of society,which an individual may utilize in his ethical effort. The individual is not submerged by these Residues,but they do supply,according to Pareto,limits beyond which no alterations can be effected. Pareto,in common with Durkheim,finds no place for

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List taken from an article by Bernard De Voto in Harpers Magazine,October 1933. I am largely indebted to this article for the above remarks on Pareto

the concept of purpose in his analysis of society. He strives to free himself from the notion held by Comte, Spencer, Marx and others, that there is some far off, more or less divine event, towards which society moves. Comte related social events to the teleological concept of progress, Spence^r to evolution, and Marx to economic determinism; but Pareto banishes from his system any teleological concept whatsoever, and any direct use of the category of cause and effect. He uses instead the concept, so well known in physics, of the equilibrium of forces. He conceives of society as subject to certain pressures of all kinds, pressures which call forth a contrary pressure. Contrary pressures may fail against the pressure of society, so that society will again assert itself at its former level; or they may succeed, so that society is forced to find a new equilibrium.

Pareto may, I think, be criticized for his disregard of the concept of purpose, although society, as distinguished from the individuals of whom it is composed, may fittingly enough be conceived of as a play of forces which push and pull while maintaining an equilibrium. But that very equilibrium is composed of the pressures which are, or have been, exerted by individuals which are not separate from society. The equilibrium, I would maintain, is an equilibrium of the purposive activities of individuals associated together in society. Even if we refuse to endow society with a will of its own apart from that of the individuals, preferring the term equilibrium, yet the

equilibrium is itself, at bottom, a balance of that which is characteristic of individuals, namely their purposive activity. However illogical may have been and are the customs of men, yet their very illogicality cannot be conceived of as apart from purpose. The Residues themselves are not outside the realm of purpose, however illogical their expression. Take, for example, the first Residue expressed in 'combinations' which are seen in rites of baptism, taboos, rainmaking &c. Here the illogicality as to the efficacy of 'combinations' lies in the method pursued: the purpose which lies behind their illogicality is clear enough. To deny that society is self-conscious of any 'far off divine event' or to deny that its purposiveness can be conceived of in terms of progress or economic determinism or what not, is one thing; to deny that the purposiveness of men, which may vary from age to age, and may be admitted to be fairly short-sighted, is not in some way reflected in the equilibrium of society - is another thing. Purposiveness is a concept that cannot be dispensed with in ethics. Ethics may freely grant that society does not in some magical way direct itself; but neither does society, in some equally magical way, keep itself in equilibrium apart from the purposive activity of individuals.

Bernard De Voto, commenting upon Pareto's contribution to social studies, remarks, "Social thinkers have necessarily been social philosophers, not scientists, and though philosophy may inspire emotion, it does not

produce knowledge. The work of Pareto is designed to make possible scientific knowledge of social phenomena....The wishful, the hopeful, and the evangelical will be certain to oppose him with all the devices of propaganda and obscurantism. Yet metaphysical thinking has been slowly crowded out of the physical sciences, and we may expect the social sciences to follow the same course." De Voto makes the assumption here that there is only one way of approaching social phenomena as related to individuals: the way which Pareto declared had been so successful in the natural sciences. But this is to overlook the difference between a descriptive and a normative science. After descriptive social science has described and classified its material, there are still left the questions of value, the problems of the better and the worse. Now, what 'ought to be' is never derivable merely from the 'is', but, on the contrary, the 'is' receives its value or disvalue from the 'ought'. No social studies, carried on purely by the method of the natural sciences, are able to deal with the comparative values of the material handled; and, furthermore, they must abstract from the uniqueness of the individual, for they deal only with uniformities. The phenomena of religion, for example, might be studied by the classificatory method of the natural sciences, but, as Rudolph Eucken has pointed

out, when the actual experience of religion is to be studied, a different set of categories is required from that which is used in natural science. And likewise, for the study of society from the ethical point of view at any rate, a method of valuation is needed, or the worth of the individual will be ignored, and one type of society will be as good as another.

In discussing the nature of social structures, the question is bound to arise; are group minds real? Undoubtedly, social structures of all kinds - families, guilds, corporations, nations, and the rest - are real; but whether they can be described as minds or not, depends upon the definition that one is prepared to give to 'mind'. Let us cast a glance at two different theories of group minds, advanced by Wilhelm Wundt and William McDougall.

Wilhelm Wundt (1832 - 1920) defends the hypothesis of a group mind, but he accepts the Humian notion of a mind as the sum total of impressions and ideas, not adhering in any metaphysical substance. Wundt argues that an individual mind does not require the metaphysical supposition of a bearer in which the sum of conscious states inheres: this, for one thing, he thinks would involve a materialization of the spiritual. And so, the group mind which Wundt thinks of as an association of collective ideas, has no need of any metaphysical bearer, any more than such a 'substance' is required by an individual mind. Wundt writes: "We have even today the grossest misunderstanding of the conception of collective consciousness

and collective will. Instead of regarding these simply as expressions for the actual agreement and interaction of individuals within a community, some continue to suspect that behind these terms there is a mythical being of some kind, or at least a metaphysical substance.....It is obvious that these notions are themselves the result of the unjustifiable use of the concept substance, which concept has so long dominated psychology and led to the identification of substance and reality."¹³

However, Wundt is careful to point out that the word 'mind', when it is applied to the collective consciousness of a group, takes on a different meaning from that which it possesses when applied to an individual person. The conception of a group mind leaves out all that pertains to the consciousness of anything analogous to the physical body, and so, in this respect, it is less intimate than the individual mind; but, on the other hand, it has a wider connotation than the individual mind, for it includes everything that pertains to the group. Especially is the group mind able to persist and survive the perishing and replacement of the individuals whose mental associations constitute its content.

An objection may very properly be raised against Wundt's confusing use of the term 'mind' to cover both what are usually known as individual minds and the men-

¹³ "Grundriss der Psychologie" by Wilhelm Wundt, Chap. 4, sec. 21

tal associations which lie behind social cultures. Surely it would be less confusing if a term other than mind could be found to denote the aggregation of ideas, customs and sentiments, which form the life of communities. The term 'mind' is not a very serviceable instrument to use in describing societies, for only in a very strained way, can 'mind' mean anything other than that which the individual usually means when he speaks of his mind. If societies are not minds nor spirits in the sense that individuals are such, why not drop the terms altogether when speaking of societies? Or why not let it be clearly understood that, when applying the term 'mind' to societies, we are using it in a purely metaphorical and not realistic way? It would probably be better to take the latter course, for the literary device of Personification is too useful to be lightly cast aside.

It would take us too far afield to examine the objections to the Humian notion of mind as consisting of a 'bundle of ideas' - which is the conception of mind accepted by Wundt. In one way, this theory states too much, and in another, too little. It states too much, for in this sense any bundle of ideas as found in a book, or in the mechanism of an automobile, would be a 'mind'. From the Kantian point of view, it states too little, for a 'unity of consciousness' is necessary to hold a 'bundle of ideas' together: strung-along states of consciousness require some central core upon which they can be strung. And the unsatisfactory Humian conception of mind becomes doubly unsatisfactory when it

is used as a basis for a supposititious construction of unconscious entities known as 'group minds'. The social phenomena may be regarded as real without applying any such terminology to them.

Turning to William McDougall, much of his language seems to indicate that he regards a 'group mind' as a self-conscious entity. For example, he writes: "The development of the group spirit in general and of national self-consciousness (my italics) in particular is favored by and dependent upon, conditions similar to those which develop the self-consciousness of individuals." ¹⁴ Again he writes: "In considering the mental life of a patriot army as the type of a highly organized group, we saw that group-self-consciousness (my italics) is a factor of very great importance....the self-consciousness of the group is the essential condition of all higher group life." ¹⁵ McDougall appears to mean that the group has a self-consciousness which it possesses on its own account as a group mind; and that this self-consciousness of the group may be apprehended by individuals. This position is surely absurd, for even an individual mind is not able to apprehend the self-consciousness of another, for that self-consciousness, qua self-consciousness, is not communicable to another. My self-consciousness is mine, and mine alone. If a group possesses self-consciousness, it is its and its alone; but there is lacking to a group any

¹⁴ "The Group Mind", p. 226

¹⁵ Ibid. p. 62

analogous empirical body-structure, such as is present to the individual, to warrant any supposition of group self-consciousness, let alone the communication of it, if it could exist.

The question under discussion is not whether social structures are 'real' or not: their reality may be taken for granted. The question is, whether the term 'mind' can be applied to them in any realistic sense. I believe that the question as to whether social structures are to be regarded as group minds in a realistic or merely a metaphorical sense carries an important corollary, touching the ethical status of an individual. If we accept the implications of a realistic version of group minds, then it seems necessary to think of the individual as submerged or overwhelmed by them. The group minds become more real than the individual minds, for they carry in themselves an immortality which is denied to the fragmentary participators in their structure. The individual would, furthermore, be submerged beneath the vast multiplicity of these group minds, for, if every 'we' is a mind in the realistic sense, group minds tend to develop by a kind of geometric progression. The world would be full of a myriad of mystic presences, seeming to deny the importance of individual minds having, in some sense, their habitat in physical bodies. The individual would also be apt to surrender his personal responsibility to that of the 'group mind' of which he was only a kind of psychic state. Being realistically a true mind, a group mind would have to

accept responsibility for its actions as distinguishable from the deeds of the individuals of its composition.

W. E. Hocking very pertinently remarks: "Admitting all that can be said of the incompleteness of the individual without the group, we can neither reduce the individual to a mere transmitter of the universal life, nor place the authorship of group deeds outside his consciousness and selfhood. If, finding that the individual voice comprises a chorus of other voices, we identify him with that community, we must make each of those other voices, in turn, an echo of many more; so that the individual in the end becomes a mere echo of echoes with no original sound to begin the series, hence in all consistency a mere nothing. If we say that the group deeds which he must execute are not his, but those of a super-mind, we make him the tool of a power which evades human reckoning and human control ... The true dignity, as well as the wealth of personality, consists in the power to retain within the circle of its own selfhood and responsibility those thoughts, decisions, and acts, which it undertakes in the name of its group, and so distinguishes from its private acts. Group deeds are the deeds of individuals, and the minds behind them are individual minds."¹⁶

The concluding point that I wish to make,

under the general heading of this chapter that certain theories of social structures tend to submerge the individual, is that the course of history shows that, as social life has developed from primitive to modern times, the individual rises from his depths, so that modern society cannot be explained without recognizing his importance. It seems possible to concede that in primitive societies the individual possessed only a small degree of self-consciousness, and counted for much less than he does in more advanced societies. Wundt says that changes in the equilibrium of society are "never effected by the ordinances of individuals, but develop of themselves of a necessity immanent in the cultural conditions. Their effects are never foreseen, but are recognized in their full import only after they have taken place."¹⁷ I am inclined to agree with Wundt that the further back we go into the history of the customs of mankind, the more we find that the individual is submerged by his group. It can hardly be contended, for example, that the Australian black, in his individual capacity, ever intelligently constructed his intricate system of the 'phratries' with their rules of exogamy, to avoid the danger of inbreeding. This is quite apparent since he was devoid

of the knowledge that there was any relationship between the sexual act and the production of offspring. Whether we can say, with Lévy Bruhl, that the individual in primitive tribes had no consciousness of his individuality distinguishable from his tribe, is another matter. But, as we ascend the ladder of history, it is a remarkable fact that the submerged individual rises in the degree of his own self-consciousness and as a distinguishable factor in the life of the community. Primitive religion seems to have played a large part in helping the individual to emerge from beneath the pressure of his tribal society. Religion must have had an intensifying and dynamic effect upon the units of the tribe as well as upon the tribe as a whole. Religion has been the mother of the arts and sciences, and it appears to have been the mother of an emerging individualism as well. Primitive religion was mostly a religion of feeling, expressed in symbols and the rhythmic movements of the dance. Such a religion bound the individual close to his tribe in a feeling of unity, but it also deepened his consciousness of being an individual distinguishable from his tribe. Says R. R. Marrett: "The symbolism which originally faced outwards, namely, towards the material world, is turned round so that it faces inwards, that is, towards a world of its own. This new plane of experience is one baffling to the intellect because the literal, the language of the senses, no longer suffices; but it is apprehensible to the mind as a whole, since on the side of feeling and will the value of the

dynamic approves itself directly. Herein, then, lies the truth of religious symbolism - not in what it says, for it speaks darkly, but in what it makes a man feel, namely that his heart is strong." ¹⁸ His religion tends to draw forth the latent individuality of the savage: it induces a dynamic mood, a sense of exaltation which is felt within his own breast. If religion is primarily a thing of the tribe, it also functions to arouse a sense of power within the units of the tribe. Under the mystic influence of the crude symbolism of his religion the savage feels, however dimly, that he is distinguishable from his tribe. It is true that religion awakens and fosters his tribal consciousness, but it is also true that it intensifies and makes more dynamic his self-consciousness. This fact should not be overlooked when we ask how it was that the individual began to emerge as a latent personality distinguishable from his community. Religion unifies the individual and the tribe, but, by the sense of power which it creates, it also distinguishes the individual from the tribe. "Religion thus brings to a head what is essentially the vital problem as it confronts man, the sole careerist of the animal kingdom.. Born in the mud like the other beasts, man alone refuses to be a stick-

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"Faith, Hope and Charity in Primitive Religion", by R. R. Marett
p.19

in-the-mud." ¹⁹ We cannot attempt to explain why man possessed, above other animals, a latent individualism. We can merely offer a few remarks to indicate how that latent individualism has emerged from primitive society. Besides the dynamic power which religion exercised upon primitive man, we must remember that he was endowed by Nature with certain characteristics which have also been responsible for the emergence of his individuality. Man's latent individuality must have been developed by his insatiable curiosity joined with the extraordinary power of manipulation which his hands possessed. The mythical account of man in the Garden of Eden is correct in emphasizing man's curiosity and his desire to handle and taste the object of his curiosity. Many of man's inventions seem to have arisen not solely from a sense of need - as Tarde seems to think - but from an urge of sheer curiosity joined with man's monkey-like tendency to paw everything that he came across. Some individual must have been the first fire-maker, and thenceforth whoever knew the trick must have had his sense of individuality immensely enhanced. Man's curiosity and the use of his sensitive hands must have produced specialization in handicraft and art, and man becomes more of an individual as he finds himself engaged in creative work. The powers of curiosity and

manipulation as fostering an emerging individuality, are greatly increased when we see them against the background of primitive religion. "In short" says Marett "he (primitive man) conceives the human sphere as ideally co-terminous with the divine; for whatever baffles his natural powers in the first instance he deems eventually subject to his mastery, thanks to supernatural means that he hopes somehow to bring within his reach. What presumption in a low-born, if a decidedly high-brained creature! Yet too large a measure of humility in his emotional composition might have left him for ever embogged in the primeval slime of animal instinct. We may perhaps console ourselves with the reflection that, if a certain immodesty is a condition of emergence, the upstart is wont to mend his manners when once he has made good." ²⁰ To say all this is not to explain the mystery of individuality but to show that a latent individuality, ready to emerge and grow, must have been resident in man from the dim beginnings of the race.

It has been said that great institutions are but the lengthened shadow of some great individual; and it is at least true that individuals have played an important role in the rise of religions and modern institutions. Bergson has drawn attention to the fact, which cannot be disputed, that societies of men are open to the influences

of great personalities which cannot be exhaustively classified in terms of the existing customs. These men have ultimately succeeded in passing on the flame of their inspiration to many others whose personalities act to raise the height of the common good. By their own individuality these great ones have enhanced the individuality of others, and have woven a superior element into the fabric of society. It is that which is individual and the growing of individuality into personality, the upward march of this type of contribution which can only be expressed in terms of 'worth' - it is this with which the theories of social structures which submerge the individual are ultimately unable to deal. For this reason, I suspect, McDougall does not fulfil his promise to explain "how, given the native propensities and capacities of the individual mind, all the complex mental life of societies is shaped by them"; for his concluding chapters of the Group Mind, pertaining to the development of civilizations, are not in this vein. Wundt also finds his method fail him in discussing the more complex societies, especially is this so when he passes from his psychological studies to his ethical studies. The difference between Wundt's psychological treatment of primitive societies and his ethical treatment of comparatively modern societies, is well pointed out by W. R. Dennes: "The phenomena of mature and civilized social life Wundt interprets (fragmentarily, to be sure) in terms of the extent to which they embody cer-

tain values, which would seem, in the end, to be taken as all of them forms of moral value. But the phenomena of primitive social life he treats, not in terms of any values or value to which they are related, but in terms of their amenability to a general classification and to general laws of relation."²¹

It is when we look at the theories of social structures from the ethical point of view that we see most plainly that there can be no adequate theory which submerges the individual. If it be acknowledged - as I think it must - that a human individual is one who is characterized as such because he pursues certain ends, then he will not allow himself for long to be submerged by a society in which and through which those ends cannot be achieved. If the individual realizes that there are certain values which he can only realize through the structure of society he will give himself freely to the society which enables him to actualize these values. But if, on the other hand, the individual sees that the community has assumed a form which stands against the achieving of what he regards as valuable, he will even use force to overthrow it. There is something very fundamental in the concept of 'natural rights', something that is not merely

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"The Method and Presuppositions of Group Psychology" in "University of California Publications in Philosophy." Vol. 6, Footnote to page 84

conventional nor arbitrary, but which is seemingly ingrained in the individual. The notion of 'rights' is a militant rather than a theoretical concept, and again and again the right of the individual not to be submerged by society has been asserted. The deep human desire to live a life that will be satisfying to the individual carries within it a self-evident 'right' to the satisfaction of that desire. We touch here something very fundamental, although admittedly vague, which must not be confused with any artificial specification as to what these rights have sometimes been asserted to be. "The general claim to a right to live the life that calls into exercise one's powers, subject to the rights of others to the same thing, is ultimate."²²

Also, from the ethical point of view, the social structures are themselves subject to the valuation of the individual: they exist, not for themselves, but for the well-being of the individuals of which they are composed. No community can maintain itself for long unless it ministers to the ends of the individuals concerned, and embodies that which is for them valuable. Any theory which submerges the individual will at length be wrecked upon the nature of the individual it attempts to submerge.

CHAPTER III

INDIVIDUALISM AND THE FRUSTRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL

It is not surprizing that we found, in the preceding chapter, that many theorectical structures of society have submerged the individual; for, if one were to undertake a logical analysis of the concept of the 'individual', one would find that anything which might be described as individual was a very elusive quantity. Where can analytic thought come to rest in that which is simple and unique? We do not intend to undertake an analysis of the concept here. We simply touch upon the matter of the concept of the individual to point out that the conception of individuality is rather an ideal to be aspired after, than a fixity to be realized once and for all. Josiah Royce maintains in many of his writings, the elusiveness of the individual. Royce insists that we cannot define in thought, nor find directly presented in experience, the beings we most of all love and trust. They appear to evaporate into types. This, he says, is true even of your own self. The individual objects of our oldest friendships constitute not merely a psychological problem, but a metaphysical mystery. We never meet the real individual at any time as a fact of sense. Our doctrine of this real presence of our friend remains, in common life, a dogma, just as truly as if it were a dogma of supernatural faith. Our search for individuals is like the lover's search for his lady in Browning's lyric, where she eludes him from

room to room:-

"Yet the day wears
And door succeeds door:
I try the fresh fortune,
Range the wide house, from the wing to the centre,
Still the same chance: she goes out as I enter."

The fact of the elusiveness that clings to the concept of the individual can hardly be denied. But it also cannot be denied that, as individuals distinguishable from society, we are supremely interested in the exploration of what is involved in the ideal of our singleness and uniqueness. The practical urge to 'find ourselves', to realize the worth of our individuality, will not allow itself to be frustrated by any analysis 'sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought'. For we are creatures of faith as well as of logic. Faith in the unfolding worth of the individual lies at the heart of all personal endeavor. And it is this aspiring quest for individuality which presents its challenge to the negative results of the logical analysis of the individual. As Zeno dispersed the theoretical impossibility of motion by the act of walking, solvitur ambulando, so the individual rises from his theoretical submergence by the exercise of an active aspiration. 'Individuality' - if it is to have any significance at all - cannot be taken as a residuum of logical analysis, but is to be conceived of as an ideal which the units of society pursue. "Individuality", says Professor J. Loewenberg, "is like Plato's Idea of the Good: all men seek it without comprehending its essence. In the absence of our non-cognitive interests, those

commonly spoken of as 'values', the concept of individuality would have to be abandoned as a concept referring to existents which defy our noetic powers. Reduced to absolute singleness or uniqueness, the individual eludes both experience and logic. But the individual is not an existential object or fact cognized as such by disinterested contemplation or reflection. It is the aim of aspiration and affection. It is the object of desire, of faith, of work, of choice. Individuality is a word which, perhaps more than any other, epitomizes the most cherished predicate in all our judgments of value. We attach the predicate to everything we love and long to achieve. Individuation is valuation, and valuation is individuation. Hence the supreme dignity of these acts in art, morals, and religion. The discovery of individuality, or the assumption that it is antecedently existent, seems hopeless: the aspiration after it, in feeling and action, defines the ideal by which the good life is regulated.¹ This aspect of individuality as the goal of aspiration is what we shall have in mind in this chapter. The aspiring after individuality is primarily what distinguishes the individual who can be distinguished but not separated from society. And the aspiring individual may be aided in his development by the society which he attempts to develop, or he may be hindered, frustrated,

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From an unpublished paper on "The Remoteness of the Individual", read by Professor J. Loewenberg before the Philosophic Union of the University of California, Feb. 1936

and thwarted by a type of society which crushes his aspiration.

The individual, being conjunctively part of his society, must find his aspirations frustrated if he imagines that he can seek them as if he were disjunctively separated from society. The error of a one-sided individualism is to attempt to do the latter. The fulfilment of the individual's individuality can only come through the medium of society. Is it self-realization which the individual seeks? If so, he can only achieve it by the aid of the society of which he is a member. Is it happiness he seeks? If so, he cannot find it alone. Is it Nietzsche's will-to-power that he seeks? If so, he is powerless without his community. It is true, however, that individualism need not be thought of as a self-stultifying attitude which will defeat the individual's realization of his ideal. Individualism may be thought of as simply the legitimate claim that ultimately society exists to further the expanding individuality of the individual: it may be the just claim that he shall not be frustrated, in his deepest desires, by his community - 'cribbed, cabined and confined' within it. If the individual is to 'be himself' and achieve harmony in the empire of his personality, he cannot remain out of harmony with his community. If individualism means that, in the last resort, the community was made for man and not man for the community, then its claim is perfectly legitimate. In the reciprocal relation of the individual to the community, the important question

to ask is, does the community frustrate or minister to the individual's pursuit of individuality? Individualism is that attitude towards society where the emphasis falls upon the individual who can be distinguished from society, rather than upon the society from which he cannot be separated. This is the correct emphasis: but the fallacy of a one-sided individualism lies in the attempt to turn a conjunction into a disjunction. The ideal to be arrived at is that there should be a congruity of the inward world of the individual with the outward world of society. The spirit within must find an answering and recognizing spirit without - otherwise the individual is lost, confused and frustrated. The Ideal, which alone gives meaning to the concept of individuality, must be sought as an ideal conjointly for both the individual and society. A dualism of ideals will frustrate the individual's ideal.

Unfortunately, in its historic development, individualism attempts to put asunder what ought to be joined. The individualist usually declines to be suborned to the defence or control of society, preferring to take his stand upon what he regards as the purely private nature of the self. De Toqueville describes individualism as a studied attitude of self-centredness. He says, contrasting individualism with egotism: "Egotism is a passionate and exaggerated love of self, which leads a man to connect everything with his own person, and to prefer himself to everything in the world. Individualism is a mature and calm feeling, which disposes each member of the community

to sever himself from the mass of his fellow-creatures; and to draw apart with his family and friends; so that, after he has thus formed a little circle of his own, he willingly leaves society at large to itself."²

There are two weaknesses in this attempt to pursue one's own individuality by 'severing oneself from the mass of one's fellow-creatures'. In the first place, the self-realization or whatever may be the aim of the individual who thus attempts to sever himself from society, cannot be secured by this designed isolation. The wrong method is taken to achieve the desired result. Of course, the isolation cannot be achieved, but the approximation towards it is not the direction in which to look for the realization of the personal ideal. For worthy individualism is of a paradoxical nature: to directly pursue it, is to fail to approximate to it. As happiness is never achieved by its forthright pursuit, so individualism is never to be attained, in anything but a distorted fashion, by pursuing one's own privacy and that alone. "He that would find his life, must lose it." Individuality is not achieved by 'building a house by the side of the road and letting the rest of the world go by'. Such aloofness, on the contrary, may be expected to bring about the atrophy of one's powers. Individualism is to be found, so far as it may be achieved,

not in isolation from, but in active cooperation with, one's fellows. The true individual is one who neither sacrifices society upon the altar of his individuality, nor his individuality upon the altar of society. So, in the first place, the individual frustrates his own self-development by direct concentration upon it; for his good cannot be sought successfully except in conjunction with others who also strive for the common good. It may be said, as Scheler says of 'moral values', that the self-fulfilment of a true individualism always appears 'on the back of the deed'. And, in the second place, the individual who seeks his individuality by 'severing himself from the mass of his fellow-creatures' frustrates his own end by helping to create a type of society which will ultimately block his his own intimate purposes. In the long run, the type of society produced by a one-sided individualism will do scant justice to the interests of the individual. That which the individualist claims to be good for himself, he must, in all consistency, recognize to be good for others. If it be a good for me to prefer myself before others, then it must be a good for others to prefer themselves before me. And so the type of society which is produced by a one-sided individualism is a tissue of forces where one man's hand is against every other man's hand. And the individual has frustrated himself by helping to create such a state of affairs.

One-sided individualism is also, to a large extent,

the result of a reaction against a one-sided collectivism. The frustration of the individual is so evident in the latter that he attempts to escape by swinging to the other extreme. In every department of life the evils of a one-sided collectivism are apparent, and it is not at first seen that extreme individualism may itself eventuate in a state of society that is equally frustrating to the individual. It is all too possible that, in our large universities, students may be produced who have not learnt the power of independent thought, but whose thought is standardized according to pattern. In art, the individuality of the artist finds it difficult to break through the accepted fashions of the day. In industry, on account of the division of labor and mass production, men tend to become as standardized as the products of the machine. It is true that all this need not be so, for there is no real reason why the large university, schools of art, and even our machine age, should not become the media for the expression of a healthy individualism. But, as a matter of fact, often it is not so: subjects are taught in a wholesale fashion while originality of thought goes un-nourished; churches tend to become the mausoleums of spontaneous religion; academies are apt to foster 'schools' of art; the personality of the laborer is sacrificed to expedite the production of material things in the most 'profitable' way. The mass of knowledge weighing upon the originality of the mind; the forms of religion stifling the spontaneity of the individual soul; the mechan-

ized processes of industry pursued at the expense of the human side of labor - all these cause that restlessness of the individual who strives to free himself from the coils of collectivism by resorting to a one-sided individualism. But one extreme becomes as bad as the other, for in both the harmony of the individual's life with his encompassing community is disturbed. L. T. Hobhouse defines this one-sided individualism as "that which attributes to the individual as against society anything which really belongs to the individual only as a member of society", and he goes on to say: "Outside the domain of theory this is a very common mode of thinking and speaking. Thus the successful man boasts of the great business which 'I' have created without thought of the complex social engine which he found ready to hand. The poor man maintains 'my' right to work and wages as though the community whose system of exchanges makes work profitable and gives money wages their value had nothing to say to the claim. The inheritor of wealth talks of 'my' property, and resents interference with it by society, forgetting that without the organized force of the community and the rule of law, he could neither inherit nor be secure from moment to moment in his possession."

One-sided individualism may indeed establish by the use of force - financial or even physical as in the

case of slavery - a condition of society in which there exist favored classes. Individuals may forget, or conveniently ignore, the fact that the only rights which they possess, they hold as members of society and not against society. They may even come to think of these rights as absolute; but this can only come about by the autocratic frustration of other individuals - as in the case of slavery; and, in the end, the falsity of their claim to hold individual advantages as against society will be frustrated by the reminder - forcible if necessary - that the only privileges which accrue to them are those which they hold in harmony with the common good. Very largely, the problem of the individual and the common good arises from the fact that a disharmony is introduced into society by the crystallization of the claims of a one-sided individualism into laws and customs which frustrate the aspirations of many members of society; and this state of affairs introduces, as it were, toxins into the blood-stream of society, so that ultimately the one-sided individualists themselves are poisoned along with everyone else concerned.

So far in this chapter we have been considering the fact that the individual finds himself frustrated if he pursues what he considers to be his own good as something to be achieved apart from or in opposition to society. We have pointed out the self-defeating nature of a one-sided individualism. But this form of individualism is not to be thought of as something which some wicked

people have decided to take up as a kind of anti-social policy, saying "Go to now! let us concentrate upon our own aspirations and let society take care of itself". On the contrary, the form which individualism takes in any one generation has been largely moulded by the thought of preceding generations. On the whole, taken as a characteristic of any society where the individual is frustrated, one-sided individualism is not something that has been set up by conscious design, but is an outlook upon life which is a 'carry over' from past generations.

In heading the present chapter "Individualism and the Frustration of the Individual" I have had in mind two historic facts. The first is the emergence of individualism as that which men have come to prize and strive for as the most precious privilege of living - the idealism of individualism. The second is that men in the past have had mistaken ideas of the relation of the individual to society, and that to carry forward these ideas into our modern age is disastrous to the individual. The high worth of the individual which we accept today, at least in theory, is a precious heritage which comes to us from the past. But also, many of our present difficulties in relating the individual to the common good are a 'carry over' from outworn conceptions of the relation of the individual to society. We have received the 'gold' of individualism, but we have also received much worthless 'ore' that is mixed with it. The pure gold of individualism we shall wish to keep; but the baser metal, symbolizing fallacious notions of the relation of the individual to society and

certain economic and political accretions, we shall do wisely to discard.

CHAPTER IV

SOME FACTORS IN THE BACKGROUND OF INDIVIDUALISM

To describe in detail the factors that have gone into the construction of modern individualism would be beyond the scope of this essay. But it is not necessary to write a history of individualism in order to understand some of the considerations that ought to be kept in mind if we are to understand the significance of individualism in our modern world. We ought to remember that modern individualism is not a child of yesterday nor of the day before. We cannot say that individualism is innate in mankind, and let it go at that. The kind of individualism we have fallen heir to - it cannot be too often emphasized - is an individualism with a history. We need to study individualism in its historical background. We must remember that we are not studying individualism as a solitary phenomenon, but we are studying it in relation to society. We need to know how men regarded that relation - especially in the comparatively recent past. Individualism has passed through many phases in its interaction with conceived structures of society, and it will be reconstructed again and again. The study of the history of individualism will show us how it operated in social structures other than our own. By this historical knowledge, we may be able to discover if the individualism of past centuries is able to function within the structure of modern society; we may be able to discover how old conceptions of individualism

should be readjusted to meet the requirements of an individual living in our modern society.

History shows that there has always been a recrudescence of individualism when rapid changes have come about in society. Men are then torn from the 'cope of custom' and thrown back upon themselves. Such times of transition the historian often studies to describe the battles fought or the changes in the outward life of the people. But these wide shifts in the human scene are invariably accompanied by an intensification of the individual's consciousness of himself. Modern individualism is, in part, the product of historic upheavals whose reverberations have lived on in the history of humanity. Illustrations of this upsurge of individualism in times of rapid change might be found in any of the 'striking hours' of human history. Perhaps as good an illustration as any is the breaking up of the City States in the ancient world under the conquests of Alexander the Great and the Roman legions. On account of the comparatively narrow confines of those City States, it was possible for men to take an intelligent interest in the affairs of the community. The tie between the individual and his community was close. But when the States were broken up by the advance of imperialistic power, men were thrown back upon their inner lives, cut loose from their old social milieu. Increasingly, in the highly militarized Roman world, men came to think of the power of the State and its imperialistic aims as something external to their private concerns. Accordingly, men began

to concentrate upon the individual inner life, as if it could be regarded as a tiny island where, if nowhere else, the individual could establish control. Frustrated without by a power which became more and more impersonal as compared with the individual, man turned to the empire of his own soul within.

Another illustration of the rise of individualism in a period of swift change is to be found in the experience of the Jewish people during the Babylonian exile. The Jewish worship had been closely associated with the temple in Jerusalem. Torn loose from a life that had been centralized in the temple worship and transported to Babylon they lamented that they could not 'sing the Lord's song in a strange land'. The outward shift in their human scene operated to introduce a new individualism into the stream of Jewish history. Ezekiel, speaking for Jahveh, declares that no longer is the proverb to be used, "The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge". Out of the experience of the exile came a new note of individual responsibility which Ezekiel thus expresses:—"The soul that sinneth, it shall die; the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son." Once won, that individualism was not wholly lost again: it passed through Judaism into Christianity and became part of the individualistic inheritance of those who have been influenced by Christianity.

This phenomenon of the invariable upsurge of individualism in times of social upheaval ought not to be overlooked; for it ought to provide us with a clue to look for a re-

newed emphasis upon individualism in the swift changes which the world is undergoing today. It is not likely that our age will prove to be an exception to the general rule of history. If the course of history teaches us anything concerning this matter, we ought to expect that, underneath the expedients of government as expressed in the one-sided collectivism of the post-war totalitarian States, a new individualism is waiting to be born

Again, the forms which individualism has taken in the past have a definite bearing on the kind of individualism we have today. Our individualism is apparently a complex thing - the product of many forces which have been at work in the history of human thought. How much, for example, has our individualism inherited from the individualism of the Stoics and early Christianity? Here we have two great forces which have nourished the stream of individualism, and whose influence still persists. Both Stoicism and early Christianity represent an emphasis on the inner life of the individual as over against the externality of the Imperial Roman power. It would not be correct to say that the outward conditions caused these philosophies of the inward life; for Christianity was a product of the religious impulse, and Stoicism the outcome of philosophic reflection. But it would be correct to say that the outward conditions had much to do with the concentration of many individuals off that time upon that aspect of their lives which could be distinguished from society in the Roman Empire. More and more the judicial, civil, and military institutions seemed,

to an increasing number of individuals, an external brute force calling forth no real loyalty. By and large, the individual came to think of himself as merely the passive instrument of a vast imperial regime. The term sometimes used to describe an autocratic State such as Imperial Rome is the 'Servile State'. The existence of such a State has had far-reaching effects in producing monasticism, asceticism, and martyrdom. Mommsen even goes so far as to question if monasticism would ever have arisen if it had not been for the existence of the servile State. At any rate, the development of individualism is what one would expect to arise within the confines of the Roman Empire.

Both Stoicism and early Christianity were forms of individualism which attempted to overcome the frustration of the individual by winning an inner freedom over the autocratic claims of the 'servile State'. But the modern individual would wish to distinguish the substance from the form in both of these individualisms. Their 'inwardness' is the substance which we of later times, confronted with new problems, would wish to preserve; but we would still feel ourselves frustrated as individuals unless we made some alterations in these ancient conceptions of the individual's relation to society.

From Stoicism we have inherited a healthy undisturbedness of the inward spirit, that "moral and religious freedom of the dignity of reason which is united with God, and is therefore far above being disturbed by any concrete ex-

ternal happenings in the world of time and sense."¹ We have also inherited a healthy emphasis upon the notion of 'natural rights' of the individual. In man, the Law of Nature, which the Stoics held to be fundamental, became the Law of Reason in which all men by virtue of their humanity participated; and so a doctrine of 'equality' was enunciated, which afterwards was destined to play such a large part in the social theory of democracy. The debt of individualism to Stoicism is very great. It is not surprizing that Montesquieu is impelled to say of Stoicism, especially in relation to the subject of his book, "The Spirit of Laws":

"Never were any principles more worthy of human nature, and more proper to form the good man, than those of the Stoics; and if I could for a moment cease to think that I am a Christian, I should not be able to hinder myself from ranking the destruction of the sect of Zeno among the mis-²fortunes that have befallen the human race." But there are certain weaknesses in Stoicism which would make it an unsatisfactory theory of individualism for our modern age. There is an element of defeatism in "the Stoic distinction between things in our power and the things not in our power which would incline us to retire with Boethius into the citadel of self-command and the routine of duty".³

¹ "The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches", by Ernst Troeltsch, p.65

² "The Spirit of Laws", Vol. 11, p.32 (World's Greatest Lit.)

³ Adapted from W. E. Hocking, "Man and the State", p.318.

Stoicism was also backward looking. Its gaze was directed towards a Golden age in the past with no great hope for the future. Its doctrine, if regarded as the whole fabric rather than one of the strands incorporated in modern individualism, could always be appealed to as upholding the 'status quo'. Says Ernst Troeltsch, "....their attention was directed towards a golden age which has disappeared for ever, which could not maintain itself for long even in a new world era...Above all, however, this faith is essentially that of the upper classes, who, in spite of all, their concentration on the desire for spiritual 'goods' in virtue, are still bound up with all the existing institutions: in the Stoic ideal, therefore, the hope of the future seems to be connected with the selection of particular individuals for intensive cultivation and moral knowledge. It fostered the aristocratic self-sufficient spirit of a ruling class which has been recently enlightened and ethically deepened."⁴

It will be well also to cast a glance at the individualism of early Christianity, which is one of the important strands woven into the fabric of our modern individualism. The part which Christianity has played in

⁴ "The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches", p.67.

the development of individualism cannot be over-emphasized, but, at this point, I wish merely to touch upon its essential and initial contribution. It can hardly be disputed that the essential emphasis of Christianity is upon the unique value of the human individual. The average individual or the 'forgotten man' comes to his own in Christianity. Stoicism emphasized the individual also, but here the world of the individual was composed of himself and his own rational ideal. Christianity linked the individual with the 'Love of God' as manifested in what Jesus called the 'Kingdom of God'. Confining ourselves briefly to essentials, we may make the remark that what is prominent in the Christian doctrine of the individual is the possibility of his connection with a love that seeks him through the fatherhood of God. The words, 'supernatural', 'revealed', 'transcendent', are words that we cannot do without in thinking of the type of individualism manifested in early Christianity. Nowhere is the fact, that the inner life of the individual Christian is connected with a 'supernatural' order, more evident than in the Book of Revelation. Here the realm of Caesar and the realm of God are deliberately contrasted. Primarily, throughout the New Testament, the individual attains supreme worth because he is sought by the love of God. It is not so much the love of man towards God which is emphasized, but the love of God which seeks the individual through the Gospel. The word 'love' has a new and exalted meaning placed upon it. It is noticeable that the New Testament writers scrupulously avoid the use of the Greek word, Eros,

so that love may not be thought of in its romantic sense.

Each individual's value - and that of his 'brother' also - is of paramount importance because he is the object of God's love. This fact is central in the New Testament. It is central in the conception of the Kingdom of God which is rather that which is bestowed upon man by God than something which man can, by his own initiative, construct. "It is only fellowship with God which gives value to the individual, and it is only in common relationship with God, in a realm of supernatural values, that natural differences disappear. Where this kind of individualism prevails all earthly differences are swallowed up in the Divine power and love which reduce all other distinctions to nothing."⁵

So far as the social significance of primitive Christianity goes, we may say that it was destined to have a far reaching influence. We are only just beginning to see the implications of the Christian ideal of Love which is not mere kindness, but springs from the common brotherhood of individuals as related to the common fatherhood of God. But, at the beginning, this dynamic power worked within the accepted social framework of the age, not directly attempting to alter it. We shall deal later with the latent power of the Christian conception as a contribution to the relation of the individual and the common good. It is sufficient to say now that, in the spirit of modern individualism, even if unrecognized by

many, there is a deep religious undercurrent; and that the importance of Christian individualism which came to birth against the background of the Roman Empire can hardly be over-emphasized. Of the two systems of individualism which we have been briefly considering Troeltsch says: "Both these ideals - on the one hand that of equality and union of all men through the possession of the Divine Reason, and, on the other, that of the elevation of the souls of men and their fusion in the Love of God - represent an ideal of humanity which is based upon purely religious ideas, which is separated by a deep gulf from the old naturalistic ideals, or from the ideals which only limit and modify natural instincts; and yet this ideal feels constrained to make repeated attempts to bridge this gulf. In their idealism both Christianity and Stoicism reduce the value of the natural basis of life, and both are concerned with the attempt to restore its significance. Thus in both a rich Ethos is working its way up, full of difficulties and tensions, which has remained an abiding possession of the European type of humanity, but which also is always in permanent conflict with the realistic demands of the natural instincts, with the needs of material existence, and with political and legal authority. In increasing measure, however, the leading part in this development was taken by the organization which grew out of the Gospel."⁶ There is, then, a sequel to these forms of individualism, especially Christian individualism,

whose course we have no space to adequately trace. The genuine contributions of these individualisms to our problem of the individual and the common good, consists in the supreme worth of the individual and the common brotherhood of men, which we find emphasized in both; but in the course of development both individualisms have become associated with political and economic points of view. The association with these other cross-currents of life has resulted, as we shall shortly show, in a frustration of the individual. This frustration can itself only be prevented by bringing into prominence again that which is deepest in these individualisms, namely the sacredness of human personality and the brotherhood of man. The association of these individualisms - which are of course religious in the broad sense - with the other 'interests' of human life, cannot be prevented. Man is a political and economic being as well as religious. Our problem is to preserve what is deepest in Christian and Stoic individualism, and to make it a living power in our modern individualism. To preserve the genuine heart of these individualisms as a principle of harmony among the other 'interests' of the individual is, perhaps, the most important problem and task which we face today.

CHAPTER V

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF INDIVIDUALISM TOWARDS FRUSTRATION
OF THE INDIVIDUAL

Let us notice first how one of the elements of Stoicism has united with other cross-currents of history, to help to form an individualism which has become frustrating to the individual. The element to which I refer is what afterwards became known as the doctrine of natural rights.

"This conception...had its origin in Greece in the appeal from custom or convention to Nature. At first an appeal to the natural impulses and wants, it became with the Stoics¹ an appeal to the rational order of the universe." Now, in the conception of 'natural rights' we have something that is very fundamental to individualism. Again and again the conception has been appealed to in the name of justice, and to assert the freedom and the dignity of the individual; it has been the weapon of that idealism which is embodied in the Declaration of Independence of 1776. The conception of natural rights contains a principle which any adequate individualism will wish to retain inviolate.

Many metaphysical questions may be raised concerning the doctrine of natural rights. It may be asked, does the 'state of nature' refer to some golden age in the past or to some ideal age in the future? It may be

¹ "Ethics", by Dewey and Tufts, p. 152.

asked if 'natural rights' are something that an individual ought to possess or, as a matter of fact, does possess. We recall that the controversy about Deism which dominated theology for a hundred years called into question the meaning of 'natural' in religion. The question was: are there any elements of religion which are natural in the sense of being independent of specific historical events? It was a very pertinent question, at one time, as to whether animals possessed rights or not. It is apparent that the inflicting of pain seems to be somewhat different from the violation of a right. St Thomas Aquinas would have said that animals do not possess rights. These matters are mentioned to show the ambiguity which lay in the conception of natural rights. And yet the original conception of the rights of an individual represents something very real; for if an individual has no rights he cannot object to anything which an autocratic society may impose upon him. "The human mind", says Harold J. Laski,² rejects the idea of law as that behind which there is to be found the sovereign power of the state because, as the eminent Jesuit jurist Cathrein has said, 'then one must regard every statute, however absurd, contrary to reason, or despicable, as a true statute, and one no longer becomes entitled to complain of injustice.'² Law, to be law, it is widely felt, must correspond with something more valid than the will of an authority which grounds

² "Naturrecht und positives Recht", p. 85.

its claim to respect upon nothing more than the coercive power at its disposal."³

What really has happened to this doctrine of natural rights is that it has been made the tool of a one-sided individualism. That which was intended to assert the liberty of an individual has been forged into iron bands which hold him in thralldom. The appeal to 'rights' may be - and, as a matter of fact, has been - resorted to by an ultra conservatism. It is common knowledge that 'rights' have been the last resort of 'vested interests'. How often have they been invoked as the crystallization of ancient customs which militate against the well-being of the underprivileged!

An outstanding example of the exploitation of the 'natural rights' doctrine may be found in its application to private property. The principle of holding private property may be defended as a wise social provision; but to give the private ownership of property the status of an absolute natural right has meant frustration to many individuals. The status of a 'natural right' has, of course, been given to all kinds of property. Slave-ownership came under the same heading, and was fought for as such, until the social conscience and changing economic conditions

³ "The State: in Theory and Practice", p.19.

led to the 'right' being withdrawn. The conception of the natural right to private property, of course, applies to the ownership of great industrial plants. The theory of natural rights has many times been claimed by the owners of these plants as vindicating their purpose to run them solely for profit. Along with the ownership of property goes the control of the time, the talents, and the physical well-being of many individuals. Does the 'natural right' to control private property, include also the 'natural right' to control the destinies of individuals whose welfare or otherwise is bound up with that property? Now, to hold private property as a natural right, and to hold it as a public responsibility, are two different things. But the emphasis has fallen upon the former. The 'sacred right' of property has been regarded as such, not because of its 'sacredness' in ministering to the well-being of society, but as a means of personal prestige and power. The sacredness of private ownership can only be upheld so long as it ministers to the common good. Yet the law relating to private property may be legally interpreted to mean that such property is held as a natural right. For example, John M. Mecklin says: "While the doctrine of property as a natural right is not distinctly enunciated in the Constitution yet, as Professor Beard has shown, that famous historical instrument is to all intents and purposes an economic document. It is economic not in the sense of aiming primarily at the protection of property interests but because the men who formulated its principles, es-

pecially Madison and Hamilton, realized that only through the support of the property interests could national unity be attained. Hamilton especially saw that it was only possible to offset the decentralizing influence of the states and to create an adequate central government by securing the loyal support of the various property interests. He had, therefore, no illusions as to the end the Constitution sought."⁴ It is apparent that a moral right may be superior to a legal right. This latter may be simply a custom that has become recognized by law. The institution of private property stands upon a much firmer basis when it is recognized as a social provision involving duties for the good of all, than it does if it is based upon the claim of a 'natural right' crystallized into law.

I have made this brief excursion into the 'natural right' theory of private property to show how far the theory of natural rights may be divorced from its original intention. If the gulf had not been opened between the conception of 'private property' as an element in the common good, and the contrary conception of it as something held by 'natural right' as against the common good, there would not be the room which now exists for radical differences upon this matter. As a matter of fact, the individual has no moral rights whatever which

⁴ "Introduction to Social Ethics" by J. M. Mecklin, p. 307.

conflict with the common good. Falsely interpreted, and distorted from the original purity of their conception, 'natural rights' have become an instrument to be used in the frustration of the individualism which seeks harmony with the common good. On the intimate relation of rights to the common good, Hobhouse contributes the following illuminating statement: "It is true in a sense that rights of the individual are founded on personality. They are conditions of personal development. But personality is itself an element in the common good, and that is why its rights have moral validity. In general terms, a true right is an element in or condition of the real welfare of its possessor, which on the principle of harmony is an integral part of the common welfare."⁵

To continue, in brief outline, the general theme that individualism, unless kept closely related to the common good, ends in its own frustration, let us now turn to the subject of the individual's 'interests'. We may think of an individual's interests as bearing a close resemblance to his rights; but the latter have, what might be called, a metaphysical origin. They arise, in the Stoic conception, out of man's participation in an ideal order of Nature. Man's 'wants' or 'desires' or 'interests' differ slightly from his 'rights'. His interests are not necessarily static. They may vary from time to time,

taking on different forms. They are not thought of as related to a metaphysical conception of the 'natural' state of man as a being having certain inalienable rights. Man's 'interests' are related to a purely empirical order rather than to a metaphysical one. These desires or interests also have about them a certain voracious or insatiable quality. Human interests have been expanding with an expanding civilization. An individual's interests grow with a developing personality, while his 'natural rights' may be thought of as remaining fairly static. Historically, there has been a shift from thinking in terms of natural rights to a thinking in terms of interests. Jeremy Bentham and Adam Smith may be taken as representing, in their ethical, political and economic thought, a new emphasis upon interests rather than upon natural rights. We have here, then, to do with a new development in the conception of individualism, yet standing in the same succession as 'natural rights'. The individual's interests are as real elements of individualism as are his rights, and must be so considered in their relation to the common good. It will now be my purpose to show that the conception of the relation of human interests to the common good has had a history which has eventuated in the frustration of the individual.

Let us begin by asking how the conception of the individual as possessing interests was related to the conception of society as a whole which prevailed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries? The answer is

contained very largely in the theory of social structure prevailing at that time. Society was then regarded as a kind of self-adjusting mechanism. At the end of the seventeenth century, Sir Isaac Newton had revolutionized men's conception of the physical universe. "His discovery of the law of gravitation had been made as early as 1666; but the erroneous estimate which was then generally received of the earth's diameter prevented him from disclosing it for sixteen years; and it was not till the eve of the Revolution that the 'Principia' revealed to the world his new theory of the Universe."⁶ Newton had shown that the Universe was governed throughout by law, maintaining that it was shot through and through with rationality. The Newtonian conception of the cosmos was that it was a vast mechanism, governed throughout by mathematical laws. It is impossible to over-state the influence of this cosmic theory upon the theory of social structure that came to prevail. This is especially true with regard to the economic aspect of the social structure. The social theory was modelled upon the cosmic theory. Both were regarded as self-adjusting mechanisms. This type of economic theory is very prominent in the writings of Adam Smith (1723 - 1790) and appears under the system of Natural Liberty. This theory has to do with the relation of individuals as

⁶ "Short History of the English People" by J. R. Green, Vol. 11, p. 326. (World's Greatest Literature Series)

economic units to society as a whole, which was regarded as a self-adjusting mechanism. The main difference between the cosmic theory and the social theory was that, in the former, the units were mechanisms, whereas, in the latter, they were purposive individuals with interests. But, whether the units were material atoms or purposive human beings, they were both conceived of as related to a self-adjusting mechanism - either the mechanism of the cosmos or the mechanism of society. The purport of the theory of Natural Liberty was that each economic individual was free to pursue his own interests, plan and devise to the best of his ability; but it was of no use to try to plan for society as a whole, for that was, like the solar system, a self-adjusting mechanism. The economic world, as a whole, was subject to laws which were as inviolable as those of the physical universe. It did not alter the situation that each individual unit had interests to follow, for they would, on the whole, interact, like the play of physical forces, to maintain the common good. The conception of society was that it was as rational, taken in its entirety, as the cosmos. The reason why it was useless and meddling to try to plan for society as a whole was that it was already rational. An individual was considered to be following a rational course in giving free play to his own interests and leaving the common good, not to chance, but to the inherent rationality of the whole. There was a deep confidence in the beneficence of natural laws which worked together for good in the sphere of society

as they did in the cosmic order. In this conception of the relation of the individual to society, we have the root of the hedonist doctrine that, if each individual worked for his own happiness, there would ensue no conflict with the happiness of the whole. "Private vices - in the sense of enlightened selfishness - would become public virtues."

Here we have also the root of the laissez faire theory of the State, the belief that 'that State governs best that governs least'. "Most Americans", says Hocking, "are instinctive laissez-fairests in the respect that they dislike being reminded of government, believing in their capacity and that of their neighbors to manage their own affairs and their mutual affairs on terms of fair play without the surveillance of public authorities."⁷ If this attitude is as prevalent as Hocking thinks it is, it seems to be possible to trace it back to the system of Natural Liberty. But if the laissez-fairests are wrong in thinking that "human nature has a bent to goodness, and gives the best account of itself when unfettered by artificial requirements"⁸ then such a doctrine will end in the frustration of the individual, for it will produce chaos rather than the common good.

Of course, the conception of the relation of the individual to society conceived of as a self-adjusting mechanism, was used by Adam Smith in the attempt to remove

⁷ "Man and the State" by W. E. Hocking, p. 91

⁸ Ibid. p. 91.

economic abuses which frustrated the individual. It must be seen against the background of mercantilism. We have to think of princes, successful merchants, and protectionist governments, as attempting to interfere with the 'self-adjusting mechanism'. We have to think of men like Sir Josiah Child, the author of the Discourse upon Trade, who controlled the East India Company, and diverted immense sums of money to his own pocket by means of unscrupulous practices 'within the law'. People like this were, in common parlance, 'throwing a monkey wrench into the machinery'. Adam Smith's doctrine maintained that, if the machinery were left alone, unimpeded by government grants and regulations, it would work well. The theory which Adam Smith used to fight predatory and 'special' interests, entrenched behind government support, was that which found expression in the economics of the 'natural order', 'laissez faire' and the 'guiding hand'. It is ironical that this economic theory, which Adam Smith used with the intention of freeing the many from the frustration of the few, was destined itself to become an implement of frustration. Adam Smith, like most of us, did his thinking in terms of an age that was passing rather than in terms of one that was coming to birth. He did not foresee the colossal changes which steam and the division of labor would introduce. Much less did he envisage the greater changes which the mightier machines and mass production of our day have brought to birth. An expression of individualism which is liberating to one generation may indeed be-

come confining and frustrating to a subsequent one.

When Adam Smith wrote (c.1776) the opening-up of the great American continent was looming upon the horizon. Bring these matters to bear upon the doctrine of Natural Liberty, and a flood of light is thrown upon the history of what was recently called 'rugged' - though more expressively perhaps today 'ragged' - individualism. Human interests remain a permanent factor in individualism; but the relation of those interests to new developments in society continually demands revision, if the individual's real interests are not to be frustrated. The relation of human interests to a theory of society which is outmoded tends to attain a degree of fixity, which defeats its own ends when introduced into new conditions. "Business" has placed the emphasis on the natural liberty which an individual felt he possessed to 'carve out his own destiny': it calls attention to the golden rewards which have been reaped by the individual and society through its 'initiative'. As a matter of fact, the theory of individualism, put forward by Adam Smith to curb the power of a plutocracy backed by government in his day, was destined to give such a plutocracy the power it needed when the large and juicy continent of America came to be carved up. The individualist, who inherits the theory of Natural Liberty from Adam Smith, is wont to proclaim 'what business has done for the country'. It is a partial truth; but it may indeed become frustrating to the rank and file of individuals - indeed to all individuals - when there are

no new frontiers to be crossed and no new territory to be developed.

It was quite a reversal of the proposed working of the theory of Natural Liberty in Adam Smith's day when 'those who live by profit' at length became the very ones to demand the freedom of industry from governmental interference. "By the customary apologetic generalization from individual acquisitive interests to general social welfare, the idea of social good as a consequence of individual gain became a part of currently accepted social philosophy and currently formulated economic theory" - the economic theory of men - "whose pecuniary interests found expression in the political creeds of liberal parties,"⁹ and "whose fortunes were bound up with individual liberty."

Owing, then, to factors which were not, and could not be, foreseen, when Adam Smith wrote his Wealth of Nations in 1776, the theory of Natural Liberty developed into a one-sided individualism which gave undue power to those who happened to be 'successful'. The theory was intended to secure a closer approximation to the ideal of liberty for all, but the direction in which it moved was towards a liberty for some whom fortune smiled upon, and the loss of it, except in theory, for others.

For example, it is not surprising that those who

⁹ "The Ethical Implications of Current Economic Theory" by W. H. Hamilton, (unpublished). Quoted by Clarence E. Ayres in "The Nature of the Relationship between Ethics and Economics." Philosophic Studies, University of Chicago, No 8.

had the greatest financial power were the staunchest defenders of the principle of 'freedom of contract' which "comes to mean, in effect, not only that one individual or group of individuals may not legally bring any other than pecuniary pressure upon another individual or group, but also that pecuniary pressure cannot be barred."¹⁰

Of course, the theory of Natural Liberty has undergone many modifications since the time of Adam Smith; but my point is that the heart of it, which consists in the notion that the untrammelled liberty of the individual is the best thing for society at large, still forms part of our inherited individualism.

About the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Darwinian theory of evolution began to play a great part in influencing thought about social and ethical problems. It was then seen that, as there was a struggle for the 'survival of the fittest' going on in Nature, something of the like was taking place in society. The attention of men was drawn to the conflicting nature of 'interests'. This warring of interests was evident in the field of economics and also in the international sphere where competing nationalisms emerged after the Napoleonic wars. Just as once the theory of society as a self-adjusting

"The Theory of Business Enterprise", by T. Veblen, p. 274.

mechanism had been thought to be sufficient to take care of the harmony of the whole, so, now, the principle of evolution was appealed to as that which would ultimately harmonize the conflicting interests of men. At this time (the latter part of the nineteenth century), Herbert Spencer and Nietzsche attempted to vindicate what might be called a 'rugged individualism' by making use of the scientific theory of evolution.

Although Spencer thought that he was working in an original way in relating ethics to evolution, yet one cannot but feel that he was simply placing in the frame of 'evolution' sets of ideas that belonged to the eighteenth century. As Adam Smith had believed in the 'invisible hand' of the self-adjusting mechanism, so Herbert Spencer pinned his faith to the role which he conceived evolution was playing, not only in the cosmos, but in the conduct of society as well. Spencer writes: "We have to enter on the consideration of moral phenomena as phenomena of evolution; being forced to do this by finding that they form a part of the aggregate of phenomena which evolution has wrought out. If the entire visible universe has been evolved - if the solar system as a whole, the earth as a part of it, the life in general which the earth bears, as well as that of each individual organism - if the mental phenomena displayed by all creatures, up to the highest - if one and all conform to the laws of evolution; then the necessary im-

plication is that those phenomena of conduct in these highest creatures with which Morality is concerned, also conform."¹¹ In the end, Spencer believed, the best people, ethically as well as economically, would emerge at the top. The process of evolution could be trusted to bring about a beneficent result, just as the rationality of the self-adjusting mechanism had formerly been trusted to do the same thing. According to Spencer, it was only because men did not willingly embrace the goal of evolution, that they felt in themselves the tension between their own interests and those of society. The goal of social evolution was the individual's adjustment to society. Evolution saw to it that maladjustment involved pain, and adaptation carried with it a feeling of pleasure. "Along with complete adjustment of humanity to the social state, will go recognition of the truths that actions are completely right only when, besides being conducive to future happiness, special and general, they are immediately pleasurable, and that painfulness, not only ultimate but proximate, is the concomitant of actions which are wrong. So that from the biological point of view, ethical science becomes a specification of the conduct of associated men who are severally so constituted that the various self-preserving activities, the activities required for rearing offspring,

¹¹ "The Data of Ethics" by Herbert Spencer, p.63.

and those which social welfare demands, are fulfilled in the spontaneous exercise of duly proportioned faculties, each yielding when in action its quantum of pleasure; and who are, by consequence, so constituted that excess or defect in any one of these actions brings its quantum of pain, immediate and remote."¹²

So, the individual's interests ought to be those that would come to light under the process of evolution. It appears, then, that we have, in Spencer, a modification of the theory of Natural Liberty - Evolution takes the place of the Self-adjusting Mechanism. The position is not essentially altered by the substitution of one concept for another.

Nietzsche boldly said that men ought to desire those qualities which were generated by the struggle for existence. This amounts to an ethical nihilism. To call might right is simply to give up the ethical problem. Nietzsche regarded the exercise of humility or sympathy as positively harmful, because they would simply be interferences placed in the way of the evolution of a race of super-men. He writes: "The loss of force which suffering has already brought upon life is still further increased and multiplied by sympathy. Suffering itself becomes contagious through sympathy. Sympathy thwarts, on the whole, in general, the law of development, which is

the law of selection."¹³ Nietzsche makes the mistake of singling out one 'instinct', the craving for power for the sake of power, as that which ought to be developed in a system of 'liberty'. Undoubtedly, this particular variant of individualism has had an enormous influence, especially since applied science put into the hands of men magic keys for opening new and undreamed-of avenues of power. It is hardly necessary to point out the way in which the individual is frustrated if such a theory as Nietzsche's is taken seriously. Not only are the exploited ones frustrated, but the 'super-men' overreach themselves and bring about their own undoing. The self-defeating power of an inordinate ambition has been the theme of many dramas and comedies, and has been enacted, again and again, upon the stage of real life. Spencer did not make this error, for he recognized other elements of personality which would become prominent in an evolving society. He writes: "Once more we may recognize as not only possible, but probable, the eventual existence of a community, also industrial, the members of which, having natures similarly responding to these requirements, are also characterized by dominant aesthetic faculties, and achieve complete happiness only when a large part of life is filled with aesthetic activities."¹⁴

¹³ Nietzsche, Works, Vol. XI. p. 242.

¹⁴ "Principles of Ethics" by H. Spencer, Vol. I., p. 169.

However, the point we are making is that the theory of Natural Liberty was not materially altered when evolution came upon the scene. In all these theories of individualism which appear to spring from the root of Natural Liberty, the central motif may be said to be: 'Let an individual be unhampered in the pursuit of his own interests, and society as a whole will take care of itself.' There are some exceptions to this general mode of thinking, but they appear to be like 'exceptions which prove the rule'. T. H. Huxley, for example, did not feel that human interests were to be advanced by embracing what he called 'the gladiatorial theory of existence'. For Huxley, Nature was like the weeds which were for ever ready to overrun the garden plot which man, by his ethical efforts, was precariously cultivating. Also Rousseau saw that 'man was born free but was everywhere in chains', and to remedy such a situation set up his theory of the general will. However, the main stream of individualism followed the line of development begun in the theory of Natural Liberty. It is this theory which, having passed through many phases, came at length into contact with the state of affairs created by the industrial revolution.

The problem which is created by the impact of an inherited and triumphant individualism upon the industrial revolution as it developed into the machine age, I shall leave until the next chapter. Suffice it now to say that we shall find that the conceptions of the relation of the individual to ^a society, thought of as a self-adjusting mechanism or as automatically evolving, will be totally

inadequate to the new situation. It will appear that the individuals must themselves find some way of directing the whole, however gigantic the task may appear to be. The old individualism, inherited through the channels of Natural Liberty has become 'a moral Frankenstein that is in danger of being destroyed by the monstrosities which it creates'. Man's real rights and interests will have to be won, not in a society thought of as being inherently rational, but in one that is controlled by rational individuals who will need to create its rationality.

It is now necessary to indicate how that part of our inherited individualism, which was derived from Christianity, came to be associated with economic and political forces, so that it contributed its quota towards the frustration of the individual. It seems possible to trace the stream of individualism back to the two great fountain heads which we have mentioned, namely Stoicism and early Christianity. Though the two sources are, by no means, ultimate, yet we have in them a concentration of head-waters, so to speak, from which the stream of individualism has taken its course in subsequent history. In the historic stream, the influences of Stoicism and Christianity intermingle. We said previously that early Christianity was distinguished from Stoicism by one factor which becomes important for our study. The differentiating factor referred to consists in the relation of Christianity to the 'supernatural' or to the revealed will of God.

But, early in the course of Christian thought, this distinguishing aspect of the individual as a potential son of God, was united with the Stoic conception of the individual as a participant in the Law of Nature. It is true that the Church regarded man as having fallen from a primitive state in which the absolute Natural Law prevailed, but she retained a conception which Troeltsch speaks of as the 'relative Natural Law'. "The Christian relative Natural Law was the final result of a process created by the Church through the following stages: first of all she gradually modified that indifference towards the natural basis of life which characterized the Gospel, owing to the great enthusiasm and heroism with which it lived only for eternity; then the Church tolerated the natural basis of life unchanged as she found it, as the product of relative Natural Law; and finally, from the time of the middle ages, with the changes in the general conditions of life, she regarded the natural basis of life as instituted by Providence for the purpose of the Christian church. The sociological, purely ethical, and religious fundamental relationships of the Gospel then become an integral part of the Church, embodied in obedience to the Church and in the sense of the unity of the Church, while the social and political elements are embodied and assimilated by means of the Christian theory of the Natural Law of the Church. In this Natural Law, however, there still remains the root idea of Stoic rationalism - that is, that God is related

to the universe as the soul is to the body, and the rational equality of all beings endowed with reason; from this root rationalistic reactions will arise, until, in the seventeenth century, when they have developed their full power, they will destroy the ecclesiastical civilization itself."¹⁵

We see from the above how the two streams of Stoicism and Christianity were united, and how that which was inherent in the Stoic conception, when it came to expression in the seventeenth century, burst the bonds of the ecclesiastical institution. Working from the religious background, it may indeed be upheld with some show of reason, that the doctrine of 'natural rights' was but the logical outcome of the Protestant revolt against traditional authority. At any rate, the religious conception of individualism is not to be severed from the stream of individualism which we have traced from the Stoic conception up through the doctrines of 'natural rights' and 'natural liberty'.

The connection of Calvinism with Stoicism, it may be remarked, is very easily perceived. The Stoics had looked upon man as a citizen of a universal commonwealth under the "Spermatikos Logos" or governing reason. Fuse this conception with the doctrines of the Sovereignty of God and Predestination, and Calvinism is the result. The emphasis upon the 'rational life' is strikingly similar in Stoicism and the Calvinistic version of Christianity.

¹⁵ "The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches" by E. Troeltsch, p.p. 160, 1.

Calvinism and Puritanism(which is largely infused with the doctrines of Calvin) played a very large part in the formation of the type of individualism we have inherited. Especially should we notice the intimate connection of the rise of modern capitalism with this religious background. When we say that capitalism is intimately connected with the background of Protestant religion,we are not thinking of capitalism in the naive manner which would make it equivalent to the impulse for acquisition or the mere pursuit of gain. "Capitalism may even be identical with the restraint,or at least a rational tempering,of this irrational impulse. But capitalism is identical with the pursuit of profit,and forever renewed profit,by means of continuous,rational,capitalistic enterprise...The important fact is always that a calculation of capital in terms of money is made,whether by modern book-keeping methods or in any other way,however primitive and crude. Everything is done in terms of balances:at the beginning of the enterprise an initial balance,before every individual decision a calculation to ascertain its probable profitableness,and at the end a final balance to ascertain how much profit has been made."

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Historically,this type of capitalism has been developed along with,and created by,the Calvinistic and some other types of Protestant thought.

Calvinism is dominated by two fundamental doctrines,

namely the Sovereignty of God and Predestination. The two doctrines are intimately related, the second being the means of the first. Calvin felt that his iron-clad system was the logical outcome of an interpretation of Scripture, especially the writings of Paul, and particularly Paul's epistle to the Romans. That Calvin made an unwarrantable deduction from this epistle is, I think, very clearly pointed out by Professor John Wright Buckham in an article in "Religion and Life" entitled "The Misunderstood Epistle".¹⁷

However, Calvin drew the deduction that "from all eternity by an eternal and immutable counsel God has once for all determined both whom he would admit to salvation and whom he would condemn to destruction".¹⁸ And Calvin further declared that "there is no discordance between these two things - God's having appointed from all eternity on whom he will bestow his favor and exercise his wrath, and his proclaiming salvation indiscriminately to all".¹⁹ Only God knows who is to be saved and who is to be damned. Some individuals are elected to be 'saved' and others are, just as irrevocably, elected to be 'damned'. At a time when the other and eternal world was thought to be more real than the mundane world, the most pressing question that could be asked was: "Am I saved or am I damned?" It then became very important to attempt to discover how this problem could be solved, if indeed it was solvable at all. It was

¹⁷ Winter Number, 1933, p.p. 110 - 118.

¹⁸ Institutes of the Christian Religion, 111, 21, 7.

¹⁹ Ibid., 111, 24, 17.

not sufficient to rely on a 'feeling' as to whether one was damned or not for Calvinism frowned upon emotion as a means by which this point might be decided. The individual who embraced the Calvinist doctrine was always faced with the question: 'chosen or damned?' To surrender to the 'magnificent consistency' of this doctrine was to experience an unutterable loneliness of the inner life. No priest could help such a one to decide his fate. The sacraments could not help him to attain to election, if he had not already been chosen by God. No church could help him, for the membership of the church included both the doomed and the saved - the tares were growing with the wheat. Even God was unable to help him, for Christ had died only for the elect, and the question still remained for the disquieted soul - was he one of these? It seems that the Calvinist was never able to determine beyond all question of doubt whether he belonged to the redeemed or to the lost. But he strove to discover, as best he could, some indication of his position before God. He felt that at least some light could be thrown upon his predetermined position, by the success or failure of his worldly pursuits. Calvin strongly emphasized the Old Testament in which 'prosperity' is generally taken as a sign of God's favor. Also, "Calvin was not opposed to private property nor to the endeavor to acquire wealth, provided that all is done honestly, moderately, and united with a generous charitable activity. It all serves the good of the community (of the Church), of

the State, and thus the glory of God".²⁰ Seeing that the mysticism of Luther was not accepted, how was one to set about obeying Paul's command: "Try your own selves, whether ye be in the faith: prove your own selves"? (2 Cor. XIII. 5.) If there was no method of absolute proof, a pretty fair indication might perhaps be had through the channel of works. Works could not indeed purchase salvation, but they might be the technical means of minimising the fear of damnation. These 'works' were to be pursued, not for one's own pleasure nor for material satisfaction, but for the greater glory of God: they seemed to be the only means for making one's calling and election sure. "It is not for our released and light-minded generation", says J. W. Buckham, "to condemn the serious and devoted Christians of a period less privileged than ours. In all good faith they accepted what they thought they must and 'wrought in sad sincerity' deeds that have purified and ennobled their heritage to us and done much to offset the evil effects of their doctrinal system."²¹

However, the connection of the emphasis which Calvinism placed upon 'works' with the spirit of modern capitalism, is very evident. This type of individualism led to a certain hardness in the pursuit of the evidences

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"The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches", by E. Troeltsch p. 600.

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Article above referred to in Religion and Life, p. 114

of one's election in the success of his calling. It led to a demand to be unhampered by limiting conditions in the pursuit of a calling. It led to the religious motive becoming fused with capitalistic enterprise. "God blesseth his trade" was a remark often passed about a man who was successful in business. There went along with this attitude a certain hardness or uncharitableness towards any who were 'unsuccessful', who apparently had had the opportunity for 'success'. Charity was given to the 'halt', the 'lame' and the 'blind' - God's almighty poor - but, with regard to others, the maxim was adopted: 'if a man will not work neither shall he eat'. The spirit of capitalism was tremendously reenforced when it was made equivalent to man's most intense desire to know whether he was eternally damned or eternally saved. "In fact, the summum bonum of this ethic, the earning of more and more money, combined with the strict avoidance of all spontaneous enjoyment of life, is above all completely devoid of any eudaemonistic, not to say hedonist admixture. It is thought of so purely as an end in itself, that from the point of view of the happiness of, or utility to, the single individual, it appears entirely transcendental and absolutely irrational. Man is dominated by the making of money, by acquisition as the ultimate purpose of his life. Economic acquisition is no longer subordinated to man as the means for the satisfaction of his material needs. This reversal of what we should call the natural relationship, so irrational from a naive point of view, is

evidently as definitely a leading principle of capitalism as it is foreign to all peoples not under capitalistic influence. At the same time it expresses a type of feeling which is closely connected with certain religious ideas. If we thus ask, why should 'money be made out of men' Benjamin Franklin himself, although he was a colorless deist, answers in his autobiography with a quotation from the Bible, which his strict Calvinistic father had drummed into him again and again in his youth: "Seest thou a man diligent in business? He shall stand before kings".

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(Prov. XXII.29)

The whole of this religious individualism which became bound up with capitalism was dominated by the idea that a man must live a rationally ordered life: he must, in his private concerns, be in accord with the rationality expressed in the Universe under the law of predestination. Nothing must be indulged in which is irrational - that was the objection to card-playing, for it was a game which magnified the element of chance. This was also the objection to theatrical performances, for they set up a make-believe world which was confusing in a plan of life where each man was required 'to work out his own salvation with fear and trembling'.

Perhaps we have said enough to briefly sketch the Calvinist background of our inherited individualism.

It should be noted, however, that, when success in one's calling became a main religious consideration, the ethical aspect of that success would not be so closely considered. 'Business is business' would be the accepted maxim. "We shall expect to find that the influence of Calvinism was exerted more in the direction of the liberation of energy for private acquisition. For in spite of all the formal legalism of the elect, Goethe's remark applied often enough to the Calvinist: 'The man of action is always ruthless; no one has a conscience but an observer.'²³"

Capitalism has long since cast off its Calvinistic garments: it is not now allied with the spirit of asceticism, nor with the spirit of religion. Neither the spirit of the age in which capitalism has recently flourished, nor the spirit of our present age, is at all en rapport with the spirit of Richard Baxter or of Jonathan Edwards. But the ghost of this outworn individualism still lives on, in many unsuspected ways, to add confusion to our present problem of the relation of the individual to the common good.

One curious aspect of our inherited individualism might be noted before concluding this chapter. Of the two aspects of the concept of the individual, singleness and uniqueness, Calvinism may be said, from one point of view, to emphasize the latter; for it held that differ-

ences between individuals were ordained by God. On the other hand, the individualism developed from the abstract jus naturale of the Stoics, Locke, and Rousseau, laid the emphasis upon the singleness rather than upon the uniqueness of the individual. This form of individualism tends to issue in equalitarianism, and to find its expression in a democracy where an individual counts for one and no more than one. From another point of view, Calvinism may be said to emphasize the individual merely as a unit, for it considered that all men were equal as sinners before God. So, politicians in a democracy such as America, which inherits an individualism from a Calvinistic background, can argue both from the equality and the inequality of individuals: the inherited individualism contains a precedent for both points of view. When politicians wish to combat what is branded as 'socialism', they can draw upon that aspect of individualism which supports ordained inequalities. Also, when they wish to protest against a legislation which would help the under-privileged, they are able to appeal to the individualism (also contained in the Calvinistic tradition) which declares that all men are equal.

We are now in possession of some of the historical factors which fashioned the individualism of men as they entered the age which began with the industrial revolution. To show that such an individualism, carried forward into our present 'machine age', is particularly frustrating to the individual will be the task of our next chapter.

CHAPTER VI

THE FRUSTRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE 'MACHINE AGE'

It is, perhaps, somewhat misleading to use the commonly accepted term, 'machine age', to describe the kind of society in which we are living today. Our age is only partially the 'era of the machine'. Not the 'machine', taken by itself, but the 'machine' employed as the tool of an inherited individualism, is largely responsible for the confused and frustrated state of the individual today. Our age is the age of science which, in so many ways, has been liberating to the individual. But, our age is also the age of science applied to industry, and then permeated with an inherited individualism. This latter alliance has, so far, culminated in the frustration rather than the liberation of the individual. The most pressing task of the age is to bring the individual into closer harmony with a social structure which is so largely affected by the results of applied science. To do this it appears that it will be necessary to develop a new individualism. And, on the other hand, it will be found necessary to control the social structure, so that it will tend to liberate rather than to frustrate the individual. Our age has been busy in applying science to industry so that we have the means in our hands to turn the economics of scarcity into the economics of abundance. Problems of production seem to be well-nigh solved. But our age has not been so successful in bringing within the grasp of every man a new security and fulness

of life, which could be the result of science as applied to industry. The individual, qua individual, is tantalized by the thought that the means for a greater self-realization and happiness are in sight, but that social conditions place them beyond his grasp. We are not saying that there has been no improvement in the lot of the individual as such, but we are saying that the gap between what might be and what is, is made unnecessarily large by our inherited individualism. One is not consciously frustrated by what he regards as outside the limits of possibility. One is not keenly conscious of frustration on account of conditions which lie beyond the power of man to change. Like Margaret Fuller, one then decides to 'accept the universe'. But one is keenly conscious of frustration when the frustrating conditions lie in the constitution of a society, which is largely constituted by the acceptance of these conditions on the part of the individuals of whom one's social milieu is composed.

"Modern Science", says Christopher Dawson, "owes its birth to the union of the creative genius of the Renaissance with the mathematical idealism of Platonic metaphysics. This romantic marriage was the source not only of a new physical synthesis, but of the vast material and economic progress of the modern world."¹ This is true, but we have to remember that there was another marriage, not

¹ "Progress and Religion", p. 184

quite so romantic:that of our inherited individualism with industry clothed in the bridal array of science. If one wished to pursue the metaphor,one might say that we of the machine age are the issue of this marriage.

In so far as we may look upon our age as the age of science,we may surely look upon it as an age of liberation. Taken by itself,the scientific method is a tool which has broken down many doors of superstition and falsity. Applied to history,it has set a standard of greater accuracy. Applied to religion,it has been the enemy of obscurantism, delivering men from a blind belief in the miraculous. Says W. R. Inge,"It would not be fanciful to find some analogy between the joyous trust of Christ in the Father in heaven who makes His sun to rise on the evil and on the good,and without whom no sparrow falls to the ground,and the reverent spirit in which the man of science accepts whatever facts his studies reveal to him,confident that 'the universe is friendly'to him who devotes himself without reserve to the discovery of truth."² But it is not with the benefits of science in themselves that we shall have to do in this chapter,but rather with the union of science to industry which produced the age of industrialism. Especially,shall we be interested in the bond which has cemented the union,namely our inherited individualism. We shall be interested,first of all,in the contact of this individualism with what is known as the Industrial Revolution.

² "Christian Ethics and Modern Problems" by W. R. Inge,p.218.

The period of the Industrial Revolution is usually taken to have begun about 1760 and to have ended about 1830. The industrial revolution really began when two remarkable inventions changed the complexion of the agricultural and industrial scene. The 'spinning jenny' of Hargreaves and Arkwright was invented about 1767, and Watt's steam engine in 1786. Within fifty years English society was transformed by the rise of the factory system and the consequent division of labor. The introduction of machinery rendered possible a vast increase in the products of industry, but it had a certain narrowing effect upon the lives of men employed under the new conditions. Before the beginning of the industrial revolution industry was comparatively localized within limited areas. The 'homestead' was a fairly self-contained unit. If one homestead happened by accident to be abolished, the effect upon the industry of the others was not apparent. Articles were produced singly in this era of handicraft and the workman took a pride in his work. He was able to find in creative work an expression of what Veblen has called 'the instinct of workmanship'. I do not think, however, that we ought to paint the picture of pioneer life - in America or anywhere else - prior to the coming of the industrial revolution, in too glowing colors. We are apt to idealize the individualism of the pioneer in order to show, by contrast, how the individual is frustrated in the realization of his desires for freedom and happiness by the conditions of the 'machine age'. The individualism of the pioneer was narrow enough when we

view it from within. His life was circumscribed and narrowly determined. The constant labor involved in securing the necessities of life left very little room for the enjoyment of books, of works of art, of music. "For that matter the general level of the pioneer life may well have been lower than that, in present times, of the city's very poor. For these, in spite of the grinding conditions of present-day industry, have a certain choice of occupation, a certain variety of companionship and interest. Their life can hardly be so lacking in stimulus and opportunity for thought. It must be remembered that the early life of the wilderness was no vacation camping-trip of an over-stimulated city-man, seeking leisure and opportunity for thought. For any free flight of the imagination there was neither leisure nor stimulus. It is true that a few men of genuine intellectual power rose out of these conditions; but we have only to remember the struggles (e.g., of Lincoln) to obtain the rudiments of an education to appreciate how far the conditions were in general those of spiritual bondage." ³ All this is very true, but it is also true that the individual's life was fairly well harmonized within narrow limits. The problem which is presented to us in the relation of the individual to the 'machine age', however, is not primarily one of contrast with any idealized picture of the glorious liberty and happiness of the pioneer. It is rather the problem of finding a way by which the individual may be integrated within himself and harmonized with the much vaster

possibilities which the 'machine age' has brought to light. To bring it about that an individual may be congruent with the larger life of the world made possible by the industrial age, as secure and free within the manifold material and spiritual products of the new age as he was within the narrower atmosphere of the homestead - that is our problem. The contrast is not with the past, but with the latent possibilities which lie within the present. To state the problem, as I have just stated it, namely that the individual in our present age may become as closely fitted to modern society as the pioneer was fitted to his society, will probably appear as too idealistic. Of course, it is idealistic, and like all ideals, will never be actually attained: 'a man's reach should exceed his grasp, or what's a heaven for.' But the presence in consciousness of an ideal of individualism, closely knit with the society which the 'machine age' makes possible, is very real. We cannot surrender it without surrendering the hope that we shall move towards an actual state of affairs in which the inner life of the individual will no longer remain frustrated by the outward conditions set up by the advent of the machine.

But let us return to a consideration of the conditions which were brought about by the industrial revolution. The application of steam to industry, and later on, electricity and other forms of power, made mass production possible. Along with this went another factor, the division of labor. An article was no longer made by one craftsman, but one workman made one part and another

made another part, and so on. Now, this state of affairs has produced a paradoxical result. Viewed from without, society as a whole was closely knit together: there was an interpenetration of all the parts. As the process begun by the division of labor has developed, there has also come about an increasing interdependence of one individual upon others, of one trade upon others, and of one nation upon others. In place of the mutual independence of the old 'homestead' type of society, we have the mutual dependence of the type of society, fostered by the age of industrialism. More and more, it has come about that what happens anywhere is felt everywhere. Today, it would not be incorrect to say that what happens in one corner of the earth is felt in all parts of the globe. In place of the local market there has developed the world market. No one country has within itself quite all which it needs to run the machinery of industry. The United States, for example, must go outside its own boundaries for tin, rubber, coffee and many other things. With the world market, there has also come into being a different conception of money. We have now the vast system of credit. Not much actual cash changes hands. Also, one nation's currency is sensitive to another's. This objectivity of an interdependent society is one side of the picture. But now turn to the subjectivity of the individual as he finds himself situated within this mosaic of an interdependent society. Objectively, the industrial age has bound an individual more closely to society as a whole; but subjectively, it has tended to make him more isolated. Objectively, the fortunes of an individual are affected by

the whole tissue of a world that is interdependent. But, as a subjective individual, how can he hope to grasp the situation as a whole? He appears to be buried beneath the vast world-fabric, frustrated by a kind of brute force about which he is able to comprehend very little. The situation is somewhat the same for the individual whether he thinks of it, on the small scale, as it affects his work, or, on the large scale, as he is supposed to cast an intelligent vote on matters involving the whole. Work is robbed of a great part of the joy of creativity under the division of labor. The workman is like a cog in a vast mechanism. The specialized function which he performs contributes its part to the outward knitting-up of society, but the part which he plays becomes for him a routine task - just something to be done. And, oftentimes, he is forced to spend so much of his time upon the one uninteresting thing which claims him, that he is debarred from attempting to take an intelligent interest in the affairs of a 'democracy'. Hence it comes about, from this paradoxical state of affairs, that, whereas the world is outwardly international, the inward attitude of the individuals composing this closely knitted world tends to become more and more nationalistic and provincial. A further effect is that, whereas the field of possible knowledge has vastly increased, the opportunity for most individuals to explore that knowledge, or even to be interested in it, has diminished.

It is significant that the industrial revolution began in a period of the world's history, when the

nations wherein it appeared, were not disposed to recognize and control its frustrating influence upon the individual. "Western Europe, in the throes of the long and exhausting Napoleonic war, was quite unprepared to deal with the new problems raised by the progress of mass-production. England especially, where the new processes were mostly discovered, had no leisure to do anything else except preserve its existence.... Then came the peace and the recovery.... Hard work, low wages, and thrift were necessary to give England that predominance as a manufacturing country which it desired to obtain... When politicians and ecclesiastics inveigh in unmeasured terms against the social system which produced these results, we may remind them that every great achievement involves self-denial and severe labour, and that the employers took their share in promoting what they believed to be the welfare of their country." ⁴ We might add to this statement that England, in her effort to rehabilitate herself after the Napoleonic wars, prevented, as far as possible, the establishment of industry in the colonies. She attempted to keep the knowledge of new inventions secret, so that she might have a monopoly thereof. But this could not be done for long. It is a well known fact that Samuel Slater memorized the details of certain inventions in the cotton industry, and, in 1789, set up - in Pawtucket Rhode Island - a mill equipped with the new machinery. But

⁴ "Christian Ethics and Modern Problems", by W. R. Inge, p.p. 246, 9.

public sentiment in England forced the government to pass laws to control the effects of the industrial age, long before there was any such legislation in the United States. In America the evolution of what Graham Wallas has called 'the great society' was more gradual. "The fundamental changes of the industrial revolution were wrought into the fabric of American business life along with the expansion of that life. Hence the spirit of the machine process is more gradually but more deeply ingrained into the thought and life of America than of any other great nation. We accept its philosophy all the more readily because we have known no other system. We lack the perspective enjoyed by the Englishman that enabled him the better to grasp the meaning of these fundamental changes and provided him with a point of view for their evaluation and control. The problem of the machine process in America, therefore, is not so much a matter of the disruption of old social traditions as the more vital question of the effect of the reign of the machine upon human nature and the spirit of free democratic institutions." ⁵ One of the important factors which enabled the results of the machine process to be more ingrained in the life of America than elsewhere was the fact that the frontier could always be pushed farther back. There was always the new territory where individuals, frustrated by the conditions of industry, could find comparative freedom from their pressure.

There is another factor which we ought to note in considering the impact of the Great Society upon the individual. This factor is largely connected with the name of Karl Marx, and is known as 'economic determinism'. This factor puts economic considerations in the forefront of human life. The individual is the 'economic man'. The industrial age has had the effect of making the economic aspect of human life appear to be more important than any other aspect. Economic considerations are said to be basic. There is, however, a confusion in the use of this term, 'basic'. For the economic determinist, economic values were supposed to be of more intrinsic importance than anything else. They were basic in the sense that they had the greatest claim upon man's activity. But, as a matter of fact, economic values, represented by money, have no intrinsic value whatever. They are only important as means and not as ends. It is true, as Aristotle said, that 'before a man can live well, he must first live'. As instrumental values, economic values are indeed basic, but as intrinsic values they are not basic at all. When a steamer puts out to sea, it is necessary to have men down in the hold shovelling coal. But no steamer, unless manned by a crew of madmen, puts out to sea in order that the men may have the pleasure of shovelling coal in the hold. It puts out to sea because it has some other objective, some port to which it is bending its course. The economic values are basic because they are instrumental for the realization of the intrinsic values. The intrinsic values for which the economic values are instrumental have been

listed by W. G. Everett as follow:- Bodily Values, Values of Recreation, Values of Association, Character Values, Aesthetic Values, Intellectual Values, and the Religious Values.⁶ The main business of life ought to lie in the realization of these values. The higher are dependent upon the lower - as Nicolai Hartmann would say. It is a reversal of the real dignity of living when the lower values are placed above those which are 'axiologically' higher. The human values must be placed above the economic values. Kant was right when he said that man must always be considered as an end and never as a means. And the frustration of individual culture is not the least disaster which befalls an individual under the economic determinism which has come to prevail under the conditions of the 'great society'. "It is a commonplace that the problem of the relation of mechanistic and industrial civilization to culture is the deepest and most urgent problem of our day."⁷ "The question is not merely a quantitative one. It is not a matter of an increased number of persons who will take part in the creation and enjoyment of art and science. It is a qualitative question. Can a material, industrial civilization be converted into a distinctive agency for liberating the minds and refining the emotions of all who take part in it? The

⁶ "Moral Values", by W. G. Everett, p.182

⁷ "Individualism - Old and New", by John Dewey, p.124.

cultural question is a political and economic one before it is a definitely cultural one."⁸ The economic question is, then, basic in the sense that it must be attended to before the intrinsic cultural values can be appropriated. The question which Mr Dewey has raised, 'can a material, industrial civilization be converted into a distinctive agency for liberating the minds and refining the emotions of all who take part in it', cannot be answered in the affirmative unless the individual can find an area of life which is not dominated by the thought patterns which the machine process has set up. The individual will need to protest effectively against the whole of life becoming subject to a mode of interpretation patterned upon the machine process. Man has other and intrinsic values, as enumerated by Everett in the list quoted above, which are not to be realized in the same way as we are apparently forced today to realize the 'basic' economic values. We shall need to withstand the invasion of our spiritual, artistic, and ethical life by the thought forms engendered by the machine process. We shall need to take advantage of the technology of industry so that less time may be given to meeting the basic requirements of physical existence, and more time may be given to the individual to 'live his life'. We shall need to realize that man has a life to live which is not to be measured by the methods which he is forced to adopt in

'earning his living'. The machine process will become more and more frustrating to the individual if it is allowed to dominate the whole of his existence and thought. On the other hand, it has within it the possibility of a great liberation if it can be restricted, as far as possible, to its own proper realm which is the economic.

However, what we have said in the above paragraph must not be understood to mean that we can isolate our economic concerns from our other concerns. When all is said and done, the intrinsic values will have to be won within the framework of the machine process: we cannot fence off certain areas of our life and put up a notice, 'trespassers will be prosecuted'. No one living, whatever may be his occupation, can altogether escape the influences of the machine age. The best he can do is to claim the right to *realize* the intrinsic values within the framework of the mechanized age in which he lives, and to be on his guard against the pressure which that framework exerts, lest even the deepest reaches of his life be moulded thereby. Living in Western civilization today, no one can escape a certain amount of 'slavery' to mechanized processes: the machine requires tribute for the advantages which it gives. Man has been required to learn to adapt himself to a civilization that literally goes by clockwork. Man's working, sleeping, and recreational hours are measured by a quantitative, 'standard' time. Our life is mechanized by means of watches and electric clocks. The machine age has greatly increased our consciousness of the seconds which everyman's

watch is measuring. The railroad system would break down were it not that the movements of the trains are synchronized with watches which record the standard time. The division of labor is often characterized by allotting to each individual a certain amount of labor to be done in a certain specified time. We hardly realize how difficult it would be for a savage, suddenly introduced into our civilization, to adapt himself to the scheduled hours and even seconds which for most purposes must be observed with accuracy. And modern man has not only to accustom himself to the mechanical division of time, but he has to learn to adjust his nerves to the speed with which things are done within specified times. The 'tempo' of life is much greater in the age in which we are living than it was in any other age of history. It is remarkable that the human organism has been able to adjust itself to the speed at which we live today. Nevertheless there is a price to be paid by the individual for the way in which he is driven by the 'tempo' of our modern society. The toll is paid in exhausted nervous energy and in a depleted vitality. The physical necessity that men, caught within the whirl of modern mechanized society, should have regular vacations, is perhaps an indication of the unnatural strain that is placed upon them. The physical frame and brain of man is not adapted to keep pace with the inexorable demands of a machine. "Not least convincing is the fact that a considerable proportion of those who are held unremittingly to the service of the machine process 'break down', fall

into premature decay. Physically and spiritually these modern peoples are better adapted to life under conditions radically different from those imposed by this modern technology. All of which goes to show...that however exacting and however pervasive the discipline of the machine process may be, it cannot, after all, achieve its perfect work in the way of habituation in the population of Christendom as it stands. The limit of tolerance native to the race, physically and spiritually, is short of that unmitigated materialism and unremitting mechanical routine to which⁹ the machine technology incontinently drives."

Not only does the machine process - unless relief can be found from its demands - impose a burden upon man's physical nature, but its methods are not in themselves hospitable to man's spiritual aspirations. The logic of machine technology is purely impersonal. In itself, it has no place for teleological nor personal considerations. It is indeed true that the results of the machine technology are often employed for ends useful to man. But the end which may be in view is achieved by purely mechanical means. These latter are most prominently before the worker. Indeed all of us are more conscious of the machine 'process' than we are of any ends which it serves. Man has immensely increased the means by which he lives, but he has not at all propor-

tionately increased the ends for which he lives.

The end which the machine industry has in view is mainly a pecuniary one: it has no large and comprehensive view of any end beyond itself, by which it could become preeminently a servant to man's spiritual needs. Industry is most conscious of the financial results and the mechanical processes by which these results may be secured. As to the end, or ends, which are to be achieved in their own personalities, both the 'workers' and the 'captains of industry' appear to be at a loss to say what they are. "Assured and integrated individuality is the product of definite social relationships and publicly acknowledged functions. Judged by this standard, even those who seem to be in control, and to carry the expression of their individual abilities to a high pitch, are submerged. They may be captains of finance and industry, but until there is some consensus of belief as to the meaning of finance and industry in civilization as a whole, they cannot be captains of their own souls - their beliefs and aims. They exercise leadership surreptitiously and, as it were, absent-mindedly. They lead, but it is under cover of impersonal and socially undirected economic forces. Their reward is found not in what they do, in their social office and function, but in a deflection of social consequences to private gain. They receive the acclaim and command the envy of the crowd, but

the crowd is also composed of private individuals who are equally lost to a sense of social bearings and uses." ¹⁰

In the machine technology, then, attention is mainly directed to the processes themselves. Now, there are two paramount principles which have become habits of thought to those immersed in machine processes - the principle of contiguous causation and the principle of the conservation of energy. The first principle is, to some extent, taken over from the era of handicraft. A workman was then in direct touch with his tools and the material with which he was working. The result was brought about by direct contact. The same conception was taken over into the machine process. The principle worked with is that of cumulative or contactual causality: A is the cause of B, and B is the cause of C, and C is the cause of D, and so on. In order to be a cause, any factor must be in touch, either directly or through a chain of causes, with the result which it produces. This is what J. S. Mill called the 'nine-pin' conception of causality. For its operation no teleology whatever needs to be assumed. It is a purely impersonal conception: the end to which it may lead is purely a matter of experiment. This conception is ingrained in the machine technology. Along with it, goes the belief that no cause can act from a distance without physical contact. Todhunter, for example, was hard put to it to explain how it was that gravitation acted, as it seemed,

through empty space. But this type of causation is not suitable to throw any light upon the ends for which man lives. Now, in order to arrive at the significance of processes of history and the development of institutions, it is not sufficient merely to cite the contiguous precedent. The theory misses the significance of man's mental life, as will be seen by a reference to the associational psychology. In these matters, where we are dealing with what may be called the 'spiritual', the conception of a controlling idea must be invoked. It is the theme which controls the ideas in a book; a book does not get written by one idea giving rise to the next, and that to the following, and so on. The same is true in music and in all the arts. Religion also cannot dispense with the principle of a controlling idea. But, confronted incessantly with the notion of mechanical causation used in the technology of industry, man tends to forget that it embodies a principle or manner of thinking, which is very inadequate if applied to life as a whole. Hence Veblen is able to write: "Neither the manner of life imposed by the machine process, nor the manner of thought inculcated by habituation to its logic, will fall in with the free movement of the human spirit, born, as it is, to fit the conditions of savage life. So there comes an irrepressible - in a sense congenital - recrudescence of magic, occult science, telepathy, spiritualism, vitalism, pragmatism." ¹¹ Bergson, perhaps more

than any other, has given expression to the dissatisfaction which the deeper human spirit feels with this mechanical theory of causation. His elan de la vie is a protest, in the name of the human spirit, against the impersonal and coldly intellectual processes of mechanization.

The other principle with which the machine technology worked was that of the conservation of energy or matter. This principle can, of course, be discovered in speculative thought long before the machine age. It is practically synonymous with the Latin dictum ex nihilo nihil fit. However, prior to the machine age, and all through the hand-craft era, it was believed that the world had had a beginning in time and that it would have an ending. Under the notion that there was a certain definite amount of energy which could neither be created nor destroyed, men, during the machine age, became less and less interested in the faith that the world had a Creator. Of course the principle of the conservation of energy could not be proved, but it came to be naively accepted as fundamental to mechanical technology. We have here, again, a principle which is suitable to mechanical processes, but which becomes inadequate when it is unwarrantably extended, as a principle of explanation, beyond those processes. And the temptation to so extend it is very great; for men, in a machine age, become habituated to the employment of this principle in the preponderance of things with which they have to do. So there arises a state of skepticism with regard to any real creativity. Men be-

come adjusted to the principle which seems to govern the closed system with which they are working. The whole of life tends to become mechanized in thought, and no questions are asked with regard to what was prior or what will be subsequent to the closed mechanical system which seems to fill the whole mental horizon. "This modern technology is a technology of mechanical process; it looks to and takes care of a sequence of mechanical action, rather than to the conditions of its inception and the sequel of its conclusion. A mind imbued with the logic of this machine process does not by habitual proclivity or with incisive effect attend to these alien matters that have no meaning within the horizon¹² of that logic." On the whole, the methods of machine technology tend to inculcate an impersonal and matter of fact relationship towards the facts which are handled. This attitude is unfavorable to the development of spiritual traits. Man tends to think of himself, in his entirety, according to the patterns of thought which his constant habituation to the machine processes develop within him. He misses his own greatness. Instead of being master of the machine, the machine becomes his master, even in the processes of his thought. By the principle of disuse, he tends to lose the power to appreciate anything to which the principles of contiguous causation and the conservation of energy can not be applied. He becomes a victim of his own 'methodolatry' - to use a

coined word. Everything, for him, must be measured in quantitative and impersonal terms. And yet, he is restless and dissatisfied with the interpretation, of himself and his world, which seems to be forced upon him. We recall that Darwin, at the close of his life, lamented the fact that he had become a kind of machine for grinding out generalizations from collections of particular facts; and that he pathetically said that, if he had his life to live over again, he would make it his business, at least once a week, to listen to some great music, or to read some moving poetry.

The question of the harmonious relation of the individual to society in the industrial age has been immensely complicated by our inherited individualism. For we recall that the individualism in vogue just prior to the industrial revolution did just that thing to which Dewey has objected: it placed the instrumental and economic values before the intrinsic values. This attitude, carried forward into the 'great society' has become known as the 'profit motive'. "The middle ages", says W. R. Inge, "had made religion a business: the nineteenth century made business a religion. I need not go to America for an illustration: the Times obituary notice of Holloway (of the pills) will suffice. 'Money-making is an art by itself; it demands for success the devotion of the whole man. Sleeping or waking, his thoughts must be devoted to it. It is not everyone who is capable of such single-hearted attention as this. Most men wish to be wealthy, but with a want of steadiness and

singleness of purpose. Politics or love are great things to them; they are not willing to give them up as so many snares by which the path of money-making is beset.¹³ On the negative side, the task which confronts our generation - and perhaps many succeeding generations - is to find a way of dealing effectively with the usurpation of the deeper interests of individualism by a paramount pecuniary interest. What a comment upon a professed individualism is this, that it subordinates the real principle of individuality which must always belong to the mind, to the demand of a few 'rugged' individualists to have a clear field in which to make money! What a travesty it is that society has drifted into the position of accepting such a substitute for a real individualism which can never be separated from the deepest needs of society! That a few self-assertive persons should exploit the discoveries of science for pecuniary gain as against society in the name of 'individualism' ought to challenge men to find a newer and nobler content for the word they have invoked. That many business men see in business a nobler end in the form of service to society rather than the sole end of profits for themselves is not to be denied. But always the 'big business' of the 'great society' is forced to ask of any proposed activity, not, 'is it good for the service of men?' but 'will it return monetary profits?' To the scientists must go the credit

of placing in our hands the possibilities for the greater good of society. These 'disinterested madmen who died poor' were actuated by a nobler motive than that of profit for themselves. Society - contrary to the opinion of many business men - would surely have found a way to make use of scientific inventions without linking them up with a paramount pecuniary interest. It is, indeed, not to the interest of society that pecuniary interests should be the sole interests considered by business. Business, it is true, has its technologists, but their function in business is always to discover what will pay, not what is most useful for society - if it will not pay. And the law safeguards, oftentimes, not what is good for society, but what will further the pecuniary interests of business concerns. "The 'producers', 'manufacturers', 'captains of industry', whose interests are safeguarded by current legislation and by the guardians of law and order are the business men who have a pecuniary interest in industrial affairs; and it is their pecuniary interests that are so safeguarded, in the naive faith that the material interests of the community at large coincide with the opportunities for gain so secured by the business men." In this comment, Veblen has disclosed the real danger to the common good which lies in the 'profit motive' when it becomes the controlling aim of business. The real danger lies in the union of the pecuniary interests of business with certain forms of current legislation; that legal en-

actments have equipped it with a power which it would not otherwise have, and that, by means of this power, it is able to exploit the under-privileged. Legalized exploitation is quite a different thing from the legal protection of justifiable pecuniary interests. The profit motive (apart from its legalized power as an instrument of exploitation) ought not to be condemned in a wholesale fashion, either from the point of view of the individual or that of the common good. When transactions take place there ought to be a mutual profit which accrues to both parties. George Herbert Palmer writes: "Buyer and seller establish a kind of mutuality. Suppose a customer on coming to my store and putting down his five dollars for a pair of shoes should suddenly bethink himself and say: 'I wonder if you are not cheating me. That pair of shoes cost you not more than four dollars and seventy-five cents. By your price you are taking twenty-five cents more from my pocket than you are delivering to me.' Might I not answer? 'It seems to me it is you who are cheating me. You need those shoes more than you need five dollars. You would give five dollars and a quarter rather than go without them. Are you not, then, returning to my pocket twenty-five cents less than you are receiving?' In reality neither of us has cheated. We have merely made a legitimate profit from one another. Such mutual profit is involved in all good bargaining." Such a mutuality of profit is not contrary to the beneficent re-

lation of the individual to the common good, but contributory thereto. The 'profit motive' is only to be condemned when it becomes the consuming and sole end of business transactions. However, it is this latter kind of profit motive which the business of the machine age has fostered. Ingrained as it is in our industrial society, it is very difficult to say whether this kind of profit motive could be abolished in some new form of society. There are hints, however, that the psychological difficulty may not be so great as some of us are inclined to think that it is. In some walks of life the functional aspect has preference over any other. This is most conspicuous, perhaps, in the professions. The functional aspect is uppermost in the professions of teaching, of medicine, of the Christian ministry, of the British civil service, and - yes - of the soldier. It is not a psychological necessity that the 'profit motive' should surpass the functional motive in business, if business had a chance to function for a real mutuality of profit. Why - at least psychologically - could not the 'professional spirit' be uppermost in business? Palmer writes again: "How different is the professional spirit! (from that spirit which finds no real satisfaction in its work) It took up its work originally not as a task but as a chance to gratify a personal interest. To following that interest through all its windings its heart has been given. Throughout there has been a passion for perfection, never realized, never abandoned. Each day carries accomplishment forward and discovers wider ranges into which skill might extend. Hard-

ship, lack of gain, failure to be recognized, are matters of slender consequence. The work itself is its own rich reward." ¹⁶

The condemnation of the 'profit motive', in its sinister meaning, is that it tends to dislocate the functional aspect of industry, and also to destroy the real profit motive which is a mutuality of benefit including pecuniary profit.

It is one thing to frankly acknowledge that we all have pecuniary interests which we wish to safeguard, but it is another thing to place those interests above everything else. It is a degrading state of affairs when money is the real god worshipped in a community. To regard the world as full of a number of potential dollars or pounds sterling and to consider the sole business of life as consisting in turning them into real ones, is to live upon a very low level indeed. But, if economic values are basic, although only instrumentally so, they certainly ought to be safeguarded. Shakespeare commits a literary exaggeration when he says: "He who steals my purse, steals trash": he who steals my purse steals my basic requirements for living. However, Veblen has not in mind any legal protection against the exploitation of individuals when he speaks of 'current legislation to safeguard the pecuniary interests of the business men'. On the contrary, he is thinking of the business men as invoking current legislation which may be used to exploit others.

The machine age has produced an instrument adapted for possible exploitation which may take place under the sanction of law. I refer to the corporation. The real danger to the common good is not the profit motive alone, but the profit motive as exercised through the corporation. If Adam Smith's dictum, 'the consideration of his own private profit is the sole motive which determines the owner of any capital', be true, then the corporation is a most powerful organ for the unscrupulous execution of that motive.

The corporation is a special product of the machine age. In itself, qua corporation, it exists only for one purpose, namely the gaining of dividends. It merits the name which has been applied to it, 'the soulless corporation', for it is quite impersonal, a coldly rational machine for grinding out dividends. It is as impersonal in its working as any steel or wood invention of the machine age. The corporation consists of shareholders, board of management, and the manager. The practical management of the corporation is usually left to the manager, whose sole duty it is to make the industry pay. The pecuniary interests of the corporation - if such a soulless thing can be said to have interests - are safeguarded by a legal fiction by which the corporation has been granted the rights of a natural person. Strictly speaking it is not a person - it bears a closer resemblance to a machine. Once it has been created it goes on its determinate way with as much mechanical precision as any other machine. It is rational throughout; it is a machine built solely to ex-

pedite the production of profits. The entrance of any other human consideration would throw its machinery out of gear. And yet a corporation has the legal status of a natural person! And it claims the rights of a person! I have already, in Chapter 11, denied the accuracy of applying the term 'mind' to a group in anything but a metaphorical sense; but even the arguments usually advanced in favor of the existence of 'group minds' would not apply to a corporation. The corporation is not like a club in which all the members participate by reason of a close, personal, and well-informed knowledge of its affairs. If I buy stock in a railroad company I do not, as a rule, do so because I am interested in rolling stock, in the construction of railroad tracks &c. I buy the stock purely because I am interested in the pecuniary returns which I may receive from my investment. The corporation, as such, is not primarily interested in opening up the country for the benefit of citizens nor in the transportation of goods from one place to another. It is true that these are subsidiary interests; but they are interests at all only in proportion to the degree in which they return profits to the stockholders of the corporation. It may conceivably be against the interests of the corporation to put down lines for the purpose of opening up the country. No private corporations, for example, could be found to undertake the laying of extensive railroad tracks to open up the continent of Australia. So the task had to be undertaken by the governments of the States and the lines run at a loss. A stock-corporation is never anything less than a machine

for making profits. By no stretch of the imagination can it be regarded as a person. "Like every other machine it represents an abstract motive forcibly detached from other motives and sent out to operate alone; and when once set in operation its course is fatally determined. It is true that intelligence is required for its operation; but this intelligence is limited in its legitimate exercise to the task of keeping the machine in its predetermined course; it can never by any means assume to reconstruct the end, - not even to entertain considerations that would appeal to every individual stock holder. In a word, then, the corporation is by its very nature, as well as by the deliberate intention of its construction, impersonal, unresponsive, and irresponsible.¹⁷

Being a machine, the corporation escapes the application of traditional ethics to its operations. The stock-holders may indeed, in their private lives, subscribe to the customary traditional ethics; but their relation to the corporation is by no means an ethical one. The manager of a corporation may, in his private life, be kindly and just, but, in his official capacity, he guides a machine which is assembled solely for the making of profits. As manager, he cannot indulge any benevolent sentiments, for he is merely the representative of the stockholders who hold him responsible for returns upon their investments. The stockholders, indeed, know but little of the effect that 'cutting down expenses'

¹⁷ "Individualism" by Warner Fite, p. 254

and the exercise of 'efficiency' may have upon the lives of men who are dependent upon the corporation, not for dividends, but for their very means of subsistence. The corporation, as a lifeless machine, stands between the individual and the common good. And, let us remember that, before the law, the corporation has the same 'individual' rights as the natural individual whom it so often crushes beneath its pecuniary operations. In so far as the corporation is an 'individual', it is a corporate individual, the product of the State which creates its legal individuality. But its legal individuality is altogether different from the individuality of a natural person. No State could create a person, in the sense of a natural person such as a Shakespeare; nor could it create the lowliest person within its borders. For real individuals are such in the first place because of their self-conscious life. Self-conscious individuals as such can claim rights, even against the State. But the corporation, being solely created by the State has no rights in the same sense in which an actual person possesses rights. Created by the State, and given its legal standing by the State, it ought also to be controlled by the State. There are rights which a real individual possesses, rights to privacy, rights to liberty, and so on, which ought not to be granted to the corporation. A confusion arises when the corporation which is really a machine is recognized by the State as an individual. Being a machine, the corporation ought to be subject to rigid control by the State. "From the standpoint of individualism the status of the corporation before the State is very different from that of the individual person.

The latter may quite properly urge that his ends, as self-conscious ends, have a value in themselves, a value which it is for others to appreciate. And as an intelligent and responsible agent he may claim to have worth for all others who will come to terms with him. The corporation is an end only for others. In itself it stands for no value whatever. And when it appears with a claim for personal rights it has commonly left its responsibility at home. The others for whom it is supposed to stand are by special convention excused from appearing. Hence, on principles purely individualistic, where the individual may expect to be free, the corporation should be strictly controlled."

The frustration of the individual in the machine age is nowhere so evident as in his relation to the impersonal power of corporations. That power is often quite unscrupulous, linked with traffic in vice, linked with political corruption, linked with pecuniary interests which extend to the underworld of the great cities. However, the corporation is so integrally a part of the 'great society' that it could not be abolished without the downfall of the 'great society' itself. But the corporation can and must be controlled in the interests of the individual. And it can only be controlled by the development of a social conscience which can express itself through the action of the State. We must also get rid of the confusion which exists between individual rights and uncontrolled corporate privilege.



'Safeguarding the interests of the business men' has usually meant the latter. But what is the aim of the business man as such? Taussig answers, "The proximate aim of the business man is to make money. All is fish that comes to his net.

Unless restrained by the law or public opinion or moral scruples, he will turn to anything that promises a hand-

¹⁹some surplus over expenses." But the law, public opinion,

and the moral scruples of the business man, have not proved

themselves powerful enough to prevent the exploitation of

many victims by those who 'live by profit'. Nor can we say

that it is altogether the fault of the business man that

the profit motive, augmented by the machine process and the

corporation, continues to claim its victims. It will not do

to single out the business man as the arch sinner among us

in this regard. Every man who has an investment, possesses

a life insurance policy, or is employed by an endowed in-

stitution, shares the responsibility with the business man.

There are many business men who see the situation pretty

clearly, and whose moral scruples are aroused. But they

themselves are victims of the system. I am not thinking

of any particularly odious profiteering which sets out grimly

to make profit out of the misery of others. I am rather

thinking of the general frustration of many individuals which

goes along with the technique of business as set up by the

machine age. The 'moral scruples' of many single business

men, acting sporadically here and there, would not be ad-

equate to deal with the evils of our present order. If
 a business man possesses moral scruples - as of course many
 do - it is not correct nor fair to say with Taussig that
'all is fish that comes to the net of the business man'.
 But, unfortunately, it is correct to say that every business
 man, scruples or no scruples, is provided with a net of the
 same pattern. And if he will not use the net, then he will
 have to go out of business. But, even then, he cannot escape
 responsibility, for he is still a member of society which
 sanctions the net. Public opinion could be a greater restrain-
 ing influence; but it is notorious that it has not yet become
 as strong a deterrent to the harmful power of corporations
 as it is to the unsocial qualities of individuals. It still
 seems to be more respectable to steal a railroad than to
 rob a man of his purse. The frustration of the individual
 is accomplished by the conditions of the machine age cry-
 stallized into a system. The victim is not crushed primarily
 by the deliberate conspiring together of any section of
 the community such as the business men. Of course there are
 notorious examples of business men who are quite callous
 towards any of their fellow men who stand in the way of
 their financial gain. But, on the whole, the real problem of
 the frustrated individual, and the problem of others on his
 behalf, is constituted by the system itself. I hasten to
 add that I refer to the system as it has developed in our
machine age and as at present constituted. For I hold that
 the system has within it possibilities for human betterment
 and liberation which have not yet been released. We must

not prejudice these possibilities by turning to Fascism or Communism. There is no need to point out that these latter are, to say the very least, as frustrating to the individual as our system in its present state of development. The real problem in America is to find a way of dealing with the present frustration of many individuals - of us all if we realized it - without turning either to Fascism or Communism. But the frustrated individual indeed does have a quarrel with those who constitute themselves spokesmen for the unmodified social system as it has developed from the industrial revolution up to the present. The public conscience needs to be on its guard against those who seek to maintain unaltered the social conditions of the machine age which have proved so crushing to its victims. It is preposterous, for example, to use the word 'Liberty' - so often used by the upholders of what has become the status quo - as expressing a genuine quality of a system which robs individuals of all real liberty. Liberty for whom! The machine age, rightly controlled in the interests of the many, may indeed mean liberty for the many, instead of liberty, and that only in an exotic sense, for the few.

CHAPTER VII

THE COMPLEMENTARY RELATION OF INDIVIDUALISM TO THE COMMON GOOD

Let us return to the thesis which we upheld in Chapter I, namely that the individual is distinguishable but not separable from society. Now, this way of stating the relation may be maintained whether the individual consciously thinks of himself as so related to society or not. An impartial observer, who was able to take a comprehensive view of the situation, would recognize both the inseparability and the distinguishableness of the individual from society. But an individual may possess varying degrees of consciousness with regard to his relation to society. Those who practised the older individualism had a kind of 'blind spot' which prevented them from being vividly conscious of their inseparability from society. We shall endeavor to show that, as the individual becomes more conscious of his inseparability from society, he will increasingly realize that his individual good is bound up with the good of society as a whole. The intelligent thing for him to do, when he has gained this deeper insight, will be to adjust his own interests in some way to those of society. The advocates of the older individualism, either were not conscious of the common good at all, or else felt that it needed no conscious direction on their part. We have seen the disasters of such unintelligent individualism. These very disasters, coming to light over a wider area, will tend to

make man more conscious of the short-comings of the one-sided and narrow individualism. The results of the unbridled exercise of the old inherited individualism are writ so large in society that 'he who runs may read'. The first hope for the rise of a new individualism is a vivid consciousness of the mal-adjustments brought about by the old. This consciousness is itself a consciousness of the complementary relation of the individual to the common good, though not a consciousness of the practical adjustments which need to be undertaken. The latter are a work for the exercise of good-will and intelligence. When, therefore, we speak about a new individualism we must deny it to mean any attempt to make use of the machine age so that more persons may be able to indulge in the errors of the old individualism. It will definitely not mean an increase of the number of persons who think they can afford to exercise the prerogatives of a one-sided individualism. It will not mean any attempt to return to society, by means of philanthropy and charity, some of the material 'good' which an individual had won as against society. It will certainly not be a revival of our inherited individualism which became tied to pecuniary interests - the economic individualism which was largely a parasitic adjunct of scientific technology. We shall not go back to "the irony of the gospel of 'individualism' in business conjoined with suppression of individuality in thought and speech". On the

contrary, the new individualism will be realized by a more intense consciousness on the part of an individual who finds himself more closely cemented to society. It will be an individualism which is finding itself by a more intelligent study of the problems raised by the machine age. It will challenge the notion that there is any ultimate hostility between the good of the individual and the good of society.

All this means that we shall need to find a deeper connotation for the term, 'individualism'. We shall need to break with the notion that individualism can be adequately comprehended in the form in which it was developed during the past two centuries. There we found that the individual was regarded as a kind of 'atom' of society - something fairly fixed. Individuality is not something which has been handed down to us as an inheritance to be lost or preserved. It is rather an achievement to be won through constant interaction with problems of the common good. Neither the individual nor the structure of society are fixed entities. "Since we live in a moving world and change with our interactions in it, every act produces a new perspective that demands a new exercise of preference. If, in the long run, an individual remains lost, it is because he has chosen irresponsibility; and if he remains wholly depressed, it is because he has chosen the course of easy parasitism." The recognition of the complementary relation

of the individual to the common good will be the basis of an ideal to be reached, not by levelling down to find the lowest common denominator, but by a levelling up to reach a higher synthesis in which there will be a mutuality of the uniqueness of individuals and the common good.

We shall also need to find a deeper connotation for the term, 'common good', which must mean something more than the finding of a mediocre average which acts as a drag upon the uniqueness of the individual. We shall, at the present, use this term to connote, quite broadly, the mutual good of society and the individuals of whom it is composed. We shall, first of all, try to show the fruitfulness of that thinking which will not admit an irreconcilable antagonism between individualism and corporateness. If the thinking is sound which sees that individualism and collectivism (in its best sense) belong together, then machine technology will not be able to keep them apart. Even from the point of view of self-interest, individuals will then attack the problem of making the machine age minister to an individualism and a common good which may be distinguished but not separated. The new individualism will accept the advantages of the machine age, advancing from where we are, but it will perceive that "such genuine individuality as can be detected in the existing social system is achieved, not because of the prevailing money-making motive, but in spite thereof". It will perceive that the trouble with our industrial age

is not in what it has achieved but in what it has left out.

The complementary relation of individualism to the common good has received various forms of statement. In every such statement, the pressing question is, how can we preserve the uniqueness of the individual without sacrificing it upon the altar of the common good, and, at the same time, maintain the common good without sacrificing it upon the altar of individuality? The question itself is a philosophic one. If it can be shown that, in ideal, individualism and the common good require each other, then obstacles such as those raised by the machine age, exist only to be overcome by intelligent practice: we are not faced with a fundamental antinomy but only with practical matters of extreme difficulty.

'Individualism' and the common good' appear, at least at first sight, to confront each other as opposing interests. When, as an assertive individual - an individualist - I am confronted with the claim of society as a whole, I am conscious of a clash of interests. There are at least three methods by which any such opposing interests may be reconciled: the weaker interest, whichever it is, may give way to the stronger; some kind of compromise may be effected between the interests; or some wider field may be discovered in which both interests may find their satisfaction. The first method is no real solution, for it is reconciliation by conquest; it involves renunciation on the part of the weaker interest; it gives rise to a state of tyranny in which the weaker interest is held down by the stronger. The best

which can be looked for is a kind of armed truce, for if the weaker interest should ever have an opportunity to reassert itself, it will do so. If we are dealing with genuine interests - as in the case of individualism and the common good we are - the weaker interest, driven under, will seek to reassert itself in a different form. Any tyrannous autocracy must expect to be faced with strikes, lock-outs, and smouldering discontent. The weaker interest, shut out by the front door, will creep in through the back door. An individualist of the old type may recognize that he is, unfortunately, inseparable from society, but determine to act as though he were separable; but, before long, the society against which he has asserted himself, will assert itself against him. The collectivist of the regimentative type may recognize that the individual is distinguishable from society, but determine to act as though he were negligible; but, before long, the individual against whom a collectivist society has asserted itself, will assert himself against such a society. Unless some kind of adjustment or compromise can be arrived at between conflicting interests there will always be a state of warring tension.

A very good historical illustration of this state of affairs will be found in Cecil Jane's book, 'Liberty and Despotism in Spanish America'. The whole book is a portrayal of the conflict of two fundamental interests, dear to the heart of every Spaniard, namely individualism and efficiency. The Spaniard holds each of these ideals so passionately that he can find no middle ground of

compromise. On the one hand, Spain has been the home of the real rugged individualist. The rugged chains of mountains which divide the country, the caves in which men may hide, the sudden tempests which may in a flash destroy the results of the labor bestowed upon the barren land - all these, taken with the fiery spirit of the people, make for an intense individualism. On the other hand, the Spaniard is, to our way of thinking, almost ridiculously romantic. He is a great idealist. He loves heroes; and he is impressed by a conqueror who can seize and exercise despotic power. He knows no middle course between 'individuality' and an 'efficient despotism'. This is the real explanation of the kaleidoscopic changes in the political scene of the South American republics. The pendulum is continually swinging between a rank individualism and despotic power. All the South American republics have splendid democratic constitutions, but the people lack any spirit of compromise which would enable them to be obeyed. Their only hope, so they think, lies in an efficient dictator who will see that the constitution is obeyed. Every citizen loves to think that the constitution is being enforced by a strong hand, even if it is not - and then he goes off and becomes a rugged individualist. Cecil Jane writes: "In political affairs other peoples have been content to accept a working compromise: they have foregone the full realization of their desires in order thereby to secure a solution of questions which has not been wholly satisfactory but

which has been more or less practical. The Spanish Americans have, however, been impatient of anything short of perfection. They have been altogether dissatisfied with anything less than the fullest liberty; they have been altogether dissatisfied with anything less than the most complete efficiency..... The persistent search for the ideal has led to the emergence in every State of two parties, agreed in desiring to attain the perfection both of liberty and efficiency, convinced that the perfection of each is simultaneously attainable, but wholly at variance as to the paths which lead to the goal. The one party holds that if liberty be assured, efficiency will necessarily result; the other that if efficiency be assured liberty will thereby be secured.

The one party has been ready to sacrifice efficient government on the altar of freedom; the other to sacrifice freedom on the altar of efficient government."⁴ Here is indeed a recognition that individualism and the common good (as expressed in efficient government) are somehow complementary; but there is no disposition to make the necessary adjustments. And so the problem of the relation of the two remains unsolved.

Now, turn for a moment to the second method of effecting adjustments between conflicting interests - that of compromise. The word does not sound very attractive to our Spaniard, nor to any man who is resolved to stand by

his 'rights' as against all comers. Nevertheless, I shall hold that the old individualism must effect a compromise with its spirit of self-assertiveness before it can enter into a complementary relation with the common good. Something of the self-assertiveness of the old individualism needs to be surrendered. Something of the efficient despotism of a strong autocracy needs to be given up for the sake of the individuality of all. And yet, individualism will not itself be surrendered: it will be modified voluntarily: its turbulence may be seen to be out of place in a new set of conditions. If, as Dewey says - I think rightly - that the machine age calls for a new form of individualism, it means that individualism, as a purely assertive individualism, will be obliged to conform to a new situation. This new situation is an external one which calls for a correspondingly new pattern of individualism which must be achieved within the soul of man. This will mean some kind of compromise with the new conditions. Some would say that there is an element of tyranny in such a compromise. So be it: but it ^{is} that kind of tyranny which curbs an assertiveness which would militate against the common good. The new situation exerts a pressure upon the old individualism; and to that extent the old individualism may feel that there is an element of tyranny in the pressure. But the old one-sided individualist himself exerts a greater tyranny over the many if he uncompromisingly insists upon carrying the old individualism into the new situation. In the last resort, we are free only to choose by what we shall be bound. Liberty never consists in casting off all restraints.

If one attempts to do this, he will find that he is still bound - bound by his own whims and caprices, which is the worst form of slavery. Liberty and law are complementary; but there is a compromise which may be effected between the conception of liberty as 'doing as one pleases' and the conception of law as the curtailment of liberty. However, when the new synthesis has been made, it has surrendered something of what was contained in the old conception of liberty, even if that was a bad thing. But liberty itself has not been surrendered: the conception of it has been deepened by a more intelligent grasp of its nature; its real essence is seen to be a power of self-determination, rather than a casting off of all restraint.

I know that the word, 'compromise', is anathema to many because it means that, while both sides gain something, both sides also lose something. It may be said that the gains far out-weigh the losses; but that does not mean that there has been no compromise to achieve the greater gains. Our Spaniard feels that it would be a real loss to him to lose his old notion of individualism; and, so long as he feels that way, it is a loss to him, for what he calls individualism is indeed precious in his sight. It is of no use preaching to him that he will be giving up nothing; but through long striving to reach the impossible, he may come to see that a practical compromise is better than an impossibility. Or else he will have to settle down to an unsolvable antinomy. One cannot have one's cake and eat it at the same time. Compromise, taken in its best sense, sim-

ply means that there is a price to be paid for the realization of the best possibility. It simply means that the synthesis is worth the price paid for it. No one more than Hegel, the great master of synthesis, realized that there was a certain loss involved in the passing to a higher synthesis. Compromise is simply the working of that law of compensation which Emerson has so eloquently shown to be a principle which lies at the heart of things. "We will not let our angels go", says Emerson, "that our archangels may come in". In life, unlike mathematics, subtraction sometimes means addition. In making any choice, I attempt to visualize myself in this situation and, again, to picture myself in that situation. I am confronted with the choice of attempting to actualize one of these pictures which involves the destruction of other possibilities. Along the road of my life lie the dead possibilities of what I might have been. The principle of choice operates the same way in all situations. It is a principle of compromise in so far as it means letting something go in order that something else may be realized. I do not see how certain moralists are able, in the long run, to maintain that this principle does not operate in the choice of the kind of individualism we shall choose. Is it the kind of individualism which is dedicated to the common good which we choose? If so, it must be the kind of individualism which makes some compromise with the old individualism which had asserted that the principle of self-interest alone was the one to be followed. The point which I am attempting to make is that

one-sided or inherited individualism must effect a compromise with its own rigidity before it can be a candidate for synthesis with the common good. It cannot be nothing but individualism, rank and unalloyed, if it is to have that plasticity which is needed in the complementary relation of individualism and the common good. It will be a new individualism which enters into this relation. Something of the old will be lost; something which was conceived to be of value will be lost. Something of the element of sacrifice will be required from the old individualism, if individualism in a modified form is to rise to more sublime heights. I have named this accommodating process compromise because the word is challenging, and does not misrepresent the requirement - if the sense in which I use it be understood. You may speak of it as sacrifice or adaptation or transformation, if you like; but the substance of my contention is not altered, namely that the old individualism has a preparatory work to do before it can enter into the new synthesis. The old individualism must divest itself of some of its offensive weapons before becoming a candidate for synthesis with the common good. Our Spaniard, for example, if he really desires any efficient government which is possible, must cease from his adventurous living by his sword. He must sheathe his sword and hand the protection of his rights over to constituted authority. For him, this would be a compromise; but for his relation to the common good it is a great gain. After all, the practical weakness of the new relation will not lie in the fact that he has effected a prior compromise before

entering into it. The weakness of the new relation will rather lie in our Spaniard's inability to stand by the compromise which he had agreed to before entering the relation. He may be all too ready to grasp his sword again. This logically prior compromise which an old conception needs to effect with its own rigidity before entering into a new synthesis is an entirely general phenomenon. The new situation calls for the prior compromise; but, considering the erstwhile conflicting interests as they find themselves in the new situation, we no longer speak of compromise but of synthesis. But the factors synthesised are not just the brute conflicting interests which claim the right to be completely unyielding. As such they can not be synthesised. In the process of synthesis both factors become something that they were not before. The element of compromise or surrender lies logically (and sometimes temporarily) in a field which is prior to the field of the new synthesis. As this may sound somewhat abstract, let us take a simple illustration. Take the case of the bishop, in Victor Hugo's 'Les Miserables', who found it expedient to lie 'like a gentleman' when brought face to face with the unfortunate wretch, Jean Valjean, accused by the police of stealing his silver vases. As a general principle the claim of the bishop was that truth-telling is right. But he had to compromise with that principle in order to effect a synthesis in the particular situation. It was a compromise for the bishop; but he could not tell the truth

and, at the same time, manifest the larger graces of forgiveness and self-sacrifice. It was his larger love for the man in custody which made him compromise with the principle of truth-telling and also with his right to the vases. A man who had resolved to stand uncompromisingly by the truth at all hazards and by the right of property, could not have effected the synthesis which the bishop achieved. And yet, through this compromise, the bishop maintained a higher form of individualism. In the same way, the old individualism as developed through the last two centuries, with its predominant pecuniary interests, with its conception of 'free' competition in which the devil could take the hindmost - this old individualism in its uncompromising form cannot form a synthesis with the requirements of the common good in our machine age. Only a new form of individualism can enter the synthesis, and, for the old individualist, some of his 'values' have to be left by the wayside.

The method of synthesis which aims at the ultimate harmony of interests is indeed, I hold, the only method of reconciling individualism with the common good without surrendering what is best in each. It is superior to the enforced supremacy of society over the individual (or vica versa) or to the method of compromise simpliciter. Unless we are to abandon the attempt to show that individualism and the common good are complementary, the method of synthesis is the only method which can be adopted. But I still insist that the method of synthesis has its limitations: it is not entered into without sacrifice. We

must not, however, look to this method to achieve the impossible. In support of what I have had to say about the necessity of compromise or sacrifice prior to synthesis, let me quote from H. J. Paton's book, 'The Good Will': "There must always be some sort of giving up, if we are to attain to any kind of good. We must give ourselves up to our ideal - to what we will - with a whole heart. We must give up indefinite possibilities in favour of the one thing which we definitely will. Above all we must give up mere momentary impulses in favour of actions which can be elements in a coherent life, and manifestations of a coherent will. The more wide and the more coherent is that ideal to which we give ourselves up, that life which we seek to realize through the medium of our momentary actions, the greater and the richer is our good. We extend our territory beyond the narrow limits of our individual life, in so far as we give ourselves up to social ideals in which others share; but we do not escape, and we cannot escape, from the essential character of action and the inevitable presence of sacrifice. If we satisfy our genuinely social desires as part of our coherent life, we fill our life with a richer and wider goodness; but in order to do so we may have to restrain some individual impulses, and even to subdue a considerable part of our individual nature, as for example our tendencies to cruelty or anger. It is absurd to imagine that the development of the social will does not bring an immense enrichment to the individual; and it is also absurd to imagine that the thwarting of impulses and the subduing of natural tenden-

cies are not necessary to the attainment of even the most narrowly individual good. But different sacrifices are necessary for different kinds of life, and the social life demands special sacrifices if we are to attain its special good."⁵

When any 'value' finds its place in a larger whole something of its original value is forfeited. This undeniable fact is often overlooked because there has arisen a 'plus' value ensuing upon the surrender by the original value of something of its 'isolation' to find a larger life in the whole. It is generally agreed that all values are relative to a demand, a wish or an interest of the individual. Values are such because they satisfy certain demands - even laziness is regarded as a value by a lazy person. The old individualism certainly had a value to De Tocqueville's one-sided individualist. But the new individualism is a response to a different demand on the part of individuals whose desire is that they may express themselves through society and not in defiance of it. The old name, individualism, is kept, but underneath there is no longer the old demand - and, therefore, no longer for those who do not demand it, the old value. The new demand has disclosed a new value, and forfeited an old one. It is with this new value that the broader synthesis has to deal. It cannot do the impossible and preserve the old value in its entirety - at least it cannot do this if the old value

involved a genuine conflict with the common good. Our typical Spaniard would have to become reconciled to the inevitable fact - if and when he found a synthesis between his individualism and government - that the original 'value' of the old freebooting days was irretrievably lost. Perhaps, in this inevitable death of formerly cherished values, we touch something of the tragedy of human nature. The values of maturity would not be quite what they are unless we had known the values of childhood and youth. But we need not mourn if the new values turn out to be higher than the old. Here, again, we touch the underlying law of compensation. If, for example, a United States of Europe could be formed - or, for that matter, a Commonwealth of the World - new and larger values would emerge in response to new and larger interests and demands. But what were real values for the old 'nationals' would have to be sacrificed before the larger synthesis could be effected. Somewhere along the line there would need to be compromise. This is not to say that a 'plus' value would not result within the new harmony; but it is to say that the old values (unmodified) could not be taken up into the larger whole. I suppose that this is just another way of saying that the problem of ethical choice is not usually between a disvalue and a value but between a lower and a higher value.

Another way of showing that sacrifice or compromise is involved before conflicting interests can be synthesised may be found in a reference to personal preferences. Often an individual preference is wholly at variance with the soc-

ial judgment upon it. For example, society as a whole prefers that people wear clothes, but there are individuals who would genuinely prefer to do without them. Again, at certain times society prefers to go to war, but there are individuals who prefer to be quite uncompromising with society upon this point. Or society, on the whole, prefers that quarrels be settled in the law courts, but there are individuals who prefer to 'shoot out' their quarrels with their neighbors. Usually the social judgment is right in these cases, but sometimes the individual judgment is ahead of the social. My point is that, when we are dealing with genuine and conflicting preferences, synthesis is impossible without surrender on the one side or the other. The militarist preference cannot be synthesised with the pacifist without some alteration in one or other of the original preferences. A 'plus' value would doubtless emerge if society could find a 'moral equivalent for war', but this synthesis could be effected only by the militarist agreeing to surrender his preference for war. There are not many people who are so unintelligent as to actually prefer war; but even if there were only one such individual, the case would spoil any system of harmony which claims that somehow all preferences as such may be harmonized within a wider whole. Again, even within myself, how can I harmonize my desires for comfort and security with my intellectual and aesthetic interests without some compromise? I can have a modicum of both perhaps, but the full satisfaction

of both is rarely possible. The principle of harmony does not enable me to know what proportion of each is possible. I have always on my hands the practical problem as to how much of each I must surrender to find some kind of a golden mean. But, nevertheless, it is better to enter into the kingdom of harmony maimed or halt than not to enter at all. The principle of 'integration' does not actually harmonize conflicting interests: it rather alters them somewhat that they may be unconflicting in a larger synthesis. Those who advocate 'integration' or 'sublimation' theories do not entirely rid themselves - as they think they do - of the subtle introduction of sacrifice or compromise prior to harmony. On their principle, for example, they would advocate that Labor and Capital, instead of being at odds with one another, ought to enter into partnership for the good of business as a whole; that France and Germany ought to get together, give up compromising, and establish a Franco-German commonwealth. Of course, a new 'plus' value would emerge from these 'federations' but the various factors as they stand are not prepared for the synthesis. The labor individualists, the capitalistic individualists, the nationalistic individualists - all these would need to be somewhat different to form these much desired federations. The synthesis appears to be desirable to those from the outside looking in, but the whole point is that the value of the synthesis does not sufficiently appeal to the 'interested' parties

to the extent that they will desire to surrender something of the present values. And the principle of harmony, qua harmony, will not settle the disputes between the conflicting interests. There will be different judgments involved, and upon what principle is it to be decided which judgment is to have the priority? That priority would need to be decided - and decided for the sake of harmony - upon a principle that is above harmony.

An illuminating statement of the relation of the individual to the common good has been advanced by Warner Fite in his book on 'Individualism'. He develops the relation through an analysis of consciousness itself, especially through an analysis of intelligent consciousness. An idea knows itself to be an idea only by means of contrast. The perception of contrast is necessary for the existence of intelligent consciousness. An idea cannot exist out of all relations. It must be possible to relate an idea to other ideas, and to distinguish it therefrom. This is a fundamental requirement of knowledge. To know oneself means at least to know oneself in contrast to Nature and society. There must be an other for knowledge. There can be no knower without a known. "The relation which knowledge sets up between myself and my human fellows, however superior in intimacy and importance, is not different in principle from that which it sets up between myself and other material things."⁶ Knowledge is, then, a form of self-interest,

for the other is used to make an individual conscious of himself in contrast thereto. To be conscious means that we adopt some kind of attitude towards otherness. The best attitude will be the most intelligent attitude (from the point of view of our own interest). For example, one may kick a chair out of his way, but that is not usually the most intelligent attitude to take towards a chair. A chair is a comparatively insignificant thing; but, if it be unintelligent merely to kick a chair out of the way, how much more so would it be to kick a man aside! When confronted with an apparent obstacle the unintelligent thing to do is to try to crush it or ignore it before investigating its possible uses. When confronted with another individual, I am "in logic bound - not to prefer his interests to my own, nor to give them 'an equal share' with my own - but to place them among the various interests involved in the moral problem."⁷ Fite finds no contradiction between making use of our fellows and treating them as ends in themselves (so far as they are intelligent). Placing our relation to a fellow man upon the level of self-interest, we approach him with the question, what can we get out of him? It is obvious, writes Fite, that we can get more out of him if the service we demand is along the line of his own personal interests. "The social relation is to be adjusted", writes Fite, "by just those methods of practical intelligence

and ingenuity which we use when we combine various ends in the construction of a house or a machine, - that is to say by the method of technical adjustment." ⁸ Fite refers to the condemnation that is often levelled against the deliberately selfish man. Here, he observes, the deliberateness is a good thing. The trouble is, not that there was too much premeditation, but that there was too little. The epithets which we use against the anti-social man seem to show that the trouble is that he has not been sufficiently intelligent with regard to his own interests. We speak of the inconsiderate man - the man who fails to consider. Fite would say that he has not sufficiently considered his own interests, although the usual reference is to his inconsiderateness of others. The same argument would apply to other epithets - the thoughtless man, the blindly selfish man, the brutally selfish man. Here, a man's thoughtlessness, blindness and brutality are turned against himself, although he does not realize it. "No self-regarding man", writes Fite, "feels justified in expecting another to sacrifice his own good for him. For that matter, deliver me from the self-sacrificing man: the obligations incurred towards him I shall never be able to repay. But if he claims only to be intelligent, then I may properly expect that, when the situation calls for it, he will include me in his plans. And what I condemn in the 'selfish' man is

not that he thinks of himself - if he thinks at all he must think of himself - but that he fails to take account of me." And again, "What I stand for is not the senseless self-assertion of the glorified brute, or of the intoxicated genius, claiming a special and paradoxical exemption from ordinary responsibility, but the more definite, more determined, and more effective self-assertion of the clear-sighted, and therefore, - as I hold - generous man." All this is excellent. Fite really stands upon the Platonic identification of reason and harmony. We need continually to be reminded that the harmony, which it is the function of reason to effect within the individual, reason tends also to effect in the relation of the individual to society. It is refreshing to remember, in moments of despair, the function of intelligent consciousness as aiming to bring harmony out of chaos. We recall Santayana's comment: "Reason as such represents, or rather constitutes, a single formal interest, the interest of harmony. When two interests are simultaneous, and fall within one act of apprehension, the desirability of harmonizing them is involved in the very act of realizing them together." We thankfully receive all that is said of the function of reason as the synthesizer of individualism and the common good.

But here, also, one great assumption is made, namely that

⁹ Ibid. p. 180.

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 182.

¹¹ "Reason and Common Sense", p. 267.

men will be reasonable; that they will be intelligent over a wide enough area of conflicting interests. The question is not only one of will but of possibility. Again, Reason itself is devoted to synthesis; but man, in his imperfectly conscious (that is intelligent) state, is devoted to his prejudices - the 'idols of the cave' and the 'market-place'. Reason itself has to perform a negative work of destruction - if it is equal to it - before it can achieve a positive synthesis.

However, there lies hidden in Fite's theory a valuable contribution, which he himself has assumed rather than brought out clearly. He claims to begin from the self-assertiveness of the individual's self-interest: this is the end to be maintained. Meeting another person, I am to ask myself, 'what use is he to my own self-interest?' I determine that he can be of more use to me if I treat him as an end in himself rather than as a means - or rather, I treat him as both an end in himself and a means, which Fite declares is not a contradictory thing to do. But, here, - and this is the implication which lies hidden in Fite's argument - I have subtly changed the point of view of my self-assertiveness. My self-assertiveness is now no longer an end: it becomes a means for realizing a synthesis of interests between myself and this other individual. It is true that my self-assertiveness persists through all the contacts which I make with others who form my social world; but it persists as a means: the end is constantly being altered to make room for new accommodations. What I formerly

regarded as my self-interest is subject to constant change with every new situation. From one point of view, something of myself is 'sacrificed' as I enter a new synthesis. A conflicting interest, which may have been valuable to me, is modified in order that it may fit the new synthesis. Here we see that there has been a shift in the meaning of the word 'individualism': it fits itself to the synthesis, rather than attempts to arrive at a synthesis which will fit itself to the individual. The synthesis is the ruling factor in the situation, but it is a synthesis in which the new individuality may find itself through a new loyalty. "When individual self-assertion is thought of as means rather than end, we have something which is neither 'individualism' nor 'socialism', as these terms got their settled application in the last century, but a distinct mode of legal and political thinking, more and more characteristic of the present century."¹²

So far, we have been discussing the method of synthesis as employing the means of 'integration' to effect its purpose. The other main alternative, which has been advanced to effect a synthesis of conflicting interests, may be called the method of 'sublimation'. The Freudian psychology has made us familiar with the method of sublimation as applied to conflicting desires in the individual's inner life. The theory states that there is one central driving

force or interest of which all our desires, ambitions, and so forth, are but varied and often disguised expressions. Such a central driving force is the 'libido' of Freud and Jung, or the 'will-to-power' of Nietzsche. W. E. Hocking also subscribes to the doctrine of a central driving force in the individual which he calls the 'will-to-power' but in a somewhat different sense from that of Nietzsche. With Hocking, the will-to-power is equivalent to the desire to keep one's central ambition alive. "The will to live, in man", says Hocking, "takes the form of the will to power, i.e., the will to be in conscious, knowing control of such energies as the universe has, and to work with them in reshaping that universe."¹³

As a possible means of effecting a synthesis between the individual's interests and the common good, the 'sublimation theory' has much to say for itself. In the first place, it seems to simplify our problem. If an individual's interests can be sublimated into one dominating interest, then only the latter needs to be considered in effecting a synthesis with the common good. However, psychologically, it is more than doubtful if the manifold and variegated 'instincts' of man can be sublimated into one without remainder. For example, some women try to sublimate the 'instinct' for love and children into a passion for social work, but the sublimation never seems to be quite complete. However, this does not mean that it is necessary to throw

the sublimation theory into the discard. The sublimation theory is a form of the method of synthesis which we have seen cannot be expected to do the impossible in synthesising stubbornly resisting and conflicting interests.

The form of the sublimation theory which is especially apposite to our problem is that known as the 'general will' theory. The name of Rousseau is generally very closely associated with the concept of the general will, but we are not bound to accept or reject it in the form which Rousseau advocated it. Rousseau's 'social contract' and his 'natural man' have become somewhat amusing to most modern philosophers. Critics usually point out the outworn psychology upon which the theory seems to rest. Looked at historically, Rousseau's picture of the untrammelled savage as isolated and prior to the society with which he subsequently enters into a contract, is of course absurd. However, Rousseau's theory can stand upon its own merits, apart altogether from the discarded psychology upon which some critics think it is built. The theory, in varying forms, has a long line of worthy exponents. We can even trace something of it in Plato. Socrates, seeing the prejudice and passion existing in the individual soul, proposed to seek for the outward embodiment of justice in the City State. When we come to Rousseau, we find that he was anxious to present the thesis that the State is not primarily an expression of force but of will. Rousseau's theory was a challenge to the whole tradition of which Hobbes was the main spokesman, namely that the State rests upon pure force. At bottom, the theory

is psychological - though not bound up with the psychology of the isolated individual: it employs the same conception as that to be found in Josiah Royce's 'The World and the Individual', namely that an idea is the embodiment or expression of a purpose - and a purpose that is not fully known. Incidentally, we may say that Royce's definition of an idea as a 'plan of action' or inchoate purpose, is more suitable for an ethical than for a metaphysical construction. In a way analogous to Royce's procedure, the individual's will may be thought of, in political theory, as expressing itself in the State. We recall that Royce's working hypothesis is that an individual's real purpose is not fully known to him: its 'internal meaning' unfolds as he strives to effect his purpose in Nature and society. Royce's 'external meaning' of an idea is somewhat similar to the 'real will' of the general will theory. The conception of the real will of an individual as contrasted with his actual will is very crucial to the theory. The actual will is to be sublimated to the real will, and this latter embodied in the general will as expressed in the State. The general will is but the real will of the individuals writ large in the ideal of the State. "Such truth as there is in the doctrine of the general will", writes H. J. Paton, "lies in its recognition that there is in men an abiding will to cooperation which is distinct alike from the selfish policies of individuals and the momentary passions of the mob."¹⁴ Originally, Rousseau's problem was to pre-

¹⁴ "The Good Will", by H. J. Paton, p. 264

serve the real freedom of the individual as not necessarily antagonistic to the power of the State. The theory of the general will was advanced to do away with the conception that the State necessarily curtails the freedom of the individual. The theory forms a challenge to such a conception as is advanced in Herbert Spencer's book, 'Man versus the State'. The real will of the individual is thought of as the complete will as opposed to the actual will which is not able to see 'from end to end'. Both Kant and Rousseau make this distinction. They would contend that if I knew all the circumstances, if I could see the whole, then what I ought to do would simply be what I want to do. If I could see all the range of circumstances spread out before my mind they would say that there would be no conflict between my desires and my duties.

The distinction between the real will and the actual will is a point which has often been attacked by critics of this theory. Dr. Grinsberg writes: "A thing is either real or not real and the actual will is just as real as the 'real will'".¹⁵ L. T. Hobhouse also objects to the notion that there is any part of me that is more real than any other part. Harold J. Laski, in his latest book: 'The State: in Theory and Practice', takes the same position. Yet I think that it ought to be admitted that the word 'real' is commonly used in varying senses. A poet feels

¹⁵ "Psychology of Society", p. 84.

justified in speaking of 'forms more real than living men'. One can hardly contend that there is not an order of reality which is at least different from mere existence. The Ideal is real in a different sense from the actual. There is a difference between the ought and the is and yet both must be called real. If we decide to reserve the term 'real' for the ought and the Ideal, and the term 'actual' for the is - that is a matter of the use of terms. Muirhead appears to me to be correct when he writes: "We may even be said to know more of our real will than of our actual willings. For while the great willings of life stand out clear and steadfast, our particular actions too often come we know not whence and tend we know not whither."¹⁶ In writing a book, for example, I do not know exactly and in detail what I want to do until I start to write. My general purpose becomes clearer as I write.

And the will, when it is taken in T. H. Green's sense that it is the movement of the whole man towards an end, appears to me to be fundamental in all our actions. Furthermore, a theory which makes the will fundamental goes deeper than a theory which works with integration through intelligence. It is necessary to will to use our intelligence in any situation. It is notorious that society (as Pareto holds) is permeated only to a small extent with rationality. The real problem lies in the exercise of the will to reduce

the area of irrationality. I see no real conflict between Warner Fite's or L. T. Hobhouse's theory of harmony through intelligent integration and the theory of the general will. Indeed, the latter appears to include the former. "What is essential to the theory (of the general will)", writes Muirhead, "is the assertion of the real unity and continuity of will in anything rightly called a society in virtue of the participation of individual wills in the common purpose it embodies."¹⁷ Here it will be noted that it is not claimed that the existence of a mystical 'corporate personality' is essential to the theory; and there is an implication that violence is done to the theory when it is advanced in favor of arguments which would make the individual the mere creature of the State. It must be granted that the theory is a theory of an ideal State: in ideal, the individual obeys only his larger will - and this presupposes the formation of a State which is the expression of that will. It is at this point that the political realists - such as Hobhouse, Laski, and the rest - criticize the idealist theory of the State. Their contention is that we are not concerned with ideal States, but with actual and sovereign States as they have appeared in history. The political realists see the State from the angle of its coercive power which they declare is always exercised on behalf of the privileged class. They see the State as a legal

institution, by means of which those in authority are able to grasp the whip of power so that their self-assertive aims may be accomplished. "It may, in fact", says Harold J. Laski, "be unwise or unjust in what it commands; but neither un- wisdom nor injustice makes any difference to the formal right of the state to exact and enforce obedience to its orders."¹⁸

The advocates of the general will theory deny that the State is to be conceived of as nothing but a coercive agency for enforcing the will of those who happen to be in authority. The political Idealist sees in the actual State something else attempting to get itself realized; he sees, in the actual State, an underlying purpose - however brokenly realized - which moves in the direction of a synthesis of the individual and the common good; he sees that no State is perfect, but he also insists that a willed State is necessary in order to give an individual contact with possible perfection. W. E. Hocking writes: "If there be any ideal states of will, they will be found among the actual states of will. If there is any such thing as an ideal state-undertaking, it will be found among the actual states. And if this state-intention, or state-meaning, had not been found among actual states, neither would it be yet found in human imagination. In this sense, Hegel's dictum is both intelligible and accurate: the re-

¹⁸ "The State: in Theory and Practice", p. 10.

tional is nowhere accomplished, but rationality is at work in things, constitutes their valid part. What is rational in them is what is real in them; and what is real in them is rational."¹⁹

Unless we are to take the position of the political anarchist, it appears to me that we shall have to allow that the institution of the State does express, however imperfectly realized, an underlying moral effort on the part of the citizens. It is difficult to see how the State could keep itself in existence unless at least it professed to be an actual attempt to embody such a moral intention. Political realists condemn the actual State as nothing but a coercive and sovereign power, exercised by those who have grasped the reins of authority; but they do not seem to realize that the actual State, with all its imperfections, represents, however inadequately, the ideal by which they condemn it. The essential claim of the general will theory is that the State represents a point of contact between the moral will of individuals and the goal of the common good. Of this, Hocking again writes: "When one says that an ideal effort is actual, he implies in those very terms that it is not identified with the particular facts existing. When moral effort is actual, the real and the ideal are identified

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"Man and the State", p.p. 410, 1.

nowhere but at the point of that effort. There they coincide. And strangely enough, the political realist who denies this perfection, denies it in the interest of an ideal which is not actual, that is, in the interest of that very abstract perfectionism which he thinks he repudiates. It is his ideal, not that of the idealist, which lacks concrete character."²⁰

Unless we had a State, conceived along the lines of the general will, individuals and groups would be forced to fall back into that attempted state of isolation which we have throughout been condemning. Under present circumstances, the organized and democratic State is the most inclusive expression we can have of the common good from which the individuals may be distinguished but not separated. "Here", writes Muirhead, "is the stone of stumbling for opponents of the general will - the individual is not merely and therefore not essentially a centre of consciousness but the centre of concrete social interests."²¹

Our thesis, therefore, that the individual is distinguishable but not separable from society, logically eventuates in the type of political philosophy which is, I hold, expressed in what is basic in the general will theory.

Again, I would point out that, it is true of this theory also, that it cannot preserve individual interests

²⁰
Ibid.p.411.

²¹
J. H. Muirhead, in "Mind", N. S.p.363.

which are in actual conflict with the common good. The theory of integration can only integrate what can be integrated; the theory of sublimation can only sublimate what can be sublimated. From whatever angle we look at the matter of synthesis as effected between individual interests and the common good, there is 'sacrifice' or modification of interests somewhere along the line. The actual will as it is cannot be sublimated to the real will without remainder. Josiah Royce contends in his 'The World and the Individual' that there is never any surrender of what the general will theory would call the actual will. All actual willings find their place in the Absolute Will. In the long run, this is tantamount to saying that whatever is, is the will of the Absolute. In the Absolute any distinction between the actual and the real will would be sublimated. But the general will theory is not committed to the ultimate preserving of all actual willings in this way. The theory is based upon the distinction between the actual and the real will. So the actual will has to be made unconflicting with the real will before a synthesis can be found in the general will. Looked at from the point of view of this theory, the new individualism will consist in striving towards a greater realization of the contents of the real will, and the embodiment of these contents in the laws of the State.

The real will must include a demand that I myself exercise my intelligence and recognize the rights of others to make this demand upon me. The goal of the real will is not an individual assertiveness, but a mutuality of inter-

ests to the realization of which my self-assertiveness is a means. To achieve this end, I must stand ready to surrender any of my self-assertiveness which would defeat this end. My contention is that an individual must be prepared to surrender his actual will if that represents some prejudice or something which is harmful to the realization of the common good. The psychology of Rousseau appears to be sound, at this point, in calling for such a surrender. "No one is harmonized with the law of his being", writes Stanley Hall, "who at a certain period does not feel the passion for surrender."²² This is fundamentally the contention of the general will theory: the new civilization is to be essentially rational and moral, and so it must rest upon the will to surrender all natural inclinations to the supreme requirements of the common weal. Unless this be done there can be no society, no morality, and no common political life. The disposition must arise to sacrifice something of the predatory nature of the old individualism as a means to the realization of a mutual good. If the new demand cannot be created, individualism will fall back into its old groove and the only alternative will be found in Nietzsche's grim saying: "a good war justifies any cause".

But, of course, this element of 'surrender' or of compromise with the rigidity of the old individualism,

must appeal to an individual as valuable for him. All value springs from the demands of individuals, and individuals alone can judge what is valuable. No institution, not even the State, can escape the ultimate valuation which is placed upon it by individuals alone. The mutuality of interests to be found in the common weal must present itself to an individual as something more than a logical abstraction upon which he is invited to sacrifice himself. "When the simple-minded man was told that in marriage two persons become one, he naturally enough asked: 'Which one?' " ²³ A mutual advantage must always be seen to be involved before any complementary synthesis will be whole-heartedly entered into. An individual may sacrifice one value for another which appears to be more valuable to him, but he will never perform any sacrifice for anything that does not appear to him to be valuable. It is in this sense, as we have seen, that Fite spurns the use of the term 'self-sacrifice'. An individual must perceive that his own best interests are bound up with the common weal, before he will surrender or compromise with any interest which seems to conflict therewith. He must draw the conclusion that his own good, while it can be distinguished from the common good, cannot be separated therefrom. An object of loyalty, whether it be Stevenson's 'poor rag of honor', Plato's 'Ideal of the Good'

or Jesus' 'Kingdom of God', must present itself to the individual as an appealing object. It can never be merely an object: it must be an object which is attractive and appealing; an object of loyalty to which the individual desires to surrender anything which is incongruent therewith.

Theoretically, Fite is right in declaring that the exercise of intelligence will make the common weal of mutually adjusted interests an appealing and valuable end for an individual; but, practically, it appears that the will to do this is basic, and that it needs some implementation. For this reason I hold that the meaning which underlies the idea of 'social contract' is basic to our problem of the relation of the individual to the common good. The theory of the social contract has been dismissed by the unthoughtful as nothing but an historical curiosity; but, comprehended in its inwardness of meaning, it is the key to the understanding of the complementary relation of the individual to the common good. The soul of this relation lies in a mutuality which is achieved by what can be called a contract - a contract, to be written in the wills of men, to be intelligent and to treat each other as intelligent beings. In this sense, the contract is equivalent to a covenant. The contract that men need to enter into is that they will be faithful to a mutual understanding of each other. It is only as men stand by such a contract that they can be said to have rights. As I write, the difficulty with our world is that the wrong kind of in-

dividuality is being asserted among nations. Contracts intelligently entered into by means of certain pacts have been unintelligently broken. The 'general will' formed by national 'associates' is being broken by the actual will of certain nations, with the result that, in an interlaced world, the true individualism of the many is sacrificed to the spurious individualism of the contract breakers. Of course, the only binding contract is one in which nothing is hidden from either party and in which there is no initial element of force. If such real contracts may, at any moment, be regarded as 'scraps of paper', then all possibility of a synthesis of individual and common interests is lost. Individualism and the common good must always be held together by a tacit contract that we seek our good together not separately. There is a place, as I have tried to indicate throughout this chapter, for a surrender of my actual will to my real will which is to be discovered in mutual relations with others; there is a place for a surrender of my irrational prejudices to an intelligence which implies mutuality. Only within such a contract do natural rights receive their full significance. As I have indicated in a previous chapter, the way to realize the common good (which would be better called the mutual good) is by deepening the Stoic conception of natural rights. The deeper conception of natural rights is that they are mutual rights which imply a 'contract' to which appeal must be made in the name of justice. Natural rights are rights which must be conceded within a contract of mutuality. A natural right

is not merely a self-assertive 'instinct'. No person possesses a right who will not recognize that he owes a duty to another's right. We need to return to the conception of Aristotle who declared that what anything is by nature is not to be discovered in its origin but in its goal or completion. On this conception, the nature of man is not to be found by going back with Rousseau to find it in the life of the primitive and untrammelled savage; it is rather to be found in man's developing and creative intelligence which implies mutual understanding. "Mutual understanding", writes Fite, "is by its very nature a contract. Assume that A depends upon the action of B, that B knows this; that A knows that B knows this; that B, again, knows that A knows that he knows. There you have the essential features of a contract, expressed in law as the 'meeting of minds'. This meeting of minds is the one fact that binds man together into a state; for no far-reaching obligation is involved in the mere exercise of force. And it may be said that as the citizens of a state advance in intelligence the law becomes less of a police power for the enforcement of order and ever more distinctly the authoritative statement of the terms of a mutual agreement. For this reason I hold that the social relations of self-conscious beings constitute in the most literal sense a contract."²⁴

One cannot write about the complementary

24 "Individualism", by Warner Fite, p.p. 258, 9.

relation of the individual to the common good without being keenly conscious of the chasm between the logical ideal and conditions as they exist in the world. The objection may be raised to any philosophic theory of synthesis on this matter that it is impossible to realize it in practice. Unfortunately, this is at present true. But the size and complexity of the practical problem ought not to deter us from attempting to state it in logical form. The form will be the same whatever the actual conditions may be. Much is to be gained by perceiving the form of the problem. In the previous chapter we have dwelt upon some of the difficulties which the machine age has thrown in the way of a realization in practice of a synthesis of individual and social interests. Especially did we notice the difficulty which is created by the legal fiction which gives the corporation the rights of a natural and intelligent person. The corporation, to some extent, seems to be taking the place of real individuals. "Today", writes Roscoe Pound, "the typical man (for the city dweller, not the farmer, is the type for this time) finds his greatness not in himself and in what he does, but in the corporation he serves. If he is great, he is published to the world as not having done this or that, but as a director in this company or that. If he is small, yet he shines in the reflected glory of the corporation from which he draws a salary."

Furthermore, the machine age has not made any easier the problem of 'the meeting of minds'. No one wishes to under-rate the difficult practical problem of the operation of any social theory - the general will or integration - in our society where it is exceedingly difficult for an individual to be intelligent with regard to the whole. In addition, we have difficulties created by the political machinery of democracies. The politicians usually manage to 'cloud the issue'. It is easy enough on paper for Fite to write: "If there is no contradiction between order and freedom there is of course none between the theory of natural rights and the theory of Socialism - if by Socialism we mean simply that view which stands for a thoroughly comprehensive organization of society."²⁶ Simply! But what a staggering task even for the highest intelligences is set by the ideal of 'a thoroughly comprehensive organization of society'! On paper, it is indeed possible to theorize neatly about the complementary relation of individualism to the common weal, but are we - when we are in possession of this insight - better able to deal with the practical situation? Undoubtedly, we are. The practical difficulties still remain colossal, but they would be altogether unsolvable if approached from the point of view of the old individualism. Formal theories of ethics do not give us specific directions for action in every vexing problem of moral choice but they serve as guiding principles: in their light we see light. "Philosophy is every man's business", says Clarence Ayres,

"The professional students of ethics are only spokesmen for the philosophical insight of all the world. They exist, not to save everyone else from thinking, but to stimulate thought. Theirs is not the impossible task of solving the problem, but that of directing the attention of others to its vastness and difficulty. It is for them to call upon every man, economist and chemist, theologian and geographer, to be an ethicist himself and to play the part which is assigned to him, not narrowly, but with a clear vision of the final significance of his work and of the other sciences as well."²⁷

It is true, as Roscoe Pound says in the article above cited, that "philosophical theories are apt to be like the hero of the freshman's theme who made himself immortal for a great many years". It is true that philosophical theories have in the past appeared to be somewhat of an academic luxury, not making much difference to the haphazard course of the world. But, as our study has shown, even the bad theories have had more influence upon society and individuals than the plain man is able to see. It is a great gain that we have today entered a new era of formative thinking upon social problems. We cannot today conduct our thinking under either of the major premisses of old time individualism or old time socialism. We are beginning to see clearly that we are not shut up to an 'either-or' alternative when we think of individualism and a collective society. "What we can do with assurance is to give over the extreme insistence

on the individual life at the expense of the general security, which has governed the formative era of American political and legal thinking and shaped the institutions of our past, without going to the other extreme of over-insistence on the general security at the expense of the individual life. A valuing in terms of civilization is more likely to lead to a just balance than the theories which obtained in the last century."²⁸

²⁸ "The Problem of an Ordered Society" by Roscoe Pound, in "Religion and Life" Vol. 11, No 1, p. 67.

CHAPTER VIII

THE COMPLEMENTARY RELATION AS INTERPRETED AND IMPLEMENTED
BY CHRISTIANITY

The philosophical and ethical formulation of the relation of the individual to the common good, leads naturally to its religious interpretation and implementation. Human societies appear to point beyond themselves to an ideal society: they themselves appear to stand in a complementary relation to an ideal which is not yet actualized in the social affairs of men. The principle of synthesis which we have adopted demands continually that smaller interests be set aside or modified so that they will fit into a larger whole. Living societies are not closed systems: they are open to influences which are not to be found entirely in their past history. The fact that societies do grow, under the inspiration of individuals who are greater than their society, led Bergson to think that the closed society is to be distinguished from the open society. It is doubtful if this is a valid distinction, for all societies we know of seem to have been open to the leadership of great individuals who have not been altogether enclosed by the customs of their group. But Bergson is faithful to the implication of the relation of the individual to the common good, in seeing that it leads eventually to the concept-

¹ "The Two Sources of Morality and Religion".

ion of the 'open society'. He sees that it leads up into the domain of the great mystics, that is into the realm of religion. And H. J. Paton, in his book, "The Good Will", sees the same thing when he writes his last chapter entitled "The Saint and the Divine Society". Paton writes: "The coherent will cannot be satisfied with a dead or static coherence. Actual revolutionaries may be ignorant, unbalanced, and self-seeking - that is a matter for history and not for philosophy - but the best men, the men who lead rather than follow, the men who are in the profoundest sense better than their society, are, and in general must be, of a revolutionary temperament. That is to say their business is not just to fit in with the existing scheme of things, but rather to alter, and to alter fundamentally, the existing scheme of things in order that they may establish a better."²

So, in this chapter, we turn to inquire briefly how Christianity interprets and implements the form of synthesis which we have accepted. I hold that a large part of the function of Christianity consists in doing this very thing: it pours its power into the mould of the complementary relation of the individual to the common good. Religion - and throughout this chapter I have in mind the Christian religion - widens the area of the common good and intensifies the emotional bond between the individual and his fellow men. We do not, indeed, look to religion for any new logical form of the complementary relation.

2 "The Good Will", by H. J. Paton, p. 413.

The logical principles binding the individual to the common good are the same whether they be found in a political State or a Spiritual community.

For the sake of brevity, I shall confine myself in this chapter, to four main heads. I shall show first that religion deepens the principles involved in the general will theory and suffuses them with an emotional tone; secondly, that religion (Christianity) draws out the deeper implications of the general thesis of this essay, namely that the individual is distinguishable but not separable from society; thirdly, that religion discerns ⁱⁿ the principle of mutuality or integration an activity of the 'inescapable God'; and, lastly, that religion throws the responsibility back upon the individual himself to exercise an intelligent love for his fellow men: it abandons all theories of laissez faire, whether of the 'self-adjusting' mechanism or inevitable evolution, or the pre-determined development of violent class-warfare. The discussion of these points must be necessarily confined to a briefly suggestive treatment.

First, the acceptance of the general will theory as a broad statement of the relation of the individual to the common good, carries with it certain religious implications. The crucial distinction which this theory makes between the actual will and the real will is also basic for religion. The actual will is always directed towards something greater than itself. The actual will knows that it lives to be transcended: it knows that the present experience

is not complete as it stands. The actual will is a kind of unfinished symphony; or perhaps it is but the first draft of a symphony which must be destroyed or altered before the final draft may be written. The phenomenon of religion may be fruitfully approached from the felt incompleteness of the individual's actual will as compared with his real will. The distinction between the actual will and the real will represents a very fundamental human experience. From this point of view, I am led to suspect that my actual willings fall short of my real intentions. I am led to examine very critically my present doings. I become aware of a questioning undertone which demands that I seek for my real motives in all that I do. Does this plan - I ask myself - completely express what I want? Does this action adequately satisfy the deepest within me? Is this production of mine the expression of my real will? For always my real will appears to me as something lying beyond my actual will. I do not completely say and do all that I mean. Men die with half their real purposes unfulfilled. We live in a land of half lights and unrealized aspirations. There is always some 'falling short' of the Ideal. Rufus Jones writes: "...We are forever haunted by something beyond ourselves. Nothing finite satisfies us, no achievement, no attainment ever seems adequate. There is always a 'more yet' stretching beyond our grasp. There is a beyond not only outside us and above us: there is as well a beyond within us. We always carry a ladder with us. We are self-transcendent beings, no more capable of bounding ourselves than of enclosing the sky.

We are forever ourselves plus, and the plus is the main fact. Here lie many of our tragedies, but at the same time this glory of the imperfect, this glory of going on, is a noble inheritance, not from flesh and blood, but from Spirit."³

Here we have, in religious language, the further implications of the general will theory as it inevitably rises into the realm of spiritual aspiration; for we have not apprehended the distinction between the actual and the real will until we have seen that it is, at bottom, a religious distinction. My complacency is disturbed by a Divine discontent for which the only adequate name is God - 'the Beyond who is also within'. It appears therefore that the general will theory, to be true to its own principles, must not rest content with a synthesis which equates the real will of individuals to the general will of the political State. The theory applies to all groups - to families, to larger societies of all kinds, to the State and to every imaginable community. Why should the line be drawn at the State? Why stop short of an inclusive society of humanity? There is no logical reason why the general will theory should be truncated so that it will operate only in small societies. Of course, there are very grave practical difficulties which lie in the way of widening its scope - difficulties of the lack of imagination, of prejudice of race and custom and of what religion calls sin which is nothing less than the preferring of one's actual will to the real will. But, in the general will theory itself, there

is contained no principle of limitation: it is only limited by the poverty of the human material with which it works, or by a tacit agreement to limit its operation to the political State. But Reason dislikes fixed boundaries: it seeks the further implications of its own logic. The logic of the general will theory is suited for larger constructions than that of the political State. Rousseau first conceived the theory as applicable to small States, but he also went on to apply the same principle to federations of States. There is no limit to the theory except the limit of the wills of the 'associates' who may arbitrarily say: 'thus far will we go and no farther.' The 'contract' may be small in scope or it may extend to include all humanity - the principle is the same. All we have to do is to think of Rousseau's 'natural man' as being not only a potential member of a political society, but also a potential member of a kingdom of humanity. As a political theory, the general will theory stops short of its full application to the mutuality of individuals in a common good. Individuals are ultimately spiritual personalities - not mere political units. Religion declares that the relation of the individual and the common good is capable of a larger synthesis than that which is found in the State. The real kingdom of ends is a spiritual kingdom of which the best State in the world will be but an imperfect expression. Here we have the underlying implication of the general will theory. If men are spiritual beings the final synthesis of the individual's good and the common weal lies not in the realm of Caesar but of God - although

it is ideally possible that the latter may include the former. This wider synthesis is necessary because ultimately human beings are spiritual individuals: their real will is God's will. The human individual cannot be abstracted from this wider relationship. St Augustine is the spokesman for the deepest within us when he says: "My heart is restless nor can it be at rest until it finds rest in Thee." Religion, then, makes room for a wider sweep of this complementary relation of the individual to the common good. Christianity has widened the scope of the general will theory by extending it to all humanity. To be 'born of the Spirit' is to enter this realm of wider horizons - the realm of the universal community. "Love of one's neighbor is what we may call a holy and universal rather than a merely personal and arbitrary love; and one's neighbor is to be loved not simply as another and external and finite will, to which, as in the foolish language of altruism, one arbitrarily surrenders one's own finite and personal will, but rather as equally with ourselves a manifestation of the divine and perfect will of God."⁴

Christianity raises the level of the synthesis of the individual and the common good. The synthesis is a spiritual community whose 'general will' is love. But there is this difference which becomes apparent when we thus elicit the further and spiritual implications of the general will theory: the members of the political community, in a real

⁴ "The Good Will", by H. J. Paton, p. 432.

sense, create the State; but the members of the spiritual community do not create God. God is not just merely the spirit of love which is manifested in a spiritual community; not solely the general will of the spiritual community, analogous to the synthesis of the real wills of the 'associates' which form the general will of the State.

The curious paradox of religion is that it always regards the spiritual community as more than mythical, but as already existing as an ideal objective structure - 'The Kingdom of God is among you'. The victory is already won. The synthesis is already achieved in the divine mind. One might think that this certainty of the realization would mean a slackening of human endeavor; but, as a matter of fact, the energy of the members of the spiritual kingdom is in no wise slackened by the faith which amounts to a certainty that the kingdom is already set up in ideally objective form. For the religious man, God's will is already declared, but that certainty acts as an impetus and not a brake upon his human efforts that 'God's will may be done on earth as it is in heaven'. This 'will of God' is not necessarily bound up with fanciful or orthodox conceptions; but the 'saint' - it is hardly to be denied - has grasped a fundamental principle of interpretation and implementation which has heightened and intensified the social activities of his community.

Another 'implementation' which is supplied by

Christianity to the synthesis of the individual and the common good ought to be noticed. For the Christian, his real will is disclosed in the personality and teachings of Jesus. The personality and the teachings cannot be separated. Religion is different from mathematics and science in this respect: we can forget who discovered the mathematical laws, but religion always comes to us in historical settings and intimately connected with great personalities. This is to say that religion can never be adequately stated in a set of ideas cut loose from the personality which gave birth to those ideas. In religion, ideas are suffused with emotion: the ideas come embedded in sentiment. Religion is, to a large extent, a matter of feeling. This is not to say that it is not also a matter of intellectual construction, for great ideas can be coincident with the deepest feeling. One might say that the real will of the Christian is disclosed in the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount. That would be true. One would need to recognize those teachings as representing his real will before the complementary relation of the individual and the common good could be realized in the Christian fashion, that is in the Kingdom of God. But there is another disclosure of our real will in the field of religion. Not ideas alone raise us to a new height of will, but ideas suffused with love for the personality in which those ideas inhere. To say this is not to give way to sentimentality nor to sloppy thinking. The Christian synthesis of the individual and the common good will never be

adequately grasped until our affections have been stirred for the man of Galilee. To grasp his ideas we shall need to know him by the insight of love and appreciation. This again is not an extravagance of statement, for the ideas of the founder of Christianity are bound up with his personality and the times in which he lived. We cannot cut his ideas away from his personality and look at them in isolation.

The Christian maintains that his ideas can stand the clear light of reason; but the real will of the Christian is not found merely in the ideas of Jesus: there is a plus quality of emotional tone which cannot be ignored. To grasp certain objects of knowledge, something that goes by the name of feeling is just as necessary as analytic reasoning.

Speaking of the creations of the artist, G.P. Adams says:

"Here, so much of himself goes into his work that, in order to understand it, there is need to watch the manner in which it issues from the individual's own self. The personality of the originator, whether creator or thinker, becomes so mixed with his product that we cannot go far in comprehending that product without some appreciative insight into the individual self of the originator... To read the 'Divine Comedy' with intelligent understanding is not only to enter into the mind of the man Dante, but into the mind of the medieval age as well."⁵ And again: "An idea, surrounded by feeling and kindled by imagination, is more complex and

⁵ "Idealism and the Modern Age", by G. P. Adams, p. 223.

- one may surely say - more concrete than is idea standing alone. Accordingly, those truths which, once propounded, are intelligible without making any reference to their source in some individual mind and age, may be apprehended by idea alone. But it is otherwise with all such structures as embody within themselves genuinely individual meanings, purposes and deeds..... What I am saying, then, is that there are circumstances in which feeling and imagination, sympathy and love are vehicles of knowledge. Without the functioning of these energies which are other than idea, certain significant structures could not be known and participated in." We have such a structure in the teaching of Jesus: his personality is part of that teaching and cannot be separated therefrom. To grasp his teaching we must love the man - or at least we must sympathetically appreciate him. The real will of the Christian, then, is found not in the teaching of Jesus alone, but in the teaching as issuing from his personality which must be appreciatively understood. The personality of Jesus itself becomes the real will of the Christian. The real will of the apostle Paul, for example, was found not in the teaching of Jesus alone, but in the ascendancy of the personality of Jesus over his own life. The Christian believes that the founder of his religion has placed a unique personality behind the wider synthesis of the individual and the common good. Emerson has said that the

name of Jesus is not so much written into the world's history as ploughed into it. And a modern writer has voiced the conviction of many in our century when he says "Hold our heads as high as we may we shall bow them at the last". It may be objected that the historic Jesus is a very elusive person. That is true; but his personality can be very well known: the influence of the early Church upon the synoptic writers has not been able to prevent the personality of Jesus from shining through their pages. Sympathetically understood, Jesus is still 'our living contemporary'. And, for the Christian, he himself becomes the incarnation of his real will. This, undoubtedly, stands for the even wider recognition of today that any God whom we can love and worship is incarnate in man in so far as the latter is good.

Again, one cannot separate the Kingdom of God from Jesus himself. We apprehend the kingdom of God not in idea alone, but as an appealing and emotional idea issuing from the personality of Jesus. However much more the Kingdom of God may represent, it means that for the Christian the ultimate synthesis of the individual and the common good. And, because of the Christian's relation to him who has been called the Friend of man, that kingdom is implemented by a tremendous emotional appeal. Through the 'universal man' and because of his supremacy over those who are drawn to him, man are able to 'love' individuals of other races and cultures. Strictly speaking the kingdom of humanity exists only in ideal, but it is a powerful ideal to those who accept the

Christian standpoint. It may be true, as some theologians contend, that Jesus regarded the Kingdom as apocalyptic and his ethics as an 'interim ethics'. But for us of a later age the Kingdom is both revealed and waiting to be built by human hands. The principles of the Kingdom remain the same: it is both a revelation of the will of God and the realization of the real will of those who constitute its membership. And all men are potential members by virtue of their common humanity.

It may even be said that if Jesus regarded his ethics as an 'interim ethics' it is somewhat of an advantage to us who have to wrestle with present problems. "It was one of the results of his apocalyptic form of thought that the ethics of Jesus retained an absoluteness which would hardly have been possible if he had been interested in the next steps for the Jews of Palestine in the first century instead of conditions for entrance into the eternal Kingdom of God."⁷

If Jesus had been interested in 'next steps' what we would have had from him would have been some form of the 'actual will' instead of a clear delineation of the 'real will' of those who receive the Kingdom of God as the ultimate synthesis of the individual and the common good.

Christianity, then, has carried the ideal theory of the general will to its ultimate conclusion in Jesus' conception of the Kingdom of God. A great deal is gained if

⁷ "Social Salvation", by J. C. Bennett, p. 78.

we know clearly the goal at which we are aiming. Religious history receives a new interpretation when we look at it from the distinction between the actual and the real will of those who thought they were serving God and their fellows. From the point of view of the actual willings of religious men we can exclaim with Renan, "Religion! what crimes have been wrought in thy name!" But the real will of individuals, so far as they are sincerely religious, must be progressively realized and identified with the 'general will' of God's kingdom. For the Christian, what makes the person of Jesus Christ sublime is that he stands for the real will of individuals compared with which their actual willings are but approximations. Furthermore, he is thought of as standing for the 'general will' of the Christian community, and so for God's will. From this point of view, the Christian only gives him his right name when he calls him divine.

Now, let us place the two following facts side by side: first, the kingdom of God claims to be the embodiment of the real will of its members; second, the ideal State claims to be the embodiment of the real will of its citizens. The same individuals are members of the kingdom of God and citizens striving for the establishment of the ideal political State. In ideal, there need be no clash between the kingdom of God and the State. But, between the State as it is actually constituted and the Church as the imperfect representative of the kingdom of God, there is always the probability of tension. Let us look at the ideal situation

first. The State (in ideal) and the kingdom of God are reciprocal: the kingdom of God needs the State as the arena of its practical activities, and the State needs the kingdom of God to strengthen the spiritual character of its citizens. W. E. Hocking has aptly stated this reciprocal action of Church and State in what he calls the principle of alternation: "Religion ministers to the will in its backstroke, its retreat into itself and into communion with its ultimate sources; as worship, it is a process of recovering grit, grasp, the sense of worth, and thus of recreating and revitalizing the self. The political life ministers to the will in its outstroke, in application of its energy, its formulation in policies of conduct, and its concrete realization of character. In the life of the will the backstroke and the outstroke belong together as alternate phases of a single rhythm. Each phase of this alternation - of which for most men the outstroke is the most prolonged - sets up by its own fatigue and dearth of interest a hunger for the other. The political life is not satisfied with mere outwardness: the State cannot be indifferent to the springs of its own vitality... Without the State, religion is empty; without religion, the State is blind, anaemic, incohesive." ³ It is true that the State needs the kind of men developed within the kingdom of God, and the kingdom of God must find a point of contact with the social life of men. But the possibility of conflict is also apparent. The modern State is, unfortunately, not constructed

8 "Man and the State", p. 425.

upon the ideal lines of the general will theory. Certain vested and pecuniary interests are able to dominate the policies of States. In so-called democracies, the powerful political class is able to control the flow of capital as certain feudal barons were able to control the wealth which moved through their mountain passes. The privileged class is able to see that laws are written and interpreted in their favor, even if the outward semblance of democracy is preserved. The actual State is too often woven out of the actual wills of a minority who have grasped the reins of power by their manipulations under the name of democracy. Christians are no longer thrown to the lions on account of their beliefs, but they may find themselves in concentration camps if they do not believe in war, and the Church will find that it has a battle on its hands if it strikes at the vested pecuniary interests upon which our social order is largely built. A State is necessary to make tangible the common good; but any actual State in which the powerful few, dominated by pecuniary interests, may control the press, the radio, and the politicians, is not the expression of the highest form of the common good. The State must be nourished at its root by those who find their real will expressed in the kingdom of God in which 'there is no respect of persons'. The State has no power but that which its citizens confer upon it; and, in the last resort, the common good is to be achieved through the State, but by the regenerative power of those who acknowledge a wider allegiance. We cannot avoid the possibility that the awakening of the conscience

of the Christian church with regard to its responsibility for the social order may lead to a clash of two totalitarianisms. If so, for the Christian, his real will is to be found in the larger loyalty - what Jesus called the kingdom of God. There are revolutionary seeds in Christianity when it rises for the interpretation and implementation of the common good. H. J. Paton sees this clearly when he writes: "There was a good deal of reason for the persecution of the early Christians. They were indeed bidden to render unto Caesar the things that were Caesar's as well as to render unto God the things that were God's; but however humbly they might submit themselves to existing laws which did not impinge upon their faith, they were none the less a revolutionary force in the ancient world. The reason why modern Christians are seldom persecuted today is that they have ceased to be exponents of a revolutionary religion and have made a compromise with the world. They accept a society which is only half Christianized as something with which they can genuinely cooperate. In this they may be wise, for there is good in our existing societies, and a permanently revolutionary attitude may be hard to maintain and unlikely to secure results. But a religion which becomes respectable is in danger of ceasing to be a religion altogether. Mere convention is more fatal to religion than it is to morality. It is because so much Christianity today is conventional, and not merely because of the new intel-

lectual problems which it has to face, that it seems to be losing rather than gaining the allegiance of men." ⁹ But there is that in Christianity which, if aroused, will give the most adequate interpretation of and implementation to the common good.

The acceptance of the principle that the individual is distinguishable but not separable from society, will mean, when religiously interpreted, a widening of the notion of individual 'salvation'. The individual who is to be 'saved' will no longer be the 'isolated' individual. For too long the Christian Church has worked with the outworn concept of the 'isolated' individual. Christianity has emphasized the inner life as if it could be regarded as separable from the life of the community. For many centuries now the Church has aimed at the cultivation of the emotions of individuals in response to an 'other-worldly' appeal. The ideal religious life of the middle ages was the life of seclusion from the world. If compelled to live in the world, the Christian was taught to believe that he could still be not of it. There was a time when the framework of the old theology was very real to most individuals - it was received without question. Within such theological frameworks as cosmic backgrounds - though differing between themselves - arose great literature such as Dante's Divine Comedy and Milton's Paradise Lost.

The religious individual sought his relation to that supernatural realm rather than to the social order of the mundane world. This supernaturalism lingered on until comparatively recent years, so that 'revivalists' were able to induce an inward glow of feeling which was called conversion. We are beginning to see now that the Church was working with an erroneous psychology of the individual. The correct psychology of the individual in relation to society is well phrased by Josiah Royce as follows: "Practically I cannot be saved alone; theoretically speaking, I cannot find or even define the truth in terms of my individual experience without taking account of my relation to the community of those who know. This community, then, is real whatever is real. And in that community my life is interpreted. When viewed as if I were alone, I, the individual, am not only doomed to failure, but I am lost in folly."¹⁰ It is encouraging that Christian thinkers today are endeavoring to keep close to the social interpretation of the individual, although - perhaps unconsciously - the old conception of the isolated individual sometimes creeps in again. More and more Christian thinkers are realizing how naive it is to think that one can hope to walk straight out into our society as at present constituted and put into practice the ideals of Jesus. What a strange paradox it is that, in our Western civilization which goes by the name of Christendom, the Churches have agreed to an interpretation of Christianity

which is almost Buddhist in its concentration upon the 'isolated' inner life! The Church has been engaged with the devotional aspect of religion and in the interpretation of doctrines: it has regarded religion more as a body of doctrine than as a way of life. But now that, in large areas, the Church has awakened to see that Christianity is primarily a way of life, it has seen that it is an illusion to think that it can be practised within the existing order of society. There is need for repentance on the part of the Church that it has not taken the ethics of Jesus seriously, thereby allowing its Lord to be regarded as a sentimentalist. The Church has too readily acquiesced with the suggestion that the ideals of its Gospel are impractical. It has been slow to realize that it is its function to bring about a social order in which these ideals may be no longer impracticable. It might perhaps be argued that the concentration of religion upon the 'isolated' inner life is resorted to as a compensation for the inroads of the materialism of the present age. This is probably part of the truth. But the other part is that exactly such a religion, strictly confined to the inner life and the interpretation of doctrine, least interferes with those who are selfishly the advocates of the system that exists. There have been some leaders who have seen the challenge which the social order presents to Christianity; but, in the main the Church has naively relied upon the misplaced hope that if individuals could be regenerated one by one the social order would gradually become Christian. This seems to put the cart

before the horse. "The very attempt to secure integration for the individual", writes Dewey, "and through him for society, by means of a deliberate and conscious cultivation of religion, is itself proof of how far the individual has become lost through detachment from acknowledged social values. It is no wonder that when the appeal does not take the form of dogmatic fundamentalism, it tends to terminate in either some form of esoteric occultism or private aestheticism. The sense of wholeness which is urged as the essence of religion can be built up and sustained only through membership in a society which has attained a degree of unity. The attempt to cultivate it first in individuals and then extend it to form an organically unified society is fantasy."¹¹

There is no such individual who can be abstracted from his society and sent back there again to regenerate it. An individual, it is true, can aim to alter the structure of the existing society - as evidence the fact that Dewey wishes to do so - but he does this as existing within the framework of the present order and conditioned by it, not as lifted out of it as an 'isolated individual'. An individual may imagine himself as what he might be if the order from which he can be distinguished but not separated were the actualized kingdom of God. But real individuals are such as can be distinguished but not separated from existing societies.

¹¹ "Individualism - Old and New", p.64.

The crucial question to ask is: what is the existing society from which I cannot be separated? Is it a society which must always remain standing over against the ideal of the kingdom of God? Must I reconcile myself to the conviction that the ideals of Jesus are unattainable by any human society? If so, of what use are the ideals of Jesus when they come to be applied to society? None whatever; for then they will be only a mirage. It makes all the difference in the world if the society from which I cannot be separated has within it possibilities of the ideal kingdom of God. Then, from within, as a distinguishable part of it, I may work for the accomplishment of the ideal. 'Salvation' is not merely a metaphysical concept - it is a practical possibility of actual living, if it means anything at all. We are men of flesh and blood and desire to be 'saved' by our inseparability from an actual kingdom which is being realized in our midst, rather than by our inseparability from an ontological kingdom which is real only in ideal and impossible in actuality. The separation of personal and social Christianity is a confusing one that ought never to have been made. We are dealing, in this connection also, with the complementary relation of the individual and the common good. It is encouraging to know that Christian thinkers are now recognizing that it is a complementary relation and that its only adequate synthesis is to be found in the possible actualization of the kingdom of God. The real meaning of the inner life does not suffer from the recognition of this complementary relation. It may be said that the inner life is richest when

it is not directly aimed at as an end in itself. If one wants to reserve the term religion for an 'inner experience' he might take into consideration the query as to whether it can be best secured by pumping it up through directly 'religious' channels. When one is devoted to a cause he does not need to feel his spiritual pulse to ascertain whether he is obtaining the inner experience - that comes unsought. One ceases to be anxious about his 'personal' salvation in proportion to the degree to which - in obedience to the Christian ideal - he gives himself to raising the level of the society from which he cannot be separated. The shift of emphasis from the inner life of the 'isolated' individual to the social order is perhaps the most significant change which is taking place in Christian thinking today.

Thirdly, Christian thinking sees the synthesis of the individual and the common good as the inescapable working of the will of God. The synthesis is held together not only by the unaided wills of the members of the 'kingdom' but also by the sovereign will of God. Our thesis that the individual is distinguishable but not separable from society is a psychological law; but it may also be regarded religiously as an expression of the will of God. Many religious difficulties have become more acute because the principle of the social interpretation of the individual has not been recognized. We are one; and being one, it is impossible to isolate the consequences of our several acts. The innocent are found to suffer for the guilty. This is not ultimately

unjust unless we are prepared to say that the principle of our thesis is unjust. To try to 'get away with' anything which ignores the fundamental principle of our oneness is, in religious language, to be found fighting against God. Religion exalts the complementary relation of the individual and the common good into a law of God. It sees in it the working out of a divine decree, not autocratic but merely logical. It sees in it a condition of life which cannot be escaped unless to our hurt. There is nothing optional about this principle. Violation of it would be spoken of by religion in terms of 'sin'. To violate it would be to 'fall into the hands of the living God'. Religion names the penalties for the attempted violation of the complementary relation of the individual and the common good. You must love, it says, or be destroyed. You must share, or else you will shrivel in the shell of your own isolation. Call the power which is behind the complementary relation by whatever name you please - the implementation is still there. We may avoid the name, God; but the inexorable working which God represents, we cannot avoid. "The stars in their courses", says Rufus Jones, "have all along fought against Sisera and his kind. The way of the transgressor has proved not only 'difficult' but impossible. The universe is against it. When all the returns are in the transgressor is defeated - he cannot pass. What is 'good' has, like Jacob, been chosen, and what is 'evil' has, like Esau, been rejected. Ideals are always being tried out at the judgment seat of history and in the long run the fittest ideals survive and prevail. The

slow moral gains of the ages are saved and accumulated and a steady addition is made to the primitive stock."¹²

Henry Nelson Wieman has been so impressed with complementary relations that he calls the principle of their working 'God'. He says, "God is that intersection between individuals, groups and ages, which generates and promotes the greatest mutuality of good".¹³ It appears to me that it would be better to say that God's working is discerned in these complementary relations rather than to call the principle of integration itself God. Personally, I cannot conceive of a law such as that of the complementary relation of the individual and the common good - or any law for that matter - unless it is a law derivable from Mind. We have not created this law: it is itself the creation of divine Mind. Law points beyond itself in an analogous way to that in which we have shown that the actual will is transcended by the real will. But if we hesitate to accept Wieman's concept of God as complete, still he has shown how inevitable is the concept of mutuality of good as an expression of God.

Lastly, we shall point out that Christianity insists that the individual's 'good' will be attained in a social order that must be brought about, not by violence, but by intelligence and good will. Against this conviction, there are many who are convinced that the new synthesis of the

¹² "The New Quest" p.p.182,3.

¹³ The Christian Century Vol.49, No 6., p.186

individual and the common good, must inevitably come about by resort to violence. It is usually noted that, in history, the 'haves' have never yielded to the 'have-nots' without force. The advocates of violence point out that force of some kind is already used to support the injustices of our present order. They say that force will never give way to anything but a greater counter-force. A political realist like Harold Laski, for example, would say that the State is never an impartial judge between classes, but is organized for and throws all its force upon, the protection of the 'rights' of the privileged and powerful class. Laski's thesis is "that wherever a class-struggle exists in a society the power of the State will be manifested on the side of those who own the instruments of production in the society which it controls".¹⁴ It is claimed by the advocates of violence that our democratic institutions are based upon the assumption that they will not interfere with the workings of a capitalistic society. Most people in America and England are opposed to Communism and what it brings in its trail, but in a real democracy even a communist is entitled to a hearing. Recently the Congress lodged an objection with a broadcasting company because a communist was allowed an opportunity, along with those of other views, to state his case over the air. It is doubtful if anything like this is wise, even from the point of view of those who detest communism. So far - perhaps

because the chance of a communist being elected was very remote - there has never been any objection in America to printing the name of a communist candidate upon a ballot paper. There is this much to be said for tolerance of all parties, that the exercise of violence and suppression within a democracy - especially the enforced suppression of opinion - is apt to lead to counter violence. It is undeniable that 'under cover' violence has, in recent years, been resorted to by certain corporations. The violence has not all been - far from it - on the side of labor leaders.

Again, there are those who dislike the prospect of violence, but feel that it is likely to be exerted in the struggle for a fairer social order, because the kind of social organization we have does not permit the average man to develop the intelligence of which he is capable.

Nevertheless, the prevailing Christian opinion (there are some exceptions) is against the use of violence. It is undeniable that the method of violence usually destroys more than it gains. Revolutions, presumably aim at a subsequently peaceful society, but it is notorious that they do not appear to be able, as a rule, to 'consume their own children'. Society must have become absolutely corrupt before a revolution can be justified. The temper of the revolutionist is not prone to weigh the value of the 'good' which ought to entitle 'the city to be preserved'. If ever a revolution is justified, it ought not to be resorted to except in a spirit of great wisdom, which is very rare when the fanatical urge to violence takes hold on men. The greater havoc of violence is wrought, as George Soule points out, in the sup-

pression of the counter-revolution which inevitably arises after the original revolutionists have seized the reins of power. The second tyranny is apt to out-tyrannize the first tyranny.

Another point is suggested by the treatment which I have given to the history of Individualism. We have seen how hopeless it was to rely upon the social order to correct its own evils if it was regarded as a 'self-adjusting mechanism'. We have seen the futility of relying upon an unguided evolutionary principle of the survival of the fittest in the social order. Throughout, we have argued for the necessity of applying intelligence and good-will to the construction of society. The laissez-faire doctrines simply have not worked. Now, is the alternative, violence? On the contrary, it appears that the doctrine of inevitable violence is itself a type of laissez-fairism. The Mosaic concept is that the divisions of society, inevitably, as by a pre-determined law, must end in violent revolution. The Marxians are not Utopian socialists: they are determinist socialists - there is something fatalistic about their political theory. Their theory differs only in form from other laissez-faire theories. Their conception of class-struggle issuing in violent revolution is as fixed for them as the law of gravitation. The Marxist would say: 'There is nothing you can do about it; you must simply let matters take their course and end in violent revolution.' They think that every attempt at arbitration is simply deferring the day of reckoning. This theory is

therefore as bad as or worse than the surrender of intelligence to the notion of society as 'a self-adjusting mechanism' or the conception of it as an interplay of forces resulting in the 'survival of the fittest'. If the function of reason is harmony, and that of good-will is to find a way to live peacefully together, surely we do not have to surrender to the so-called inevitable trend of events towards violent revolution. The Marxists seem to be determined to add fuel to the fire of the inevitability of revolution. They have a technique for keeping up the notion that there is no other way of solving our social injustices except that of force. Any genuine effort for peaceful arbitration is branded as hypocrisy. Religion cannot be anything but the disguised minion of the privileged classes. The Marxists act as if they had determined upon revolution, and as if anything else which would open up another solution of the problem of the individual and the common good was to be discouraged. If, for them, revolution is as inevitable as the law of gravitation, they act as if it required a good deal of assistance on their part.

It appears to me that our hope lies in working intelligently with democracy. Our hope lies, not in abolishing democracy but in more intelligent democracy brought about by evangelism, organization and intelligence. The only alternatives to the use of intelligence are aimless drifting or else the unintelligent and fanatical use of force.

The Christian interpretation and implementation of the complementary relation of the individual and the com-

men good is to be found in the inspiration which it adds
 to the human intelligence. But, let us add, that the practical
 solution is always the work of intelligence exercised
 over a large field. If Christian love is virile enough it
 will inspire men to find an intelligent and therefore
 practical synthesis of the individual and the common good.
 But the solution cannot be piously left to a vague faith
 in a 'supernaturalism' that 'God will bring it about'.
 It is true, indeed, that the sought-for kingdom is God's
 kingdom, but it is humanity's kingdom as well: it is a
 kingdom of intelligence and good-will in which every man
 must take his part. The false Christian interpretation that
 would stand by and let God work is only a hindrance to
 an intelligent actualization of the complementary relation
 of the individual and the common good. If religion refuses
 to take an intelligent part in establishing a new individual-
 ism and a richer common weal, leaving the matter 'in God's
 hands', it is simply giving a religious label to another
 futile laissez-faireism.

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